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LIVING WITH THE U.S. MILITARY IN WARTIME CHINA, 1941–1945 
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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation investigates the U.S. military presence in World War II-era 
China, Americans’ first attempt to forge a nominally equal military alliance with a 
non-Western nation. Drawing on overlooked Chinese and English-language sources 
from archives in six countries, it recasts how we view that relationship. Other 
studies attribute the wartime deterioration of Chinese-American relations to the 
contentious relationship between Chinese President Chiang Kai-shek and U.S. 
General Joseph Stilwell, or to conflicting wartime and postwar strategic aims. This 
study, by contrast, shows how the success and failures of the alliance turned upon 
the actions of a far larger cast of characters: GIs and Chinese soldiers, ordinary 
civilians, interpreters, hostel workers, farmers, prostitutes, thieves, bandits, and 
smugglers. It argues that the power asymmetries between these various actors 
permeated all levels of Sino-American interaction, undermining the Guomindang 
government, stoking American feelings of superiority, exacerbating Chinese 
sensitivities about unequal treatment, and making these allies into adversaries even 
after Stilwell left China but also long before Cold War animosities solidified.  
A military occupation, friendly or otherwise, required a daunting set of 
 
 x
arrangements that are rarely examined in detail. Beginning in 1941, as some 70,000 
U.S. troops trickled into China, American commanders and their Chinese hosts set 
about solving knotty problems of alliance management related to providing food, 
lodging, and interpreters. Interactions between GIs and Chinese civilians 
nevertheless proved fraught, particularly in relation to issues of money, legal 
privileges, cultural norms, and sex. As theft, misconduct, and violent encounters 
snowballed, military-to-military relations also deteriorated. From Chinese 
perspectives, the alliance became an occupation. From American perspectives, the 
Chinese became impediments—rather than partners.   
The wartime alliance marked a key turning point in how the United States 
projected power around the world as well as a seminal moment for modern Chinese 
perceptions of Americans. After Japan’s surrender, Chinese Communists would 
exploit local resentment against American servicemen to attack the Chinese 
Nationalists and seize and consolidate power. Meanwhile, the U.S. military’s legal, 
cultural, economic, political, and sexual impact on China set recurring patterns of 
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 In 1942, Chinese soldiers and officials welcomed American troops to China 
with ten-course banquets and toasts to Sino-American friendship. Civilians lined the 
streets of cities like Kunming and Guilin, greeting GIs driving by with shouts of ding 
hao, meaning “very good,” and giving them the thumbs-up sign. Yet a short three 
years later, Chinese interpreters and civilian laborers who worked with the U.S. 
Army walked out of their jobs on strikes, riots by locals protesting widespread GI 
sexual misconduct rocked the wartime capital of Chongqing, and fistfights and 
shootings broke out across the country between Chinese servicemen and their 
supposed American allies. This dissertation explores how, despite such early 
promise and often effective military cooperation between Chinese and U.S. forces, 
Americans’ first attempt to forge a nominally equal alliance with a non-Western 
nation faltered so fully and with such long-lasting consequences.  
 The first American volunteers and military advisors reached China before the 
bombing of Pearl Harbor. Shortly after China became eligible for Lend-Lease 
assistance in May 1941, the American Military Mission to China (AMMISCA) arrived 
in Chongqing to manage aid distribution and advise the Chinese government. 
Around the same time, President Franklin Roosevelt granted tacit approval for 
pilots to resign from the U.S. military and join the American Volunteer Group (AVG), 
the mercenary air squadron, better known as the Flying Tigers, organized by ex-
Army Air Corps Major Claire Chennault to assist the Chinese Air Force. The Chinese 




Nationalists welcomed AMMISCA and the Flying Tigers by establishing an 
interpreter training program in Kunming and building up a network of hostels to 
house and feed the Americans, offering them a Western-style “home away from 
home.”1 When the two nations became formal allies after the U.S. declaration of war, 
military cooperation accelerated even further.  
 The U.S. Army carried out extensive activities in China during World War II, 
particularly air operations. In July 1942, the U.S. Army Air Force disbanded the 
Flying Tigers and incorporated them into the regular military as the China Air Task 
Force, with Chennault retaining command.2 Roosevelt’s special orders re-designated 
the China Air Task Force as the 14th Air Force in March 1943. Headquartered in 
Kunming, the capital of Yunnan, China’s most southwesterly province, the 14th Air 
Force also operated from smaller airfields scattered around Yunnan, Sichuan, 
Guizhou, Hunan, and Guangxi provinces, establishing a stellar combat record in 
missions against Japanese aircraft, shipping, and ground forces.3 By the time Japan 
surrendered in August 1945, 32,000 of the U.S. Army’s 65,000-plus troops in China 
                                                        
1 Huang Renlin, Memoirs of J.L. Huang (Taipei: Ying Zhong chu ban she, 1984), 117.  
2 By early April, Chennault, Chiang, and U.S. Army commanders in China—Joseph Stilwell and John 
Magruder—reached terms on the AVG’s return to the U.S. military, setting July 4 as the date for formal 
induction. Chennault was commissioned as a brigadier general on April 22. See Daniel Ford, Flying 
Tigers: Claire Chennault and His American Volunteers, 1941–1942 (New York: Smithsonian Books, 
2007), 220, 257–258, 263, 270, 303–304.  
3 On the 14th Air Force, see Jack Samson, The Flying Tiger: The True Story of General Claire Chennault 
and the U.S. 14th Air Force in China (Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 2012); Maochun Yu, The Dragon’s War: 
Allied Operations and the Fate of China, 1937–1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 24–45; 
Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China (Washington D.C.: Department of 
the Army, 1953); Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell’s Command Problems 
(Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1955); Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Time 
Runs Out in CBI (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1959); Yunnan sheng dang’an guan ed.云
南省档案馆馆编, Nanwang de Feihudui 难忘的飞虎队 [Unforgettable Flying Tigers] (Kunming: 
Yunnan renmin chu ban she, 2011).  




were men from the 14th Air Force and its maintenance agency, the China Air Service 
Command.4 Personnel from another Army Air Force unit, the Air Transport 
Command (ATC), augmented their numbers, ferrying cargo across “the Hump,” the 
530-mile air route over the eastern Himalayas between Assam, India and Kunming, 
a critical supply line to counter Japan’s blockade that severed China’s air and sea 
links to the outside world. In all, cargo planes delivered nearly 740,000 tons of 
supplies to China over the Hump, including most of the country’s $781 million worth 
of American Lend-Lease aid.5 Meanwhile, America’s most advanced bomber, the 
Boeing B-29 Superfortress, took off from bases near Chengdu between June 1944 
and January 1945 in order to bomb targets in Japan, Manchuria, central China and 
Taiwan.6  
 China also hosted U.S. Army ground forces, with troop strength peaking at 
26,063 men in July 1945.7 These soldiers did not serve in the infantry or other 
combat units but rather staffed the broad range of auxiliary functions needed to 
wage war. The largest organization, the Services of Supply (SOS), performed 
                                                        
4 Theater Planning Section, Subject: Movement of Army Air Forces Out of China Theater, 6 September 
1945; RG 493, Records Related to Histories, 1943–1946, Box 11, Army Air Force China Theater Final 
Report, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD [Hereafter NARA].  
5 Air Transport Command personnel comprised between eight and ten percent of U.S. Army troops in 
the China Theater. See Command in China Theater, undated, RG 493, China Theater of 
Operations/Office of the Commanding General, Black Book China, Box 15, Black Book China #1, 
NARA. On the Hump, see John D. Plating, The Hump: America’s Strategy for Keeping China in World 
War II (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2011). On Lend-Lease values, which are disputed, see 
Zhang Baijia, “China’s Quest for Foreign Military Aid” in Mark Peattie, Edward Drea, and Hans van de 
Ven, eds., The Battle for China: Essays in the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War or 1937–1945 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 303–304; U.S. Department of State, The China White 
Paper, August 1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), 1051.  
6 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Command Problems, 17, 77, 111–115. 
7 Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs Out in CBI, 258.  




logistical work to support to the ATC and 14th Air Force. It also distributed Lend-
Lease supplies to Chinese troops.8 Two American units advised and assisted the 
Chinese Army: the Y-Force (Yunnan Force) Operations Staff and the Chinese Combat 
Command (CCC), which superseded the Y-Force in January 1945.9 Personnel from 
these two commands also served as liaison officers with the Chinese Army during 
the second Burma Campaign in 1944 and 1945. The CCC’s liaison work continued as 
Chinese forces retook Japanese-held territory in southern China over the war’s final 
six months.10 Another U.S. Army command, the Chinese Training Center (CTC), 
operated seven training schools for Chinese forces in Yunnan province.11 Together, 
the Y-Force, CCC, and CTC sought to increase the combat effectiveness of the Chinese 
Army.12 
 To support these military operations, Americans set up a dizzying array of 
intelligence branches in China, more than a dozen in all.13 The largest and most 
important agencies were the Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO), the 
Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and the Office of War Information (OWI). At its 
apex in August 1945, approximately 3,000 American sailors and marines served in 
                                                        
8 For SOS directives, see Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China, 202. See also Richard M. 
Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940–1943 (Washington D.C.: Office of 
the Chief of Military History, 1955), 525–550; Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global 
Logistics and Strategy: 1943–1945 (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1968), 
500–531.  
9 Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs Out in CBI, 156–157.  
10 Historical Report, Office of the G-1, Headquarters, Chinese Combat Command, 6 September 1945; 
RG 493, Records Related to Histories, Box 12, Chinese Combat Command Historical Report, NARA.   
11 Headquarters, Chinese Training Center, Subject: History, Chinese Training Center, 1 October 1945; 
RG 493, Records Related to Histories, Box 14, CTC HQ’s Final Report, NARA.  
12 The Army’s largest training center for Chinese forces, however, was actually located in India, on the 
grounds of a former British POW camp in Ramgarh, Bihar. 
13 Maochun Yu, OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1996), 267.  




SACO, a partnership between Naval Group China, the U.S. Navy’s intelligence unit in 
the China Theater, and China’s Bureau of Investigation and Statistics (The Juntong), 
the Nationalists’ most formidable secret police organization. Americans in SACO 
trained Chinese Nationalist guerrillas, with whom they carried out sabotage and 
mapping operations behind Japanese lines, mostly in preparation for potential U.S. 
landings along the Chinese coast.14 The OSS also trained guerrillas and conducted 
extensive intelligence missions around the country, often cooperating closely with 
the 14th Air Force.15 A non-military organization, the Office of War Information 
translated Chinese periodicals into English, conducted psychological warfare 
operations, and oversaw a propaganda campaign that aimed to create a portrait of 
the United States and the U.S. war effort in China that would appeal to Chinese 
audiences.16  
                                                        
14 Originally criticized as a reactionary organization devoted to annihilating the Chinese Communists 
and strengthening the Nationalists’ most ardent anti-Communists, SACO has been rehabilitated in 
recent years, with scholars demonstrating its contributions to the war effort. See Hong Xiaoxia 洪小
夏, “Kangri zhangzheng shiqi Zhong Mei hezuo suo lunxi” 抗日战争时期中美合作所论析 [An Analysis 
of the Sino-American Cooperative Organization during the War of Resistance], Kangri zhangzheng 
yanjiu 抗日战争研究 (2007: 3): 59–87; Su-Feng Wu 吳淑鳳, “Juntong ju dui Meiguo Zhanlue ju de 
renshi yu hezuo kaizhan”  軍統局對美國戰略局的認識與合作開展 [The Juntong and the OSS: A Study 
of Sino-American Cooperation on Military Intelligence], Guoshiguan guankan 國史館館刊 Vol. 33 
(Sept. 2012): 147–174; Guofangbu junshi qingbao ju ed. 國防部軍事情報局編, ZhongMei hezuo suo 
zhi 中美合作所誌 [Annals of the Sino-American Cooperative Organization], (Taipei: Guofang bu junshi 
qingbao ju, 2011. For earlier accounts, see See Schaller, The U.S. Crusade in China, 231–250; Yu Shen, 
“SACO: An Ambivalent Experience of Sino-American Cooperation during World War II,” unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1995.  
15 Yu, OSS in China.  
16 Matthew D. Johnson, “Propaganda and Sovereignty in Wartime China: Morale Operations and 
Psychological Warfare under the Office of War Information,” Modern Asian Studies 45:2 (2011): 303–
344.  




 These agencies and the U.S. Army all relied on substantial support from their 
Chinese hosts. China’s hostel and interpreter programs provided the backbone and 
lifeblood for the U.S. Army’s ground and air forces in China. Nearly all American 
servicemen lived and ate at the hostels operated by China’s War Area Service Corps 
(WASC), and almost every interaction GIs had with the Chinese Army depended 
upon local interpreters.17 Meat and produce for American troops came from China’s 
farms, and Chinese workers found employment at American offices, motor pools, 
warehouses, and building sites. Conscript laborers from the countryside, both men 
and women, expanded runways for the 14th Air Force and built the 20th Bomber 
Command’s B-29 staging bases near Chengdu. Chinese officials and civilians also 
carried out cultural outreach programs for American troops. In all, Chinese laborers 
who worked to support the American presence far outnumbered the Americans 
themselves.18 
Both the Chinese and the Americans had compelling geopolitical motives for 
ensuring that such cooperation was a success. After four years of total warfare with 
a much stronger foe, Chongqing desperately needed American military aid and 
know-how. The Chinese government’s dependence on the U.S. Army only increased 
as the war dragged on and China’s beleaguered economy continued to deteriorate. 
                                                        
17 Government-trained interpreters also worked alongside American intelligence operatives. Living 
arrangements varied for SACO, the OSS, and other intelligence agencies, but they too relied on the 
Chinese government for their housing.  
18 The Chengdu airfield construction projects alone required the labor of more than 360,000 Chinese.  
See Li Xiaowei 李肖伟, Chaobao dui: Meijun di 20 hangkong dui yu Zhongguo renmin gongtong 
Kangzhan tuji 超堡队：美军第 20 航空队与中国人民共同抗战图集 [Superfortress: Atlas of the U.S. 
20th Bomber Command and the Chinese People’s Joint War of Resistance] (Chengdu, Sichuan renmin 
chu ban she, 2015).  




Partnership with the United States also bestowed prestige upon Chiang’s 
government, particularly after he joined President Roosevelt and British Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill at the November 1943 Cairo Conference, demonstrating 
to his people that, under his leadership, Western leaders had finally begun treating 
China as an equal. And unlike the British and Soviets, with their eyes on Xinjiang, 
Manchuria, and Hong Kong, the Americans seemed to have no territorial ambitions 
in China.  
For American officials, meanwhile, China’s chief value lay in holding down 
more than 600,000 Japanese troops who could otherwise be redeployed to the 
Pacific Theater if the Nationalists fell.19 China also figured centrally in Roosevelt’s 
plans for the postwar era. By promoting China as a great power—one of his “Four 
Policeman” alongside Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union—
Roosevelt sought to legitimize the anti-imperialist credo of his new postwar order 
by including non-white peoples on its highest rung.20 At the same time, whereas 
Moscow saw Communist triumph in China as a means to shift the Asian balance of 
power in its favor, and London sought a weak, divided China that would pose no 
                                                        
19 On Japanese troop numbers in China, see Rana Mitter, Forgotten Ally: China’s World War II, 1937–
1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013), 244; Edward Drea and Hans van de Ven, “ An 
Overview of Major Military Campaigns during the Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1945,” in Mark Peattie, 
Edward Drea, and Hans van de Ven, eds., The Battle for China: Essays in the Military History of the Sino-
Japanese War or 1937–1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 35–39.  
20 Erez Manela, “The Fourth Policeman: FDR’s Vision for China’s Global Role,” April 26, 2013, accessed 
online at www.youtube.com/watch?v=cL9iBD6urfl.  




threat to its colonial possessions, Washington wanted a strong, unified China under 
Chiang Kai-shek.21  
Powerful cultural arguments undergirded these geopolitical rationales for 
effective collaboration. The notion that China and the United States had a “special 
relationship,” in which the United States served as a model for China’s 
modernization, had adherents on both sides of the Pacific, including Major General 
Huang Renlin, director of China’s interpreter and hostel programs.22 For more than 
a decade, the United States had been the most popular destination for Chinese 
exchange students, many of whom sought to use what they learned in the United 
States to strengthen China. By 1941, graduates from American universities played 
an outsized role in Chinese business, higher education, and officialdom.23 In the 
United States, more enlightened thinking about China had also emerged by the 
1930s, as humanizing portrayals of the Chinese, such as Pearl Buck’s bestselling 
novel, The Good Earth, overshadowed earlier, overtly racist depictions, such as the 
Fu Manchu films. Many, from returning missionaries to the Time magazine publisher 
Henry Luce, popularized a view of the Chinese as aspiring Americans, increasingly 
democratic and Christian. The American public embraced this view and 
sympathized deeply with China’s struggle against Japan. The Luce-backed American 
                                                        
21 Alexander V. Pantsov with Steven I. Levine, Mao: The Real Story (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
2012), 343; Yu, OSS in China, 198.  
22 Huang, Memoirs of J.L. Huang, 30–32. On the “Special Relationship,” see Michael Hunt, The Making 
of a Special Relationship: The United States and China to 1914 (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1983), esp. 299–304.  
23 Madeline Hsu, The Good Immigrants: How the Yellow Peril Became the Model Minority (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2015), 50-54. 




aid agency, United China Relief, raised $3.25 million for Chinese humanitarian 
assistance in 1941 alone, equivalent to more than $52 million in 2016 dollars.24 
After the Pacific War began, a series of developments backed up the notion that 
Sino-American relations had entered a new era: the bilateral treaty signed on 
January 11, 1943 relinquishing America’s extraterritorial rights in China, Madame 
Chiang Kai-shek’s acclaimed speech before the U.S. Congress in February, and the 
December 17 Magnuson Act, which repealed Chinese exclusion.25 The end of one 
hundred years of unequal treaties, Chiang announced to his country on January 12, 
“is the most glorious page in our national revival.”26 
Chiang’s overblown pronouncement and this well-known story about a 
golden age for Sino-American relations obscures persistent problems on the ground 
in China during World War II. By 1945, not only did American military commanders 
and diplomats see the Nationalists as corrupt, incompetent, and unwilling to fight 
the Japanese, but ordinary American servicemen, and the Chinese with whom they 
                                                        
24 T. Christopher Jespersen, American Images of China, 1931–1949 (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1996). This calculation is based on U.S. government Consumer Price Index data.  
25 On the repeal of Chinese Exclusion, see Meredith Oyen, The Diplomacy of Migration: Transnational 
Lives and the Making of U.S.-Chinese Relations in the Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), 
13–41. For Song Meiling’s speech and subsequent speaking tour around the United States, see 
Jespersen, American Images of China, 91–107. On the end of extraterritoriality, see Tao Wenzhao, Yang 
Kuisong, and Wang Jianlang 陶文钊，杨奎松，王建朗, Kangri zhanzheng shiqi Zhongguo duiwai 
guanxi 抗日战争时期中国对外关系 [China’s Foreign Relations during the War of Resistance] (Beijing: 
Zhongguo shehui kexue chu ban she, 2008), 368–381.  
26 Chiang Kai-shek, “ZhongMei ZhongYing pingdeng xinyue gaocheng gao quanguo junminshu” 中美
中英平等新約結成全國軍民書 [Announcement to all Soldiers and Civilians on the Conclusion of New 
Equal Treaties between China and the US and China and Great Britain] 12 January 1943, in 中國國民
黨中央委員會，先總統將公思想言論總集 (Taibei: Zhongguo guomindang zhongyang weiyuanhui 
dangshi weiyuanhui, 1984) Vol. 32, 4–7. 




interacted, also regarded one another as adversaries. Frustrated by crime, poor 
living conditions, and the gulf between Henry Luce’s propaganda and the 
hardscrabble reality of life in China, ordinary GIs viewed the Chinese as out to 
swindle or steal from them, and the country as backward and unworthy of American 
aid. Meanwhile, American misconduct, racism, and failure to treat their allies as 
equals alienated Chinese across the entire social structure, from Chiang and his 
trusted generals down to rickshaw pullers, enlisted men, and prostitutes. 
Those who have studied the wartime alliance have overwhelmingly 
attributed the deterioration of Chinese-American relations to the contentious 
relationship between Chiang Kai-shek and U.S. Theater Commander Joseph Stilwell, 
or to conflicting wartime and postwar strategic aims. Early and widely read 
histories dismissed the Chinese Nationalists as corrupt and never really interested 
in fighting the Japanese, preferring instead to hoard American aid and use it to 
eliminate the Chinese Communists.27 This interpretation became the conventional 
                                                        
27 These accounts followed damning portrayals of the Chinese Nationalists in the U.S. State 
Department’s 1949 China White Paper and wartime China-based journalist Theodore White’s 
bestselling 1946 memoir, Thunder Out of China. See Department of State, The China White Paper, 
introduction by Lyman Van Slyke (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970); Theodore White and 
Annalee Jacoby, Thunder Out of China (New York: William Sloane, 1946). See also Theodore White, 
ed., The Stilwell Papers (New York: William Sloane, 1948). The most influential accounts are see 
Herbert Feis, The China Tangle: The American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall 
Mission (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953); Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to 
China; Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Command Problems; Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs 
Out in CBI; Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China (New York: Macmillan, 
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wisdom in the West by the early 1970s.28 Outside the narrow confines of academic 
Chinese history, it endures to this day.29 Revisionist China scholars, who emphasize 
that the Nationalists always remained committed to defeating Japan, nevertheless 
also criticize Stilwell and his staff for their imperious, Orientalist attitudes toward 
their Chinese counterparts and for misguided military decisions that decimated the 
Nationalists’ best armies, leaving the country largely defenseless against Japan’s 
massive 1944 Ichigo Offensive.30 Even scholars who move beyond Stilwell to explain 
why the alliance faltered contend that larger strategic concerns, such as 
Washington’s Europe First Strategy, Chongqing’s desire to recover such lost 
territories as Hong Kong and Outer Mongolia, or emerging U.S.-Soviet rivalry were 
ultimately responsible for undermining ties between the U.S. and Chinese 
governments.31  
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Despite their different emphases, all of these interpretations follow the same 
chronological narrative: U.S.-China ties were strained under Stilwell from early 
1942 until October 1944; they improved once he left and then deteriorated again 
during the Chinese Civil War. Even Hong Zhang, whose work is closer to this project 
methodologically than other studies of wartime relations, adheres to this narrative, 
with her monograph America Perceived examining how “the warm friendship 
fostered during World War II” that Chinese intellectuals felt toward the United 
States transformed into bitterness in the postwar period.32 Yet as this project shows, 
Sino-American ties on the ground in China were at their worst during the final year 
of the Pacific War, after the widely respected General Albert Wedemeyer had 
replaced Stilwell.  
This dissertation recasts how we view this famously rocky alliance and its 
legacies by drawing on new and overlooked Chinese and English-language sources 
from archives in six countries. It argues that the successes and failures of the 
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alliance turned upon the actions of a far larger cast of characters than previously 
recognized: GIs and Chinese soldiers, ordinary civilians, interpreters, hostel 
workers, farmers, prostitutes, thieves, bandits, and smugglers. Power asymmetries 
between these various actors permeated all levels of Sino-American interaction, 
undermining the Nationalist government, stoking American racism and feelings of 
superiority, exacerbating Chinese sensitivities about unequal treatment, and making 
these allies into adversaries even after Stilwell left China but also long before Cold 
War animosities solidified.  
Chinese and U.S. authorities tried to regulate interactions between GIs and 
locals, but such encounters nevertheless proved fraught, particularly around issues 
of money, crime, cultural norms, and sex. And a deep gulf separated American and 
Chinese perceptions of these topics and the alliance’s day-to-day dynamics. From 
American points of view, Chinese hostels provided them with substandard living 
conditions, inedible food, and filthy kitchens and latrines. Looking at interpreters 
and civilian laborers, American troops saw laziness, incompetence, and 
unwillingness to tough it out and behave like real men. All across the China Theater, 
GIs grumbled about local merchants trying to cheat them. Theft became so prevalent 
that American servicemen could not help but see all Chinese—soldiers and civilians 
alike—as potential thieves. American servicemen also became outraged when angry 
crowds began gathering in Chongqing in response to sexual interaction between GIs 
and local women, which locals understood as a rape epidemic. When civilians in 
Chongqing attacked P.B. Smitty, an American military policeman investigating 




sexual assault allegations, an exasperated Smitty told Chinese detectives, “[t]he 
United States provides China with arms and equipment, and the Americans serving 
here get paid back with rocks and clubs.”33 Few GIs would have disagreed with 
Smitty’s assessment. Their grievances filtered up the ranks, reinforcing senior 
officers’ conclusions about Chinese ungratefulness, untrustworthiness, and 
incompetence. From American perspectives, the Chinese became obstacles—rather 
than partners—both in the war effort and in American visions for the postwar 
world.  
From Chinese points of view, by contrast, American servicemen hardly 
behaved as allies. They blamed shortcomings in the hostel and interpreter programs 
on corruption and incompetence rather than acknowledging that economic 
underdevelopment and the ravages of war played the primary role in Chongqing’s 
failure to meet American standards. The U.S. Army’s insistence on granting its own 
headquarters in Chongqing sole jurisdiction over all criminal matters involving 
American servicemen and then failing to adequately supervise its men and punish 
malfeasance facilitated the widespread GI misconduct that Chinese jurists had 
warned about. Reckless driving, frequent assaults against civilians, and negligent 
shootings—among other crimes—convinced ordinary Chinese that every GI was a 
potential source of physical danger. Chinese military commanders and foreign 
affairs officials, already frustrated by American racism and refusal to treat Chinese 
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as equals, grew weary of passing on police reports to U.S. authorities that outlined 
similar crimes over and over again. And as Chongqing’s dependence on the U.S. 
Army increased during the war’s final year, Chiang felt compelled to address 
disputes with his allies using draconian measures that alienated his people and 
almost invariably made life harder for ordinary Chinese. From Chinese perspectives, 
the alliance had become an occupation.  
In order to unpack the enormous consequences of these myriad on-the-
ground encounters, From Allies to Occupiers begins with the 1941 arrival of the first 
American mercenaries and soldiers in China. Chapter one traces China’s first major 
alliance-building initiative: the WASC hostel program, which achieved its aim 
despite intractable financial problems, commodity shortages, and political tensions. 
At its peak in 1945, the program housed and fed nearly 70,000 American 
servicemen, allowing them to enjoy living standards that were out of reach to nearly 
everyone else in China. Chinese soldiers went malnourished while GIs ate their U.S. 
War Department-mandated eighteen ounces of fresh meat per day. Chongqing 
undertook this initiative to demonstrate its commitment to the alliance and show 
that Chinese deserved to be treated as equals, but despite its operational success, 
the program ended up reinforcing American assumptions about Chinese inferiority 
and became a leading source of friction between allies. The service-oriented nature 
of the hostel program replicated patterns of unequal prewar relations, with many 
American soldiers seeing hostel workers as servants rather than comrades. At the 
same time, American commanders became convinced that the entire program was 




an elaborate ruse, designed to cheat the U.S. government and make the U.S. Army do 
the heavy lifting against Japan.  
Chapter two shows that housing and feeding the Americans was just the first 
step in building an alliance: Chinese authorities also had to resolve the 
communication problem. The more than 3,400 college students and recent 
graduates who completed the Chinese government’s interpreter program made the 
alliance a reality by enabling American servicemen to communicate with their hosts. 
Yet challenges besetting the interpreter program and conflicts between GIs and 
interpreters intensified over the course of the war, overshadowing the program’s 
considerable achievements. Chongqing struggled to meet its commitments to 
interpreters—adequate pay, proper uniforms, sufficient food—and failed to satisfy 
U.S. demands in terms of interpreter numbers and language proficiency, while 
interpreters complained about discrimination and mistreatment at the hands of 
American servicemen. These shortcomings frustrated American commanders and 
sapped interpreter morale.  
Chapter three examines encounters between GIs and Chinese civilians, cross-
cultural interactions that mostly took place without the careful mediation of hostel 
staff, interpreters, or other government oversight. Efforts by Chinese and U.S. 
authorities to manage these interactions became increasingly difficult as the 
American military presence in China grew larger and the Chinese economy 
deteriorated. Although the United States repealed extraterritoriality in 1943, the 
U.S. Army maintained sole jurisdiction over all criminal matters involving American 




servicemen in China. Yet the Army failed to adequately supervise its men, punish 
misconduct, or treat violent crimes against Chinese civilians with the same severity 
as similar crimes committed against other GIs. As a result, civilians came to see the 
American presence as a danger. At the same time, rampant theft and occasional 
banditry by civilians outraged GIs, provoking backlash in the form of shootings and 
illegal searches, actions that Chinese considered violations of sovereignty. When 
cross-cultural cooperation did occur, more often that not it involved smuggling and 
black market trading, which had a negative effect on military operations.   
By early 1945, sexual relations between American troops and Chinese 
women became the most explosive threat to the alliance, the subject of chapter four. 
American affluence and Chinese want fueled a boomtown economy based on 
prostitution and alcohol. As the number of American troops in China doubled over 
the winter of 1944 to 1945, misconduct increased proportionally. As drunken GIs 
lurched down the streets, propositioning and pursuing women and striking up 
relationships that spanned from consensual to coerced—but largely alien to Chinese 
culture—a panic over rape swept the country. Violent backlash against American 
troops and the women with whom they associated followed. Senior American 
commanders privately recognized that this crisis had emerged largely as a result of 
American conduct, but theater commander Albert Wedemeyer nevertheless 
publically blamed it on a sensational Chinese newspaper campaign. With little 
leverage, Chiang addressed the crisis by using his police to protect Americans at 
liberty and launching a propaganda effort that portrayed GIs as well behaved 




foreigners whom all Chinese should try to emulate. Chiang’s campaign fell on deaf 
ears as his soldiers began taking matters into their own hands, attacking GIs around 
the country.  
With these broader social contexts in mind, chapter five returns to military-
to-military relations, examining the U.S. military’s training programs, liaison work, 
and other collaborations with the Chinese Army, Air Force, and SACO guerrillas. 
Though there were areas where Chinese and American servicemen regarded one 
another as equals and worked cordially, particularly SACO, friction caused by the 
broader politics of Americans’ “friendly” occupation of China nevertheless also 
colored military affairs. American servicemen expected Chinese officers and men to 
fall into line and follow American advice. As Chinese soldiers developed combat 
experience and confidence, they were less inclined to adhere to this arrangement. 
Combined with a breakdown in discipline as China’s soldiers returned from Burma 
and retook Japanese-held territories in southern China, this issue fueled a sharp 
increase in violent confrontations that continued until after Japan’s surrender. 
Ultimately, most American officers wanted Chinese forces to be under their control, 
and Chinese found such a neo-colonial arrangement completely intolerable. This 
issue led to Stilwell’s recall in October 1944 and it continued to hinder military 
cooperation for the remainder of the war.  
This history has remained hidden for so long because of language inabilities, 
archival access problems, and above all because scholarship has been caught up in 
Cold War wrangling over who lost China. After Mao Zedong’s Communists defeated 




Chiang’s Nationalists in 1949, a toxic political atmosphere on both sides of the 
Pacific rendered any careful assessment of the wartime alliance virtually impossible. 
In China, the soldiers and interpreters who served alongside the Americans ended 
up dead or imprisoned as counterrevolutionaries. Scholars in the United States, 
working without access to Chinese archives until the 1990s or 2000s, focused on 
vindicating the diplomats in wartime China who fell victim to McCarthyite 
accusations that they had “lost” China. The war itself was completely overshadowed 
by what followed.  
As a result, we know far less about wartime U.S.-China relations than we 
know about relations between the United States and its other major allies, or about 
the U.S. military’s experiences in occupied countries.34 An unprecedented number of 
Americans were stationed in China, engaged in intimate contacts with the Chinese.35 
Yet this epic cross-cultural encounter has been boiled down to a story about a few 
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military commanders and diplomats. Only by analyzing social and cultural 
interactions between everyday American servicemen and their hosts, and then 
situating those encounters in the larger, more well-known political and diplomatic 
history of the era, can the stakes of overseas alliance building and the local impact of 
Americans’ presence in China become clear. The wartime alliance was a key turning 
point in how Americans projected power around the world as well as a seminal 
moment for modern Chinese perceptions of the United States. After Japan’s 
surrender, the Chinese Communists would exploit local resentment against 
American servicemen to attack their Nationalist enemies and consolidate power. 
Meanwhile the U.S. military’s legal, cultural, economic, political, and sexual practices 
in China set patterns that would be repeated across East Asia and beyond, stirring 
up trouble during and after the Cold War from Seoul to Saigon. 





I. Making Our Friends at Home: Hostels and Cultural Outreach 
 
 On February 15, 1945, Major General Huang Renlin, the American-educated 
director-general of China’s War Area Service Corps (WASC) spoke to journalists in 
Chongqing about living conditions for U.S. Army personnel in China. Nearly 40,000 
American soldiers were now deployed in the China Theater, half of them living in 
the Kunming area.1 Since December 1942, the WASC had provided American 
servicemen with free board and lodging in a hostel network that stretched across 
much of western China. Huang noted that the daily ration for each man adhered to 
U.S. War Department standards: eighteen ounces of meat, twenty ounces of 
vegetables, twelve ounces each of flour and fruit, four eggs, and smaller portions of 
lard, sugar and salt. In Kunming alone, he said, the WASC supplied American 
personnel with at least fifty cows, eighty pigs, seven hundred chickens, and eighty 
thousand eggs each day. Hostels even kept rotating menus.2 During the 1943 Cairo 
Conference, when President Franklin Roosevelt asked Huang what Americans 
thought about eating yak and water buffalo as opposed to USDA beef, Huang 
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bragged that his chefs were so good, GIs could not tell the difference.3 In addition to 
food and housing, the WASC provided American personnel with fuel, laundry 
service, and hot water. English-speaking Chinese managers supervised large hostel 
staffs that catered to the Americans’ needs.4 These services did not come cheap. In 
fact, Huang told the reporters gathered in Chongqing, WASC expenditures now 
formed the second-largest item on China’s national budget.5 
 Chinese soldiers and civilians lived in a different universe. When General 
Albert Wedemeyer arrived in Chongqing as the new U.S. theater commander in late 
October 1944, he discovered widespread malnourishment, even semi-starvation, 
plaguing Chiang Kai-shek’s armies.6 Seven years of total war had devastated China, 
making sixty to ninety million Chinese into refugees.7 Japan’s 1937 invasion had 
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forced the Nationalists to abandon their capital, Nanjing, and set up a wartime 
government in Chongqing, an inland backwater where they had no existing support 
base.8 The move deprived the Nationalists of ninety percent of their tax revenue and 
eighty-seven percent of their productive capacity.9 For the rest of the war, the 
country suffered from shortages, financial crisis, and ineffective administration, 
undermining practically every government initiative.10 Japanese bombing raids 
terrorized the cities, while conditions in the countryside began to deteriorate by 
1941.11 By 1942, China’s productive output had dropped to levels not seen since the 
1890s.12 Human suffering was worst in Henan province, where famine killed around 
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three million people.13 In southwest China, where nearly all American personnel 
were deployed, tuberculosis, malaria, cholera, and hunger plagued the cities and 
countryside alike.14 Over the winter of 1944 to 1945, the war-torn economy took a 
turn for the worse as Japan’s Ichigo offensive left the harvest in large swathes of 
Hunan, Guangxi, and Jiangxi in Japanese hands. This placed enormous pressure on 
Sichuan and Yunnan, where the government’s grain tax burden reached its peak just 
as new refugees poured in from the east.15 In January 1945 alone, food prices in 
Kunming nearly doubled.16 Meanwhile, tensions between Chongqing and the 
Chinese Communist Party ensured that victory over Japan was unlikely to bring 
peace to China.   
The WASC’s hostel program, however, insulated American personnel from this 
misery. Under Huang Renlin’s leadership, the WASC created a privileged world for 
American servicemen. In so doing, it aimed to demonstrate China’s commitment to 
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the alliance and show its ally that the Chinese could adhere to American standards 
of cleanliness, efficiency, and comfort, thereby earning the right to be treated as 
equals. But by enabling the Americans to live in relative luxury, Huang’s program 
was replete from the outset with subtle forms of domination that reinforced 
American feelings of superiority and aggravated Chinese nationalism. The hostel 
program also placed unsustainable burdens on China’s precarious wartime finances. 
Chiang had expected that U.S. authorities would consider the WASC’s services in any 
future mutual aid settlement. Yet from the start, U.S. military and civil officials 
believed China intended to use the WASC to cheat them. Reverse Lend-Lease 
agreement negotiations to settle China’s expenses dragged on for more than three 
years before failing, leaving Chongqing on the hook for more than CN$35 billion.17 
The Americans also depleted much of Yunnan province’s meat and poultry supplies, 
exacerbating inflation, making life harder for ordinary civilians, and inflaming 
tensions between provincial Governor Long Yun and Chiang Kai-shek.  
Despite living in relative luxury that replicated the unequal treatment American 
servicemen had enjoyed in China’s prewar treaty ports, most U.S. Army personnel in 
China found the WASC’s hostel program never-ending source of frustration. Hostel 
food, facilities, and services elicited complaints from the men in the ranks, while 
American commanders wanted to do away with the WASC altogether. Huang came 
up short in attempting to provide American personnel with a “home away from 
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home.” He tried to address the hostel program’s shortcomings with strengthened 
cultural outreach and liaison work, but these efforts yielded limited results, and the 
U.S. took over many of the functions formerly performed by the WASC. Undertaken 
by the Chinese government to strengthen the alliance and demonstrate that Chinese 
deserved to be treated as equals, the hostel program ended up reinforcing American 
assumptions about Chinese inferiority and became a leading source of friction 
between allies.    
Huang Renlin and the Origins of the WASC Hostel Program 
 On May 9, 1941, Chiang Kai-shek ordered WASC director-general Huang 
Renlin to establish hostels in Yunnan province for the American Volunteer Group 
(AVG), the mercenary pilots, better known as the Flying Tigers, that Chiang had 
recruited to support the Chinese Air Force.18 Huang had directed the WASC since 
Chiang established it on August 8, 1937 as an agency under the Guomindang’s 
National Military Council dedicated to providing relief for Chinese soldiers at the 
front.19 While relief work occupied most of the Corps’ personnel during the first four 
years of the Sino-Japanese War, the WASC also provided food and housing to the 
chief advisor to Chiang’s Air Force, a retired U.S. Army pilot named Claire 
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Chennault.20 When Chennault returned to China in 1941 as AVG commander, 
Chiang’s Personal Attendant Staff (shicongshi), a combined Praetorian Guard and 
elite advisory body, recommended Huang as the “obvious, ideal choice” for hosting 
the American fliers.21 
Huang spoke fluent English and knew American culture well. He had studied at 
missionary schools in China and converted to Christianity before earning degrees 
from Vanderbilt and Columbia during the 1920s.22 Charismatic, outgoing, and 
massive for a Chinese at six-foot three and well over two hundred pounds, Huang 
thrived in the United States. At Vanderbilt, he played volleyball, gave lectures about 
China to church groups, and even won the university’s Founder’s Medal for Oratory 
as a senior with a speech entitled “The Sino-American Relationship: The Key to 
World Peace.” After finishing graduate studies at Columbia, he worked briefly at 
Ford Motor Company’s Highland Park factory, hoping to learn organizational 
methods he could use to assist in China’s modernization. He also traveled to the 
West Coast, where the anti-Chinese racism he encountered contrasted with the 
tolerance he had found while living in a theology student dormitory at Vanderbilt.23 
From an American perspective, Huang embodied Time Inc. publisher Henry Luce’s 
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vision for a China that followed an American path to modernization.24 The American 
policymakers, businessmen, and missionaries with an interest in China during the 
first half of the twentieth century expected China to adhere to and reproduce the 
norms and values of the West if the country wanted to enter the ranks of “civilized” 
nations, and Huang absorbed these norms and values as a student in the United 
States.25 But while cultivating the skills that would lead Chinese colleagues to call 
him a “foreign devil,” Huang also built up the personal connections essential for 
navigating the man-eat-man world of Chinese politics.26  
Before leaving the United States to take a job at the Shanghai YMCA, Huang 
befriended two fellow Chinese Christians: Song Meiling (Mayling Soong) and her 
brother-in-law Kong Xiangxi (H.H. Kung), one of China’s wealthiest bankers. The 
three remained close in Shanghai, where Song introduced Huang to his future wife 
and Kong officiated at the wedding. In 1929, Kong, now China’s Minister for 
Industry, and Song, now Madame Chiang Kai-shek, encouraged Huang to enter 
government service. In March, the Generalissimo commissioned Huang a colonel 
and placed him in charge of the Officers’ Moral Endeavor Association (OMEA), or 
lizhishe, an agency devoted to instilling “an uplifting moral influence” on graduates 
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of the Whampoa Military Academy, the school where Chiang had built up his 
powerbase in the Nationalist Party while serving as commandant in the mid-
1920s.27 Many of Chiang’s core supporters were Whampoa graduates, and Huang’s 
assignment was part of the broader military reforms Chiang launched starting in 
1928 in order to build up an elite professional officer corps and a strong, centralized 
military.28  
As lizhishe director, Huang established a program that introduced American-
style Progressive reform to the Chinese officer corps. During World War I, President 
Woodrow Wilson’s Commission on Training Camp Activities (CTCA) sought to 
create a new American fighting man by eliminating prostitution, venereal disease, 
and drinking from American military training camps. The CTCA cooperated with the 
YMCA, Huang’s former employer, to carry out a recreation program for soldiers that 
stressed abstinence, physical fitness, and other contemporary white middle class 
values.29 Following the YMCA’s model, Huang’s lizhishe nurtured Chinese Army 
officers’ spirits, bodies, and minds with athletics, musical performances, and other 
“wholesome” entertainment. OMEA headquarters in Nanjing and branch offices 
elsewhere forbade the vices traditionally associated with Chinese soldiers: alcohol, 
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gambling, and prostitution.30 Yet as Odd Arne Westad has shown, when Chinese 
internalize worldviews created elsewhere, they adapt them to their own needs.31 
Huang’s lizhishe blended progressive reform with personality cult making by 
producing and disseminating propaganda focused on the Generalissimo and his 
wife.32  
In 1937, Chiang rewarded Huang for his efforts by making him concurrent 
director of the New Life Movement General Association.33 Chiang had launched the 
New Life Movement in 1934 in order to restore national morality by reviving 
traditional Chinese virtues and purging China of habits that weakened the nation: 
disorderly public behavior, poor hygiene, opium smoking, extravagance, and 
gambling, among others. Within the Chinese military, the New Life Movement also 
aimed to strengthen identification with Chiang’s government and unite the country’s 
divided armed forces around a single esprit de corps.34 The movement’s methods 
and goals overlapped with Huang’s OMEA work, so OMEA staff became affiliated 
with the New Life Movement and vice-versa.35  
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Huang had a third responsibility as lizhizhe director: hosting foreign visitors. To 
accomplish its moral uplift mission, each OMEA branch contained dormitories, 
kitchens, and meeting halls for Chinese military officers, which allowed them to 
avoid the “demoralizing influences” readily available at hotels. OMEA headquarters 
in Nanjing resembled an American country club or private university, with a large 
auditorium, riding stables, and numerous athletic facilities. Starting in 1930, Huang 
entertained foreign guests there, including the members of the League of Nation’s 
Lytton Commission, who came to China in 1932 to investigate Japanese aggression 
in Manchuria, and the German military advisors who helped train and equip 
Chiang’s armies between 1934 and 1938.36 Official hospitality had a long tradition in 
Chinese statecraft, and Huang became a skilled practitioner in “treating outsiders 
well in order to win their hearts [怀柔远人].”37  
After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, Chiang renamed the 
Officers’ Moral Endeavor Association the War Area Service Corps and gave Huang 
his wartime mission of serving Chinese and allied fighting forces. Once the Flying 
Tigers departed for China, the WASC devoted itself largely to the latter task. No 
other Chinese had Huang’s combination of experience interacting with foreigners 
and organizational capacity for hosting them in China. His résumé combined 
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unquestioned loyalty to Chiang, faith in using American cultural practices to serve 
China’s modernization, and catering to the needs of visiting foreign dignitaries. 
Chiang’s shicongshi’s confidence in Huang is unsurprising. Feeding and housing the 
AVG, however, presented unique difficulties. Hosting small delegations at the 
OMEA’s well-equipped headquarters in Nanjing, the national capital, was one thing. 
Managing larger groups of pilots and ground crews in Yunnan, an impoverished, 
isolated province ruled by an autonomous military governor, was something else 
entirely. The WASC faced unprecedented financial, logistical, and political 
challenges. The cultural barriers Huang’s project entailed, however, were no less 
significant.   
Promise and Peril 
The AVG’s arrival launched the informal phase of the wartime Sino-U.S. alliance, 
and many Chinese saw immense promise in partnership with the United States. As a 
whole, Chinese viewed the United States more favorably than they did other 
Western countries, at least in part because America possessed unparalleled wealth 
and power, twin preoccupations that had animated the minds of China’s officials and 
intelligentsia for more than half a century.38 The meaning of American wealth and 
power to China’s struggle is illustrated in this 1939 Eastern Miscellany cartoon [See 
figure 1.1.], where Lady Liberty steers a U.S. warship toward the Far East, and the 
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Japanese devil lies bleeding and helpless when confronted with America’s 
overwhelming might. While Japan had modern industry and military power that 
China lacked, the United States had the strength to make short work of the hated 
Japanese invaders, the cartoonist emphasized. Throughout the 1937–1941 phase of 
the Sino-Japanese War, Chinese journalists closely monitored the possibility of the 
United States joining the fight. They became more optimistic after the Roosevelt 
Administration froze Japanese assets in July 1941 and imposed an oil embargo in 
August.39 With China too weak to take the offensive, and the Soviets and Britain 
reeling in the face of Germany’s advances, Wenhui Daily editor Chu Yukun channeled 
Henry Luce in writing “the future of humanity depends on America’s actions.”40  
For Huang, an alliance with the United States also fulfilled personal ambitions. 
His linguistic and cultural expertise would increase his value to Chiang if more 
American troops came to China. According to Huang’s memoir, living in the United 
States had enabled him to develop independent thinking skills and a devotion to 
service. So when he returned to China, he made a “secret vow that whenever 
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possible I want in return to show my hospitality and to render any service toward 








Many Americans also welcomed the prospect of a Sino-U.S. alliance. The notion 
that China and America enjoyed a “special relationship” had wide appeal in the 
United States. Special relationship adherents believed that the Chinese wanted, or 
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should want, to become more like Americans, and that the United States served as a 
benevolent and admired guide in China’s modernization.42 Belief in the special 
relationship dovetailed with the messianic impulse in U.S. foreign policy, and the 
prospect of Americanizing China had long animated the minds of missionaries and 
secular modernizers alike.43 Missionaries, and people connected with the 
missionary movement, like the popular author Pearl Buck, shaped American 
perceptions of China more than any other group during the first half of the 
twentieth century, and they believed the Chinese were capable of adopting Western 
practices and beliefs.44 Buck repeated this idea in public lectures after her 1931 
novel about peasant life in China, The Good Earth, made her famous.45 Henry Luce 
also devoted tremendous energy to promoting the idea of an Americanizing China. 
The China-born son of Presbyterian missionaries, Luce dominated American 
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journalism in the 1930s and 1940s, and his publications—particularly Time and 
Life—consistently portrayed China under Chiang Kai-shek as developing in an 
American way thanks to benevolent American guidance. Buck, Luce, and other 
special relationship adherents pushed vigorously for a stronger U.S. commitment to 
China during the country’s 1937–1941 struggle against Japan.46 For them, a Sino-
U.S. alliance would kick China’s inevitable Americanization into high gear.  
The special relationship idea, however, rested on paternalistic foundations. It 
accepted Chinese as equals only if the Chinese themselves aspired to be more like 
white American Protestants. Even the most sympathetic representations of the 
Chinese in prewar American popular culture—The Good Earth’s O’Lan and Wang 
Lung, and Detective Charlie Chan of the eponymous Hollywood film series—
reinforced the belief in American cultural superiority. Amiable detective Charlie 
Chan was acceptable because he spoke English and had assimilated to American 
culture.47 And while many scholars have praised Buck for humanizing the Chinese, 
her novel still perpetuated negative stereotypes: she described O’Lan, the female 
lead, as a simple creature living only for the pleasure of her husband and portrayed 
China as a timeless, unchanging, and backward agrarian land.48 The popular 1937 
MGM film adaptation of her book exaggerated stereotypes about Chinese self-
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effacement and disdain for female children to ludicrous extremes.49 White actors 
also played the leading Chinese roles in the film.  
Despite efforts by Luce, Buck, and others to humanize the Chinese and portray 
them as increasingly American, more negative stereotypes still endured. According 
to classic Orientalist tropes, the Chinese placed a low value on human life and were 
dishonest, devious, and cruel.50 Charlie Chan aside, most films portrayed Chinese 
people in unflattering terms, eliciting repeated complaints from the Chinese 
government during the 1920s and 1930s.51 In perhaps the most egregious example, 
Boris Karloff donned yellow-face in MGM’s 1932 hit film, The Mask of Dr. Fu Manchu. 
A diabolical madman, Karloff’s Fu Manchu lusted after white women, entertained 
himself with a torture chamber, and sought to lead all of Asia in an uprising as 
“Genghis Khan come to life again.”52 Meanwhile, the first Chinese-American movie 
star, Anna May Wong, played characters that perpetuated negative stereotypes 
about Chinese women in films like Forty Winks (1925) and Tiger Bay (1933).53 
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Popular writing on China also belittled the Chinese. Carl Crow, an advertising agent 
and writer who first came to China in 1911, argued in his most popular book, Four 
Hundred Million Customers (1938), that the “Chinese mind has distinctive feminine 
traits,” and criticized the Chinese for their “timorous avoidance of responsibility.” 
He also wrote that “observant and intelligent” foreigners who had lived many years 
in China had “a better knowledge of the Chinese than they [the Chinese] have of 
themselves.”54 His gendered and infantilizing views of the Chinese fit into American 
patterns of denigrating non-whites that dated to the nineteenth century.55 And few 
China experts, perhaps only Buck, enjoyed a larger readership in the United States.56  
Another factor that shaped American understanding of China and presented 
obstacles to effective wartime cooperation, particularly within the armed forces, 
was the prewar U.S. military experience in China. The U.S. Army’s 15th Infantry 
Regiment, the Navy’s Yangtze Patrol, and elements of the U.S. Marine Corps had 
spent decades in China, creating lasting institutional memory and preparing many of 
the men who would occupy senior wartime command posts in China, including 
generals John Magruder, Joseph Stilwell, Frank Dorn, and Albert Wedemeyer.57 As 
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one marine remembered, these men enjoyed a privileged life: “you don’t shine your 
own shoes; you don’t fill your own canteen; you don’t shave yourself; the chink 
coolies do it for you.”58 Disparaging views of the Chinese—often referred to as 
“chinks” in the 15th’s regimental newspaper, The Sentinel—were commonplace.59 
When Brigadier General Joseph Castner, commander of the 15th, reported a hostile 
encounter between then Major Joseph Stilwell and a group of Chinese civilians to 
the Army Chief of Staff in 1927, he wrote, “the average mind of the average Chinese, 
in my opinion, is little above that of one of our five year old children, with apologies 
to our children of that age.”60 Stilwell’s fellow major, John Magruder, found the 
Chinese “unalterably unified in racial sentiment” against outsiders.61 Stilwell was 
U.S. military attaché in China when the Sino-Japanese broke out in 1937, and he and 
his assistant, Colonel Frank Dorn, saw the Chinese war effort through the same 
Orientalist lens.62 “Chinese military philosophy had remained unchanged for 
centuries,” reported Dorn, who castigated China’s “whimsically childish” 
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commanders for “military conceptions suited to bow-and-arrow times.”63 Dorn also 
concluded that Chinese soldiers “had no sense of national patriotism,” a sweeping 
and erroneous judgment.64 American servicemen in prewar China grew accustomed 
to being treated as superiors, and like Carl Crow, they developed unquestioned 
confidence in their superior understanding of the country. To them, Chinese 
inferiority was a fact of life. Granted, China lacked a modern, well-equipped military, 
but the U.S. military’s China veterans erred in thinking that they had all the answers.  
 No AVG volunteer or American serviceman came to China untouched by 
prewar representations or the prewar U.S. military experience. They provided a 
framework for how to act in China and how to structure one’s relations with the 
Chinese. GIs and AVG men were there to save the country, and they should expect 
the Chinese to see them as harbingers of modernization. Chinese should naturally, 
and invariably, follow American advice. Yet having been conditioned to view the 
Chinese in generalized, bifurcated terms—the devious Fu Manchu versus the 
Americanized Charlie Chan—GIs also had to be wary. Some Chinese would try to 
cheat them, and backward-thinking military officers would stand in the way of 
China’s march toward American-style modernity with their incompetence, 
corruption, or laziness.65 This line of thinking all but ensured that Americans would 
blame the Chinese whenever any disagreement or misunderstanding occurred.  
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No Chinese, for that matter, regardless of their pro-American inclinations, could 
overlook the realities of U.S. China policy and anti-Chinese racism. The U.S. had 
codified Chinese inferiority with the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, which singled out 
the Chinese as uniquely unworthy of American citizenship.66 Exclusion, which 
affected every aspect of Chinese life in America, remained the law of the land even 
as the WASC prepared for the AVG’s arrival.67 Yet all through the Exclusion decades, 
American citizens could enter and exit China freely. Americans in China also enjoyed 
exemption from Chinese law under the system of extraterritoriality, which since 
1906 had given the U.S. District Court of China sole jurisdiction over all criminal 
matters regarding American citizens in China.68 Extraterritoriality emphasized 
inferiority no less than Exclusion, because it was premised on the inadequacy of 
local laws.69 Both exclusion and extraterritoriality belied longstanding American 
claims about Sino-American friendship and remained lightning rods for nationalist 
resentment. Even Nationalist government-approved history textbooks used during 
the Nanjing decade (1927–1937) described the United States as an imperialist 
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country.70 And Chiang Kai-shek himself was skeptical of American values and 
institutions.71   
Finally, even thought the August 1941 oil embargo and Roosevelt’s tacit 
approval of the AVG signaled a firmer U.S. commitment to China, these actions 
followed years of disappointing U.S. policy. Between 1937 and 1941, Chinese 
observers tied themselves in knots over Washington’s two-faced China policy: 
fueling Japan’s war machine while offering China non-military goods.72 These two 
1939 Eastern Miscellany cartoons [see images 1.2 and 1.3] illustrate Chinese 
frustrations, as Uncle Sam provides weapons to the Japanese but only medicine and 
money to China. Even Colonel David Barrett, assistant military attaché in Chongqing, 
recognized the hypocrisy. “The Chinese people must be given credit,” he wrote in a 
January 1940 intelligence report, “for the restraint which they have viewed the 
picture of the United States professing the warmest sympathy for China in her 
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struggle against Japan and at the same time aiding China’s enemy by selling her 
millions of dollars a month worth of material for making war.”73  
 
Figure 1.2: “It’s time for the United States to abandon its two-faced China policy; 
it must offer China greater support.” The Eastern Miscellany Issue 22 (1939).  
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Figure 1.3: “Why won’t the United States abandon its two-faced China policy?” 
The Eastern Miscellany Issue 5 (1940). 
  
  The first AVG volunteers and American servicemen therefore arrived in 
China believing they had come to save the country, and their Chinese hosts 
welcomed them with a mix of wariness and high expectations. Americans saw 
themselves as saviors because their culture had conditioned them to view the 
Chinese as a backward yet redeemable people who needed American help and 
welcomed Americanization. The Chinese certainly wanted American help. They 
recognized that unlike China, the United States was a powerful country with 
unparalleled industrial might and a formidable modern military. But years of war 
with Japan had heightened their sensitivity to imperialism and Western claims of 
superiority. Any American behavior that reeked of bigotry or haughtiness was sure 




to cause offense. This cultural baggage ensured that tensions would never be far 
from the surface.  
Early Setbacks  
Huang began preparing for the American Volunteer Group’s arrival in the 
summer of 1941, and Chiang granted him unlimited authority to keep the AVG men 
“healthy and happy, irrespective of cost and effort.”74 The WASC director-general 
transferred his headquarters to Kunming, the AVG’s intended base. For many years, 
the Nationalist government’s relations with Long Yun, the regional militarist who 
had run Yunnan province since 1927, had been strained, but Long offered Huang his 
full cooperation by granting him free use of Kunming’s Agricultural College as the 
site of Huang’s new headquarters and the WASC’s first hostel.75 Meanwhile, China’s 
Commission on Aeronautical Affairs, the central government agency in charge of 
military airfields, turned over buildings at various provincial airfields for AVG use. 
Huang also worked with the China-Burma Transportation Administration to 
refurbish eight service stations along the Burma Road, which connected Kunming to 
Lashio and Rangoon, for American use.76 Sparing no expense, Huang renovated 
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these facilities and equipped them with bedding, furniture, plumbing, kitchens, and 
well-appointed mess halls. In all, he spent around CN$40 million, or U.S.$2 million at 
the official 20:1 exchange rate. He also began hiring staff and training English-
speaking secretaries for work as hostel managers. In order to “to ensure a speedy 
and effective administration” in accordance with “American efficiency” standards, 
Huang divided the far-flung hostels into four districts and gave each district director 
access to sizeable revolving fund. He also appointed an American-born Chinese as 
his associate director-general in another move to strengthen cross-cultural 
cooperation.77  
Huang’s preparatory work aimed to replicate American cultural forms—spatial, 
linguistic and organizational—while also drawing his guests into the Chinese socio-
cultural construct known as guanxi. Loosely translated as “connections” or 
“relationships,” guanxi refers to the system of mutual commitment, loyalty, and 
obligation in Chinese social relations. If two people have guanxi, each can ask a favor 
of the other with the expectation that the debt incurred will be repaid in the 
future.78 By giving the Americans the creature comforts they were accustomed to, 
Huang sought to encourage a cooperative attitude and pave the way for future 
collaboration. At the same time, Huang wanted to prevent the Americans from 
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having encounters with the Chinese that would confirm any assumptions they might 
have about Chinese inferiority. Competent, English-speaking Chinese staff, efficient 
administration, and clean, well-appointed hostels would show the Americans that 
Huang, and the Chinese more broadly, adhered to American standards.  
Huang’s first guests, the AVG and the American Military Mission to China 
(AMMISCA), began arriving in the fall, and they were impressed with the WASC’s 
arrangements, but not entirely as Huang had desired. The WASC director-general 
laid out the red carpet, cultivating guanxi with sumptuous banquets, lengthy toasts, 
and exotic gifts. Colonel Edward MacMoreland, chief-of-staff to AMMISCA’s 
commander, prewar Tianjin 15th Infantry veteran John Magruder, described Huang 
as “one of the most capable Chinese I have met,” and Kunming’s AVG hostel as 
“easily the best place in town.” “The WASC is, on the whole,” he concluded before 
returning to Washington, “doing a very good job, surprisingly so…”79 AVG men also 
enjoyed the banquets and the Chinese drama performances that the WASC hosted in 
their honor.80 Hostel life had its perks too. “The Chinese did everything,” recalled 
John Allison, an AVG pilot based in Kunming, “they cooked the food, they served the 
food, they cleaned your room, they made your bed.”81 Allison was impressed, but his 
remarks reveal the fine line between service and servility, showing that AVG hostels 
replicated patterns of Sino-American interaction from the prewar treaty ports, 
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where “chink coolies” waited on GIs and marines. Living in the best place in 
Kunming also reinforced the idea that Americans had come to China as saviors 
rather than equals. At the same time, MacMoreland’s satisfaction with the WASC’s 
services did little to alter his overall impression of China. He found the banquets 
wasteful and opulent, evidence of Nationalist Party corruption, and also concluded 
that the Chinese intended to blackmail the U.S. because they wanted “someone else 
to win the war for them.”82 Whereas Huang saw elaborate banquets as a crucial 
guanxi-building tool, MacMoreland understood them as part of ruse to make the U.S. 
military do the heavy lifting against Japan.  
Brigadier General Magruder, and his replacement, Lieutenant General Joseph 
Stilwell, who took over as commander of U.S. forces in the China-Burma-India 
Theater in early March 1942, agreed with MacMoreland’s assessment, so the U.S. 
Army sought to reach an agreement with the WASC that would carefully delineate 
its responsibilities to U.S. forces in order to protect the Army from being swindled.83 
On July 4, the WASC signed a provisional agreement with the U.S. Army’s logistical 
branch, the Services of Supply (SOS).84 The Corps would house and feed American 
servicemen, and the U.S. Army would reimburse the Chinese government CN$85 
(equivalent to $4.25 at the official exchange rate) per day for each man. The WASC 
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would also provide U.S. forces with 18,000 gallons of gasoline per month and 
maintain skeleton staffs at more than twenty unoccupied hostels in case of sudden 
changes in U.S. Army deployments. Compensation for future construction, however, 
was left unresolved because the U.S. Army and China’s Commission on Aeronautical 
Affairs disagreed widely about the proportion of costs to be borne by the 
Americans.85  
Despite signing on to the agreement, Huang and his staff found it troubling, 
describing it as “another ‘Unequal Treaty’ entered into by the Chinese government.” 
Just as Western countries had used their military prowess to dictate harsh terms to 
the Qing government following the Opium War and Boxer Uprising, the U.S. Army, 
Huang believed, had used its leverage to press the WASC into accepting conditions 
that would be impossible to meet while offering China little in return. When Chinese 
Army Chief of Staff He Yingqin approved an extension of the provisional agreement 
at Stilwell’s request in late August without first notifying Huang, the WASC 
secretary-general was livid.86  
After hearing news of the extension, Huang wrote a long memorandum to 
Brigadier General Raymond Wheeler, SOS commander in China, outlining his 
grievances. According to Huang, agreeing to a CN$85 per diem had been a mistake, 
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because due to inflation the actual cost per man to the WASC averaged over CN$120 
each day. Stilwell, however, had insisted on sticking with the original rate, telling He 
Yingqin, “a man could stay comfortably in large hotels in America” for $4.25 per day. 
“I wonder,” Huang told Wheeler, “if that statement insinuated something or was it 
simply made by one ignorant of the present cost of living in China.”87 Having 
struggled with limited means to allow the Americans to live in comfort, Huang took 
offense at Stilwell’s veiled remark, which implied that the WASC intended to bilk the 
U.S. Army. Making matters worse, the U.S. Army lagged behind in its repayments, 
with accounts of CN$3 million dating back to June still in arrears. “We fail to 
understand why it has taken the proper authorities so long to make the necessary 
payment,” Huang continued. Nor had the U.S. Army reimbursed the WASC for any 
repairs or renovations, which Huang had funded and arranged voluntarily since the 
construction issue remained unsolved. Meanwhile, staffing twenty-three unoccupied 
hostels added further strains to the WASC’s precarious finances, as did paying for 
gasoline, most of which came from refineries in Yumen, Gansu province, over 2,600 
kilometers northwest of Kunming over primitive roads.88 Keeping the Americans 
“healthy and happy, irrespective of cost and effort,” as per Chiang’s instructions, had 
stretched the WASC’s finances, and Huang’s patience, to their limits.   
Huang admitted to shortcomings in the WASC’s hostel work but he stressed that 
the real issue was the U.S. Army’s refusal to recognize wartime conditions in China. 
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In expecting the Corps to adhere to U.S. War Department regulations and red tape 
regarding accounting procedures, construction, diet, and housing, the Americans 
“fail[ed] to understand what extreme hardships China has gone through during 
these five years of war against a much stronger foe,” Huang told Wheeler. Huang 
cited numerous instances, such as Stilwell’s quip about the per diem rate, in which 
Americans servicemen insinuated or flat out accused the Chinese of swindling them: 
the cost of fuel, the WASC’s adherence to the Chinese government’s official 20:1 
exchange rate, or prices for services beyond the scope of the July 4 agreement that 
Americans had nonetheless insisted on, like barbers, mechanics, or chauffeurs. 
“These accusations have become so obnoxious that we hate to take on any more 
service than is prescribed as service proper” in the July 4 agreement, Huang wrote. 
Perhaps most troubling, he concluded, was that WASC “work has been handicapped 
because so many Americans think they are crusaders in China and fail to treat their 
Chinese co-workers as comrades-in-arms.” GIs interacted with Chinese exactly how 
representations of the Chinese in the United States had conditioned them to, which, 
in Chinese eyes, belittled China’s wartime sacrifices and revealed that Americans 
were not ready to treat them as equals. Huang ended by warning that he would be 
resigning his directorship in two months, even if it meant punishment from Chiang. 
“During the next two months,” he told Wheeler, “ you ought to look for your own 
administrative personnel and necessary staff of cooks and boys who will no doubt 




render you the better and more satisfactory service that your representatives so 
insist on.”89  
In response to the U.S. Army’s continued complaints, Chiang decided in late 
November that the WASC would provide free boarding and lodging for all American 
personnel starting December 1.90 American complaints and Chinese recriminations 
regarding WASC arrangements had strained Sino-U.S. ties, turning China’s first 
major alliance-building initiative into a major source of distrust. With his unilateral 
decision, Chiang kept Huang on the job. But the reimbursement issue remained 
unsettled. On June 2, China and the United States had signed a Mutual Aid 
Agreement, which stipulated that “full cognizance shall be taken of all property, 
services, information, facilities and other benefits or considerations provided by the 
Government of the Republic of China” in the final determination of any mutual aid 
settlement between the two countries.91 This clause opened the door to a future 
reverse Lend-Lease agreement that would include the WASC’s expenses. Of course, 
in any such settlement, Chinese and American negotiators would have to agree on 
exchange rates, services rendered, and a host of other details. Given the contentious 
discussions they had had so far, this scenario seemed unlikely. In the meantime, the 
WASC would treat the growing U.S military deployment in China the same way they 
had treated the AVG, as free guests of the Chinese government.  
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Needy Guests, Lousy Hosts 
 When Chiang decided to provide free board and lodging to American 
servicemen, the U.S. Army had just over 1,000 men deployed in China, but this 
number climbed quickly, reaching 22,000 by June 1944.92 As more men arrived, the 
WASC had to expand existing facilities and build new hostels. The expanded 
American presence gave rise to land use disputes, bureaucratic confusion, food 
shortages, and soaring costs. Friction between Chinese and American commanders 
increased as a result, as did tensions between Chiang Kai-shek and Long Yun’s 
government in Kunming. But despite these problems, Washington and Chongqing 
moved no closer to resolving the compensation question.  
 Land use disputes and bureaucratic confusion dogged initial efforts to 
accommodate the growing U.S. military presence. Part of the problem stemmed 
from the WASC’s informal Flying Tiger-era arrangements. In 1941 and 1942, China’s 
relevant stakeholders—the War Area Service Corps, Yunnan provincial government, 
the Commission on Aeronautical Affairs, and the Yunnan-Burma Highway 
Administration—eagerly accommodated the AVG’s needs, but nothing ever got put 
down in writing. This became a problem when the U.S. Army requested hostel 
expansions in early 1943. China’s 5th Route Air Force Headquarters in Kunming told 
the Americans to check with the National Engineering Commission in Chongqing, 
which in turn told them to go back and get permission for the Air Force in Kunming. 
                                                        
92 Headquarters, Advance Section No. 1, SOS CBI Theater, Office of the Judge Advocate, Subject: Cost of 
subsistence at WASC Hostels, 27 August 1944, RG 493, SOS, China Theater/Interpreter Affairs 
Section, Correspondence 1942–1945, Box 246, Subsistence total costs 1942–1944, NARA. 




Weary of Kafkaesque bureaucratic delays and the effect overcrowding and living in 
tents could have on GI morale, the Army’s Services of Supply (SOS) hired local 
contractors and began construction without approval. Long Yun saw this as an 
encroachment on his authority so he ordered the contractors to halt their work. U.S. 
authorities protested to Long and Chiang in response, and the two men sparred over 
the U.S. military’s land use rights all the way until early 1944, causing further delays 
and greater American frustration.93 Chiang decreed on November 27, 1943 that the 
central government would purchase any land that the U.S. Army needed for hostels 
or other uses in Yunnan and that the Americans could use such land for the duration 
of the war.94 Yet as late as January 1944, Long refused to sanction this 
arrangement.95 As a result, hostel facilities in Yunnan remained inadequate, 
compelling many GIs to live in tents.  
 Feeding the Americans also became a problem. According to Long Yun, 
providing American servicemen with their U.S. War Department-mandated eighteen 
ounces of meat per day fueled skyrocketing beef prices in Yunnan. Agricultural 
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output also suffered because farmers sold off the water buffalos they used to plow 
their land in order to take advantage of soaring prices.96 So when Minister of War He 
Yingqin forwarded Long a request from Stilwell on January 21, asking for fresh beef 
from Kunming to be used to feed American and Chinese soldiers in India, the 
Yunnan governor refused to comply. “The number of American troops in Kunming 
county increases daily,” Long wrote in a memo to the Yunnan Civil Affairs 
Department, “and their consumption needs are massive…they need thirty head of 
cattle each day, and recently news has spread that this could increase to eighty or 
ninety. There is no way Yunnan can meet this shocking number.”97 Long banned 
foodstuff exports to India and ordered that all meat and vegetables sales for 
American use in Yunnan go through local government agencies and adhere to 
market prices.98 To keep prices stable, the Yunnan Price Control Committee fixed 
beef prices at CN$45 per half kilogram starting on February 16.99 Not until February 
22, however, did Long reply to He Yingqin, stating that Yunnan had no way of 
meeting American demands in Yunnan province, let alone in India.100 Kunming 
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Mayor Luo Peirong backed Long, reporting on March 21 that they could not meet 
the needs of both Kunming’s people and the U.S. military.101 
Chongqing and the U.S. Army ultimately pressured Long to prioritize feeding GIs 
over the needs of Yunnan’s people. SOS Colonel Lewis Jordan, the Army’s chief 
liaison with the WASC pressured him throughout April.102 Chennault warned him as 
well. “The need is urgent,” he wrote on April 8, “since the morale of troops depends 
heavily on ample provisioning, and good supplies of meat are essential to give the 
American soldier the diet to which his system is accustomed, and which it requires 
for good health.” The U.S. Army’s ability to defend Yunnan, Chennault stressed, 
depended on adequate meat supplies.”103 Turning down Chennault’s request 
imperiled Long’s relations with the U.S. military. It also invited retaliation by Chiang, 
who believed that providing the Americans with all the meat they needed was an 
essential matter of U.S.-China relations.104 Long compensated for the shortfall by 
importing beef from Guizhou Province, but beef prices in Kunming still increased 
tenfold between February and June, spoiling the Price Control Committee’s 
efforts.105 Shortages still continued into the fall, when Chiang again ordered Long to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
for the U.S. Army in Yunnan Using Republican Archives], Yunnan dang’an 云南档案 Vol. 12 (December 
2011), 21.  
101 YPA 1106.004.02753 p. 31, 羅佩榮呈龍雲電云南省政府主席龙云电 [Luo Peirong to Long Yun], 21 
March 1944. 
102 YPA 1106.004.02753, p. 30, SOS Headquarters Liu Yao-yueng, Kunming Military Headquarters, 20 
April 1944.  
103 YPA 1106.004.02752, p. 26, Claire Chennault to Long Yun, 8 April 1944.  
104 Zhang, “Cong minguo dang’an kan,” 20.  
105 Kunming shi wenshi ziliao (Kangri zhanzheng—wujia) 昆明市文史资料 （抗日战争－物价) 
[Kunming Historical Materials (The War of Resistance—Prices) (Kunming: Kunming shi zhi bianzuan 
ban gong zhi, 1989), 324. A half-kilo of beef cost CN$250 on June 25, 1944.   




raise purchase limits.106 Wherever the needs of the U.S. Army clashed with those of 
the local population, the Americans usually won out. In fact, at eighteen ounces per 
day, American servicemen in China ate more meat than GIs in Britain, who received 
an average of twelve ounces per day.107  
 Construction lags and food shortages did little to prevent the WASC’s 
expenses from adding up rapidly. Building or expanding hostels around airfields in 
the Kunming area also meant building fuel and weapons depots, radio towers, 
garages, roads, warehouses, fences, and cleared areas around the perimeters. 
Construction and land purchases for nine Kunming area hostels in late 1943 cost the 
Chinese Ministry of Finance CN$840,110,000, which amounted to over 1.75% of the 
Chinese government’s total 1943 expenditures.108 The troop influx also drained the 
WASC’s coffers. For every two Americans staying at a hostel, the WASC needed one 
worker, and by June 1943, some 4,000 staff filled the hostel program’s payrolls. The 
WASC was also responsible for feeding and housing these employees.109 Meanwhile, 
the average daily cost per man continued to creep up, reaching CN$180 that June, 
and Huang expected that figure to continue rising along with China’s galloping 
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inflation.110 The hostel program was simply not sustainable given the Chinese 
government’s financial problems.  
Chinese Foreign Minister Song Ziwen [T.V. Soong] first voiced the government’s 
concerns during a January 1943 meeting with U.S. Ambassador Clarence Gauss, 
raising suspicions that Chongqing might try to pull a fast one. According to Song, 
Chiang regarded WASC services as reverse Lend-Lease in accordance with the June 
2, 1942 Mutual Aid Agreement. “Stilwell is concerned, as is this embassy,” Gauss 
wrote in his report on the meeting to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, “regarding the 
spiraling of Chinese prices and the fantastic United States currency equivalents at 
which reverse Lend-Lease would be debited against the United States at the present 
official exchange rate.” Song admitted to Gauss that Chinese prices had climbed so 
high that when converted to U.S. dollars “payments for supplies and services 
provided might appear to be extortionate,” but he also stated that China’s Ministry 
of Finance considered it “inadvisable” to adjust the official 20:1 exchange rate. Still, 
Song insisted, Chiang would not accept any payment from the United States for 
WASC services rendered. Both Song and Gauss recommended that China and the 
United States negotiate a formal reverse Lend-Lease agreement, but the U.S. War 
Department doubted that such an agreement would meet the U.S. Army’s needs.111  
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With the compensation question still unresolved, Chiang told Gauss to inform 
Roosevelt on January 16, 1944 that China could no longer pay for the hostel 
program. In his message to Roosevelt, Chiang wrote that China’s fiscal situation was 
now “incomparably worse than a year ago, and the cost of assisting the American 
Army [in China] ha[d] become so great a strain that China cannot keep up such 
assistance” without help from the U.S. Treasury. According to Chiang, the WASC now 
spent CN$300 per day supporting each American serviceman, enough to feed a 
Chinese soldier for a month.112 Total monthly expenses for the hostel program had 
climbed from just over CN$4.5 million in January 1943 to nearly CN$92 million a 
year later.113 Market prices in China had increased 245% over the same period.114 
Unless the U.S. provided financial assistance, Chiang warned, the U.S. Army would 
have to start feeding its own men in China after March 1.115 Roosevelt’s Treasury 
Department was prepared to bear all housing and food costs for U.S. forces in China, 
but it could not “justify the use of a fixed exchange rate while prices are spiraling.” 
Yet as long as China could provide sufficient Chinese currency “to give a fair and 
equitable return” for U.S. expenditures in China, Washington would be willing to 
negotiate a reverse Lend-Lease agreement.116  
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 Reverse Lend-Lease negotiations stalled over China’s official 20:1 Chinese 
fabi-U.S. dollar exchange rate. On February 4, Finance Minister Kong Xiangxi told 
Gauss that “it was impossible to alter [the] official rate without breaking China’s 
economic backbone.”117 In discussions with U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry 
Morgenthau in April, Kong insisted it “would be impossible to maintain our armies 
in the field” unless the Nationalist government maintained confidence in its 
currency. If Chongqing acceded to Washington’s request to revise the exchange rate 
to 100:1, “we would be depreciating our currency by 500 percent which would be 
fatal to our present situation,” argued Kong.118 With black market exchange rates in 
Chongqing hovering around 210:1 at the same time—up from less than 100:1 in 
January—U.S. officials from the Army and State Department believed that 
Chongqing’s refusal to budge on the exchange rate indicated that the Chinese 
government “has not the least intention of cooperating with the United States in 
finding a realistic way to avoid continuing exploitation of United States military 
expenditures in China.”119 Yet from Chongqing’s perspective, the exchange rate 
revision Washington demanded would mean the end for Chiang’s regime. Kong’s 
April 19 memo to Morgenthau summarized a perspective that Huang Renlin no 
doubt shared: “We have already fought shoulder to shoulder for over two years. We 
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have shared considerable sacrifices…we should each contribute according to our 
capacity for the common victory.”120  
Ever since the AVG arrived in China, the hostel program had provided China 
with the means to demonstrate its commitment to the alliance despite the country’s 
negligible military capacity. From Chongqing’s perspective, Washington could afford 
to take a loss over the exchange rate, especially in light of how inconsequential U.S. 
expenses in China were and how little aid the United States provided to China 
compared to its other allies. Chongqing’s position reflected the widely shared 
Chinese belief in the boundlessness of America’s wealth and power, while U.S. 
officials’ stance on the exchange rate dispute revealed the enduring power of ideas 
about Chinese deviousness and untrustworthiness. The two sides spoke entirely 
different languages.  
U.S. Forces and the WASC authorized a basic agreement on March 1, 1944 that 
specified operational responsibilities, but it did little to address the hostel program’s 
spiraling costs. The agreement left the WASC responsible for feeding and housing 
American servicemen, supplying personnel to run the hostels, and maintaining 
laundry service. But it reduced services provided for American enlisted men, such as 
the provision of laborers to clean their dormitories. The agreement also specified 
that U.S. forces would take over hostel building maintenance, foodstuffs 
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transportation, and pay for new construction and equipment purchases.121 Still, the 
WASC’s costs per man continued to rise, as did overall American troop strength in 
China.  
By the summer of 1944, Chiang’s insistence to keep GIs healthy and happy 
regardless of cost or effort pushed the WASC and Ministry of Finance to the breaking 
point, and the U.S. Army wanted to do away with the hostel program altogether. 
“The amount our country is willing to spend to host [U.S. troops] must have a limit 
or I am afraid our country’s finances will not be able to bear it,” Kong warned Chiang 
in May after Huang requested an eighty percent budget increase.122 On June 19, the 
WASC overdrew its account, and Huang requested an emergency CN$100 million 
infusion to continue operations.123 The daily cost per American serviceman had 
jumped to over CN$470, and monthly expenses now exceeded CN$250 million.124 
Meanwhile, direct negotiations between the WASC and SOS also stalled over the 
compensation question. The SOS offered to pay for hostel services but demanded an 
altered exchange rate plus greater oversight of the WASC’s financial records and the 
power to dismiss WASC staff for unsatisfactory performance.125 Yet with the 
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Americans unwilling to abide by the official 20:1 exchange rate, Huang insisted that 
the WASC continue to host GIs at the Chinese government’s expense.126 Stilwell told 
Jordan to relent on May 5. “No good purpose will be served by declining to accept 
the offer of the Chinese government through the WASC to furnish subsistence and 
housing for USAF in China without immediate payment,” he wrote, “much as we 
would prefer otherwise.”127 But the status quo remained untenable. “We should 
work toward taking over the supervision of hostel operations and operate them 
with civilian employees thus eliminating WASC entirely,” recommended the Army’s 
liaison officers with WASC on August 28.128 
Life in the Hostels 
 For American servicemen in the ranks, however, their experiences in China 
were shaped more by how they encountered the country with their senses than by 
questions of reverse Lend-Lease or meat shortages. Seeing, hearing, smelling, 
tasting, and touching mediated how American servicemen perceived China and its 
people, and thus influenced how GIs acted toward their Chinese allies.129 Pleasing 
the American senses was implicit in Huang’s approach to the WASC hostel system 
and its cultural outreach initiatives. Clean, well-appointed hostels would contrast 
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with the poverty American servicemen saw all around them. Spacious hostel 
facilities, most of them located outside city limits, would shield GIs from the din of 
city streets, while Western-style latrines would move waste further away from 
American noses. American-style food—albeit water buffalo rather than Angus or 
Hereford—would offer the men the tastes they were accustomed to, while at official 
banquets GI could feast on high-end Chinese cuisine, sampling the best the country 
had to offer. Comfortable bedding, hot water, clean sheets and towels, and laundry 
service would provide a familiar and reassuring sense of touch. In all, Huang wanted 
WASC hostels to be a “home away from home” for American servicemen.130 In an 
attitude reminiscent of the colonial Filipino elite, he recognized that Americans 
would only judge China as a civilized country if it adhered to and reproduced 
American values and norms.131 For the most part, however, Huang’s efforts came up 
short, and hostels did little to mediate China’s impressions on the American soldiers’ 
senses, and thus little to improve their impressions of China or the Chinese people.  
 Almost every American who served in China arrived there after stopovers in 
India or British colonial possessions in Africa, where they had their first encounter 
with extreme poverty. “The squalor and the sickness, and the disease and 
everything in India helped prepare us for China,” wrote Donald Hardenbrook, a 
sailor who trained Chinese guerrillas as part of the Sino-American Cooperative 
Organization (SACO).132 “You couldn’t believe in 1944 people lived in such primitive 
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conditions,” recalled Martin Schlesinger, a C-47 pilot, who spent a few weeks in 
West Africa and Khartoum before reaching Kunming.133 After the long steamship 
journey from California to India, soldiers took liberty for up to a week in Bombay, 
where they saw starving beggars with leprosy and corpses in the street. In Kunming, 
however, local conditions were marginally better, and soldiers went directly from 
the airfield to their hostels, leaving them with the initial impression that “the 
condition of the people [in China] was so much better than the condition of the 
people in India.”134 By evoking revulsion and disgust, the sights Americans 
encountered on their way to China made GIs see locals not as human beings equal to 
themselves but as objects of pity, or sources of disease.   
 The U.S. military did little to prepare American servicemen for what they 
would see in China. Officers gave men aboard transport ships “stupid army lectures 
about how to tell the difference between the Chinese and Japanese.”135 These talks 
came from the U.S. Army’s Pocket Guide to China, which told soldiers that Chinese 
looked more or less like Americans, except with “dull bronze” skin and eyes with “a 
marked squint.” It described Japanese, on the other hand, as short—“as if his legs 
are directly joined to his chest”—with lemon-yellow skin, slanted eyes, buckteeth, a 
shuffling walk, and a wide space between their first and second toes.136 The Pocket 
Guide made the Japanese appear like the devious Orientals of MGM’s Fu Manchu 
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films, whereas the Chinese it described appeared practically American, much like 
the idealized representations depicted on many United China Relief promotional 
posters. These images [See figure 1.4] moderated Chinese foreignness, and thus 
made the Chinese seem less threatening and more civilized. By making the Chinese 
appear less foreign, the U.S. Army’s Pocket Guide sought to convince GIs “to show the 
Chinese that Americans treat the Chinese as we treat any of our allies, and that we 
respect them as human beings on an equality with ourselves.”137  
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Figure 1.4: China Is Helping Us. United China Relief, 1944. Pritzker Military Museum 
and Library, Chicago, IL. 
 Yet when American servicemen left their hostels, they saw people and street 
scenes that convinced them China and its people were dirty and primitive, similar to 
Indians and Africans. “I was shocked at first to see how desperately poor most 
Chinese are,” wrote staff sergeant Tom Hardwick in a letter home after arriving in 
Yunnan, “[t]he streets are very narrow, they are dirty, and they are crowded.”138 
Revulsion at the visual filth that American servicemen encountered comes up again 
and again in wartime accounts and oral histories. “What people wear can hardly be 
called clothes,” cargo squadron officer Warren Arnett told his mother after a month 
in China, “they are only rags, so torn and shredded I don’t see how they manage to 
keep them on their bodies.” Their homes, he noted, “are filthy beyond 
description.”139 Another cargo squadron officer, William Millner, admired the 
Indians for keeping themselves clean despite their poverty, but “I don’t think the 
Chinese ever bathed,” he recalled.140 “The are a wonderfully clean race,” Jan Peeke, a 
Kunming-based SOS lieutenant, told his wife in 1944, “faces always glistening and 
bodies so caked with dirt and stuff that you have to scrape with a knife to find out if 
they have skin or not.”141 Public breastfeeding, urination, and defecation also 
violated American cultural norms. “It is a common sight to see women with one on 
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the breast, one on the back, and one in the fetal state,” wrote Peeke, “it should be the 
trademark of China—no one else would bother copyrighting.”142  
 Other images struck American servicemen as animal-like and barbaric. Peeke 
told his wife that seeing houseboys at his hostel reading Life Magazine reminded 
him “of the monkey cage in Central Park.”143 Numerous men compared the Chinese 
to ants because they carried out construction projects in large groups without the 
help of machinery.144 American servicemen were impressed by the sight of 
thousands of Chinese laborers dragging concrete rollers to build runways, but such 
scenes evoked primitiveness in contrast to modern American methods: “they had 
manpower, just like the Egyptians when they built the pyramids,” recalled Gerald 
Broida, a major in Chennault’s 14th Air Force.145 Other Americans reported sights 
that confirmed longstanding stereotypes about the low regard Chinese had for 
human life, such as infanticide, or workers laughing when someone got injured or 
killed by concrete rollers during the airfield construction projects. Statements 
expressing something along the lines of “life in China was pretty cheap,” or “death 
had no effect on them [the Chinese] at all,” are common in GIs’ descriptions of the 
country.146 AMMISCA chief-of-staff MacMoreland, for example, responded to a car 
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accident by writing in his diary, “[t]he Chinese have no regard for life at all and no 
charity for suffering.”147 These visual affronts, which confirmed Chinese 
backwardness in American eyes, made it difficult for GIs to see Chinese as “human 
beings on equality with ourselves,” as the U.S. Army’s Pocket Guide had instructed.   
 Huang and the WASC had no power to stop GIs from venturing out of their 
hostels, but the hostels themselves failed to provide a visual regime that adhered to 
American standards. Many were infested with rats.148 “They are big,” Jan Peeke 
reported to his wife, “if one could put a harness on them, as they do on these 
Chinese midget interpretation of horses, I feel sure that the load pulled would be 
equally as big with rats.”149 “Everything was crude,” in the hostels, according to 
Orlando Wood of the 14th Air Force, “but much nicer than most Chinese houses.150 
So while hostels insulated American servicemen from China’s most unsightly visual 
lapses, they still appeared to be unsanitary and potentially disease ridden, just like 
the surrounding cities and towns.  
 Taste figured more heavily than the visual sense in American servicemen’s 
impressions. Huang’s boast to President Roosevelt about GIs’ love for water buffalo 
was dead wrong. The men found it awful, the meat as tough as the buffalos 
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themselves.151 “It was just like a rubber ball,” according to Staff Sergeant Milton 
McGee, a 425th Heavy Bomb Squadron pilot based just outside Kunming, or hardly 
palatable, in the words of First Lieutenant Carl Kostol, another pilot in the same 
squadron.152 While his confidence in his chefs might have been misguided, Huang 
knew that unlike the Chinese, most Americans preferred beef to pork and chicken. 
China’s water buffalo, however, were bred for work rather than food, and their meat 
tasted nothing like the beef Americans ate at home. Huang sought to bridge cultural 
differences by offering GIs familiar cuisine, but this American-style Chinese dish was 
no more familiar to GIs than chop suey in New York City’s Chinatown would have 
been to Chinese soldiers.153  
 Other culinary options at the WASC’s mess halls offered only marginal 
improvement over the hated water buffalo meat. Although Huang assured the U.S. 
Army his mess halls would meet U.S. War Department standards, many GIs went 
without fresh fruits and vegetables, even at hostels near Kunming. Sanitary 
conditions, particularly at more remote hostels, left much to be desired, and the 
1,400 American servicemen stationed at Yunnanyi in 1944 often refused to eat at 
the WASC messes for this reason.154 Even when sanitation adhered to American 
standards, transportation difficulties and food shortages meant that mess halls 
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served monotonous fare. First Lieutenant Wyndham Manning ate so much 
cauliflower in Kunming that he could never bring himself to touch it again after the 
war ended.155 Eggs were the single appetizing protein source, so Lieutenant Kostol 
sometimes ate them for every meal.156 “After I got home it was ten years before I’d 
eat another egg,” recalled John Green, a major in the 14th Air Force.157 Meanwhile, 
contempt characterized many GIs’ attitudes toward Chinese cuisine. “The Chinese 
eat this rot, but God damn it! We’re not Chinese!” declared Warren Arnett in a letter 
to his mother on the eve of Japan’s surrender.158 Compelled to choose between 
limited and unappetizing options, many men left China much thinner than when 
they arrived.159 
 The only affront to the senses that elicited more complaints than water 
buffalo meat was China’s pervasive stench of feces. Chinese agricultural production 
relied on human excrement for fertilizer.160 But the odor was not limited to the 
countryside. For many years, the central and local governments had tried to stop 
ordinary citizens from urinating and defecating in public, but the practice 
persisted.161 So no matter where Americans went, the stench was inescapable: it 
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emanated from farmland in the countryside and from the curbsides and public 
latrines of the cities and towns, where night soil collectors deposited it into 
containers that GIs called “honey buckets.”162 “The first impression of China was the 
overpowering smell,” recalled enlisted man James Brochon, “to be quite frank, it 
stunk.”163 “There simply isn’t any parallel,” Jan Peeke told his wife, “the smell of this 
country is like no other place.”164 According to P-38 pilot Harold Rosser, “you had to 
get in the air to get away from it.”165 Because of the stench, China became tied up in 
the American serviceman’s mind with human waste, and everything it signified: 
poverty, poor hygiene, and disease.  
 The sense of touch figured less than smell in American impressions of China, 
but again the WASC’s efforts to meet American standards often came up short. First 
Lieutenant Samuel Etris wrote that the beds in Kunming’s Hostel Three, “were straw 
ticks only two inches thick stretched over ropes strung on a wooden frame. After a 
night on the ropes, one’s back looked like a waffle.”166 Another GI remembered 
feeling mice running over the mosquito nettings while he tried to sleep.167 
Conditions at remote hostels or out in the field were worse. Whitney Greenberg 
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spent nearly three years with a combat cargo group in China, and lived without 
showers or indoor housing at a hostel in Luliang, Yunnan.168 Captain Rafael Hirtz 
trained Chinese commandos at a remote base in Yunnan, where “there were no 
showers…and I had just about every disease known to man.”169 Chongqing’s climate, 
“two seasons, both of them bad,” in the words of Danish-American war 
correspondent Karl Eskelund, froze men to the bone during the damp, sunless 
winters and made them miserable during the muggy summers when temperatures 
frequently exceeded 100 degrees.170  
 Encountering China with the senses made many American servicemen see 
the country and its people as backwards and inferior, and the hostel program did 
little to improve their impressions. Those impressed with the hostel program were 
in the minority. “The American soldier may live in barracks with a tile roof turned 
up at the eaves and corners like a pie crust,” wrote Lou Stoumen in October 1944, 
“this is romantic and something like the China he expected from looking at Chinese 
prints and seeing Charlie Chan movies. However, his romantic roof is likely to leak 
when it rains…sharing his quarters are spiders, fleas, mosquitos with a two-inch 
wingspread and fat rats.”171 For men like Stoumen, whose prewar perceptions 
derived from exoticized representations or Luce propaganda, reality on the ground 
proved disappointing. After just three months in Kunming, Earl Revell told his wife 
that he wanted to write a book about “real life” in China in order to disabuse readers 
                                                        
168 Whitney Jordan Greenberg Collection, AFC/2001/001/51147, VHP.  
169 Rafael D. Hirtz Collection, AFC/2001/00094, VHP.  
170 Karl Eskelund, My Chinese Wife (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1945), 181.  
171 Lou Stoumen, “What It’s Like for China GIs,” Yank, 20 October 1944.  




of all “the fantastic pieces of rubbish I have ever read—about the lure of the East. If 
you call a land that is overflowing with half starved, ragged, diseased, ignorant 
people, a place that has ‘lure’ or ‘charm,’” he continued, then “you refuse to let your 
mind believe what your nose and eyes are telling you.”172 China’s sensory regime 
also made it easy for GIs to fall back on prewar stereotypes, particularly the ideas 
that Chinese people had a low value for human life and that every aspect of life in 
the country would benefit from Americanization. The country’s impoverished 
people could hardly lay claim to being equal to Americans. “The country is not fit for 
any white man,” Revell wrote to his wife after another five months in country, “I 
thought India was bad, but it never took out of me what it has in China.”173  
Cultural Outreach 
 Huang was not blind to how American servicemen reacted to life in China. He 
knew what living standards they were accustomed to and how far his homeland 
lagged behind. So in addition to constructing a built environment that attempted to 
replicate American comfort and efficiency standards, he also oversaw several 
cultural outreach programs. These programs sought to showcase Chinese culture, 
promote social intercourse between Chinese and Americans, and convince GIs to 
look beyond China’s poverty. As Madeline Hsu has shown, many Chinese students 
who studied in the United States felt responsible for improving American 
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impressions of China.174 As WASC director-general, the Vanderbilt and Columbia-
educated Huang had the opportunity to reshape American views on a grand scale.  
 War Area Service Corps entertainment programs, which began when the AVG 
and AMMISCA arrived in China, continued throughout the war. Entertainment 
programs typically consisted of drama or musical performances, banquets, and tea 
parties, sometimes carried out jointly with other Chinese agencies. For example, in 
February 1944 Madame Long Yun worked with the WASC to put on a concert series 
at hostels and training centers around Kunming. Donors also contributed Chinese 
handicrafts, such as jade carvings, Suzhou embroidery, and Fuzhou lacquer, to be 
given to American troops as raffle prizes. Huang and other officials believed that 
such cultural exchange activities could improve Sino-American cooperation.175 But 
given the WASC’s limited means, these programs typically catered to officers only. 
Those Americans who attended them enjoyed these activities at first, but the 
novelty soon wore off. They did not understand Chinese drama and they disliked the 
rice wine drinking games that inevitably accompanied fancy dinners.176 ‘One 
disgusting habit the Chinese have,” recalled Jan Peeke after one such dinner, “is the 
annoying habit of wanting to ganbei with all and sundry people. The practice is 
actually bottoms up, or drinking a glass of liquor in one gulp. This would be alright,” 
he continued, “but if you’re the only American in a crowd of Chinese they usually 
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gang up on you and you drink six glasses to their one…that is very conducive to an 
awful drunk and hangover.”177 While many American servicemen expressed interest 
in Chinese culture, they preferred the leisure activities they were accustomed to: 
athletics, movies, hunting, or going out on the town and drinking western-style 
alcohol.  
 The WASC also tried to introduce Chinese culture through the publication of 
pamphlets and a daily news bulletin for American troops. Huang took printed 
cultural outreach seriously, with each hostel having an information or propaganda 
section [宣傳科].178 Huang also appointed Dr. Ernest K. Moy, a former Chinatown 
newspaper editor who had served as Sun Yat-sen’s English secretary, as a senior 
advisor and WASC deputy-director.179 Starting in 1943, the WASC published five 
series of Information Pamphlets on China for American servicemen. Written mostly 
by Western-educated academics, these pamphlets introduced Chinese culture, 
history, law, current affairs, and other topics. The tone was academic, unsurprising 
given the authorship, but the pamphlets furnished GIs with far more information 
about China than the U.S. Army ever provided. Each pamphlet was around the length 
of an academic journal article and contained a Chinese-English glossary. One 
pamphlet contained useful advice on social intercourse in China, noting that early 
Western visitors had made a bad impression in China because their “chief 
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recreations were drinking, brawling, and assaulting Chinese women,” which 
provoked a violent backlash.180 As chapter four will show, this was useful advice 
that many GIs failed to heed. As a whole, the pamphlets portrayed China as a 
civilization that had just recently begun to emerge from centuries of decline. The 
authors did not sugarcoat the Nationalist dictatorship, but they did stress China’s 
democratizing and Christianizing tendencies in the twentieth century.181 American 
servicemen’s diaries, letters, memoirs, and oral histories make no mention of the 
pamphlets, so they probably made little overall impression.  
 The WASC’s recognition that extant cultural outreach programs were failing 
culminated in the February 20, 1944 launch of the Friends of the Allied Forces 
Movement. Carried out under the authority of the New Life Movement General 
Association, which Huang still directed, this nationwide cultural outreach effort had 
four official aims: serving allied troops in China, promoting Chinese culture, working 
for allied victory, and strengthening China’s foreign relations.182 The WASC’s dire 
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financial straits meant that funding for the Friends of the Allied Forces movement 
had to rely entirely on membership fees. Legislative Yuan President Sun Ke urged 
people to sign up during a February 20 broadcast, stating that all Chinese had a 
responsibility to “help allied forces, reduce their difficulties, and increase mutual 
cooperation.” Any Chinese could enlist, and Sun wanted 10,000 people to pay 
CN$100 for annual membership, and another 100,000 CN$20 for annual 
sponsorships.183 Those who joined the Friends of the Allied Forces Society pledged 
to “receive allied troops as guests as if they were my brothers.”184 Membership and 
sponsorship numbers fell short of Sun’s goals, but enough people signed up to build 
Friends of the Allied Forces Society headquarters and branch societies in Chongqing, 
Kunming, Chengdu, Lanzhou, Xian, Guilin, and Guiyang.185  
 Huang wanted Friends of the Allied Forces Society headquarters in 
Chongqing and branch societies in other cities to be the centers of “proper social 
intercourse” between GIs and the Chinese. Headquarters in Chongqing opened on 
April 19, providing a place where American soldiers could “learn about cultural 
differences.”186 Decorated with Chinese art, it also featured Chinese and Western 
canteens, dormitories, and several different rooms where American servicemen 
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could sip tea with Chinese members and sponsors. Each Saturday, GIs could watch 
Chinese opera and musical performances.187 In August, the Society began showing 
free movies.188 As a whole, these facilities performed a similar function to the 
WASC’s predecessor, the Officers’ Moral Endeavor Association: providing 
“wholesome” entertainment to soldiers at liberty.   
The New Life Movement General Association also continued to promote the 
Friends of the Allied Forces Movement in the Chinese press, tying it into the New 
Life Movement’s main principles of li (propriety), yi (righteousness), lian (modesty), 
and chi (sense of shame). In accordance with li, Chinese should show respect in their 
interactions with allied troops and provide them with sanitary and simple 
entertainment. To demonstrate yi, they should assist any American servicemen 
having difficulty with something. Lian meant that Chinese should be honest and 
sincere in any business transaction with GIs and make every effort to earn their 
trust. In accordance with chi, Chinese should introduce GIs to “respectable 
entertainment” and “high culture.”189 Another article in Da Gong Bao, wartime 
China’s paper of record, article explained that cultural misunderstanding would 
inevitably lead to some minor incidents, but that so long as Chinese and Americans 
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dealt with these problems “with a spirit of mutual respect,” they would not affect 
Sino-American Friendship. “Since the Treaty of Equality was signed,” the author 
continued, “the two countries are complete equals…all vestiges of the old days—
arrogance and a sense of inferiority—should be swept away by the fire of war.”190 At 
its core, then, the Friends of the Allied Forces movement aimed to demonstrate 
China’s status as America’s equal.  
While the movement provided a venue for Sino-American interaction and a set 
of guidelines that ordinary Chinese could use in dealing with GIs, it failed to meet 
Huang’s lofty expectations. As subsequent sections and later chapters will show, 
friction between American servicemen and all groups of Chinese—hostel workers, 
interpreters, civilians, women, and soldiers—intensified during the Pacific War’s 
final year, much of it fueled by resentment over unequal treatment. Cultural 
outreach failed at least in part because the Friends of the Allied Forces Society 
headquarters in Chongqing and branches elsewhere could only accommodate so 
many GIs at a time. The movement’s Puritanical roots did not help either. Even the 
Chinese government recognized that cultural outreach as Huang envisioned had its 
limits. On April 27, barely a week after the Society’s grand opening in Chongqing, the 
National Military Council’s Foreign Affairs Bureau (FAB) urged the Chongqing city 
government to set up a leisure club for American troops that featured a bar and 
dancing girls. “To make life for allied troops more like normal,” the FAB suggested, 
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“we could open a brothel for a trial period.”191 Prostitution and alcohol were 
anathema to the Friends of Allied Forces Movement, but the average GI preferred 
them to tea parties and Peking Opera.   
Unequal Allies 
 Not all American servicemen took advantage of Huang’s cultural outreach 
efforts, but every GI who lived at a hostel interacted with WASC hostel staff. At its 
peak, in July 1945, the WASC employed over 14,000 administrators and hostel 
workers to manage the presence of more than 61,000 American servicemen.192 
More than sixty-seven percent of the WASC’s administrative staff had at least a 
vocational college education, as did more than eighty-eight percent of hostel 
managers.193 Many ordinary hostel workers had some degree of English proficiency, 
sometimes the result of missionary school education or prior work experience in the 
prewar treaty ports. So GIs and hostel workers had similar educational backgrounds, 
which Huang intended as part of his desire to demonstrate Chinese competence and 
equality with American servicemen. Yet GIs and hostel workers almost invariably 
interacted on unequal terms, mirroring the disparity of power between China and 
the United States and undermining Huang’s aim of creating an equal alliance. 
  During the alliance’s first months, Huang had protested to U.S. authorities 
because GIs failed to treat hostel workers as comrades-in-arms, but where Huang 
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and his staff saw mistreatment, American servicemen saw Chinese dishonesty and 
untrustworthiness. For example, on February 18, 1942, two AVG officers searched 
Chinese mess hall staff at the WASC’s second hostel in Kunming, looking for a 
missing fountain pen. Peter Shi, the hostel manager, told Chennault that the 
Americans had forcibly searched the men while using “insulting language with 
regard to China and the Chinese.” The Americans never found the missing fountain 
pen, but Chennault investigated the incident and told Shi on February 23, that the 
hostel workers in question had lied. “I am rather surprised,” Chennault wrote, “that 
you would accept such a story since you know so well the record of this group for its 
faithful service and loyalty to China.” Chennault conflated the AVG’s combat record 
with his men’s day-to-day interactions with the Chinese, which men like Shi saw as 
unrelated. Chennault ended his letter to Shi by telling him to instruct all hostel 
workers to obey the AVG police officer’s orders “and if required, to submit 
peaceably to a search of their persons if he so directs.”194 
 The AVG-WASC clash over the missing fountain pen illustrated several 
pernicious dynamics. Even if the AVG men had not used insulting language, their 
search still violated Chinese sovereignty—a focal point of nationalist sensitivity. All 
WASC employees were subject to Chinese military law, and only Chinese gendarmes 
had the authority to search them. From Shi’s perspective, Chennault’s instructions 
added insult to injury: the senior American commander practically ordered him to 
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give the AVG police authority over all Chinese hostel staff. Not only were Americans 
exempt from Chinese law, they now wanted to exercise control over local citizens on 
Chinese soil. The same presumption that allowed Chennault to make this demand 
without considering whether it would offend Shi also underpinned his and his men’s 
reflexive presumption of Chinese guilt and dishonesty. The thief, however, could 
have easily been an AVG man. By early 1942, AVG pilots and ground crews had 
stolen huge stores of goods from the Rangoon docks and smuggled them into China 
in order to sell them on the black market.195 But because Americans were 
predisposed to view Chinese as devious and dishonest, American thieves could 
evade detection by blaming their pilfering on the Chinese.  
 Even if GIs were found guilty of crimes against hostel workers, they received 
light punishments, reinforcing assumptions about Chinese inferiority and doing 
little to deter others. On October 13, 1943, a WASC guard named Wang Haotang 
searched a bag carried by Chinese civilian leaving SOS Hostel Five near Kunming, 
which was one of his responsibilities as a guard. The civilian he searched that 
evening had just purchased three cartons of cigarettes from a couple of GIs—a 
violation of U.S. Army and Chinese law—so Wang started arguing with the man. 
Private David Allan, a GI who witnessed the deal but had not taken part in it, 
attacked Wang, breaking his leg. Allan was found guilty in a court martial and 
sentenced to forfeit $35 from his pay for one month.196 GIs who hit other American 
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servicemen usually served at least thirty days to six months’ hard labor and had 
their salaries docked for six months. Causing serious injuries could mean being 
locked up for several years.197 Allan’s case was hardly unique. When Technical 
Sergeant Paul Rock beat up three pantry workers at Kunming’s Hostel Eleven, he 
escaped with a reprimand.198 After shooting hostel worker Kang Shihao to death for 
calling him “a-son-of-a-bitch,” Private First Class Charles N. Phillips was sentenced 
to just five months hard labor, despite showing no remorse during the investigation 
and court martial.199 Had Phillips killed another GI for the same reason, he would 
have probably been sentenced to death. The only GIs executed in China were 
convicted of murdering fellow American soldiers.200 Clearly, the U.S. Army Judge 
Advocate General did not see WASC hostel workers as human beings on an equality 
with themselves, as the Army’s Pocket Guide to China insisted. 
 WASC hostel staff, on the other hand, faced harsh discipline for crimes 
against GIs. Violent crimes against Americans by WASC employees were unheard of, 
but theft was a problem, though more so with civilians than with WASC staff. The 
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combination of low salaries—rendered almost worthless by inflation during the 
war’s final year—and access to privileged GIs, made the temptation to steal high.201 
In Kunming’s Hostel One, orderly Zou Jiacai ended up with a seven year prison 
sentence for stealing a single can of coffee and a screen GIs used for projecting 
movies onto.202 Lu Zhicheng and Zhang Guiqing, workers at the same hostel, 
received seven and three-and-a-half year sentences for stealing whiskey and selling 
it to a restaurant that catered to American troops.203 Water carrier Zhou Ziyuan got 
ten years for stealing blankets and cigarettes—two items GIs often sold to 
Chinese.204 Xie Chuwen, a cook at Hostel Six, received three-and-a-half years for 
taking two cans of cocoa.205 Arthur Hague of the 14th Air Force remembered seeing 
Chinese authorities whip hostel workers for theft.206 Hostel staff thus endured far 
harsher punishments for simple petty theft than GIs received for violent crimes, 
including murder, against hostel workers.  
   Even senior WASC officials were subject to mistreatment. After the 
U.S. Army reorganized its command structure in Yunnan Province in January 1945, 
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several American officers moved into Hostel One, location of the WASC’s district 
headquarters. Two young lieutenants discovered that they had been assigned rooms 
currently occupied by Chinese officials, so they complained to Y.D. Wang, the 
WASC’s district director. One of the rooms in question belonged to Dr. Ernest K. 
Moy, who served as Huang’s Special Deputy and the WASC’s chief liaison with the 
U.S. Army. Before Wang could resolve the issue, one of the two lieutenants, whose 
last name was McDonald, broke into Moy’s room and dumped all of Moy’s personal 
belongings and official paperwork onto Wang’s floor. Adding insult to injury, 
Lieutenant McDonald barged into a memorial service that the WASC’s Deputy 
Director, a major general, was leading just a few days later, interrupting the general 
and demanding that he and his staff vacate the room immediately so an American 
commander could use it. Wang reminded McDonald that a memorial service was in 
progress, but the lieutenant became aggressive, insisting that the Chinese leave 
immediately and threatening to mount the platform where the Deputy Director was 
standing. Wang and Moy eventually calmed him down, with Moy reminding 
McDonald “in China today, such an intrusion, especially by a national of another 
country, upon an official and mandatory service is a serious affront, intolerable to 
the national sense of the Chinese people.”207 For McDonald to feel comfortable 
ordering about Chinese generals and high officials, insulting them, and breaking into 
their rooms, he must have presumed that his own commanders would not see 
                                                        
207 Ernest K. Moy to Major Joseph De Pietro (Liaison Office to WASC), 18 January 1945, RG 493, SOS 
China Theater/Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, Correspondence 1943–1945, Box 13, WASC 
Correspondence 1945, NARA. 




anything wrong with his actions. McDonald, in fact, served on the staff of Brigadier 
General Frank Dorn, the Tianjin 15th Infantry veteran whose disparaging views of 
Chinese commanders had only intensified since his years as assistant military 
attaché in China before Pearl Harbor. And as Moy’s rebuke makes clear, McDonald’s 
insolence was kick in the teeth to Chinese nationalist sentiment, symbolizing the 
humiliating mistreatment of the treaty port and Exclusion era.   
Toward Victory 
 By the summer of 1944, the hostel program was in disarray. Many American 
servicemen had demonstrated their contempt for WASC employees, and even senior 
officials like Y.D. Wang and Ernest K. Moy were not immune from mistreatment. 
Meanwhile, ambitious plans for cultural outreach had failed to build respect 
between allies. Few GIs, for that matter, regarded hostels as a home away from 
home. The WASC now required huge monthly cash infusions just to continue its 
operations, and reverse Lend-Lease negotiations to settle China’s expenses had gone 
nowhere, mostly serving to exacerbate tensions between U.S. and Chinese officials. 
But while the U.S. Army in China would have been quite pleased to eliminate the 
WASC entirely, American commanders recognized that they lacked the manpower to 
run the hostel program on their own. They had no alternative but to work with 
Huang and his staff to address the WASC’s shortcomings.  
 Chinese and U.S. authorities placed high hopes on a liaison group made up of 
twenty Chinese-speaking American civilians that Chiang’s personal American 




advisor, Frank Price, recruited to strengthen goodwill and understanding between 
U.S. and Chinese forces. Price’s liaison officers—nineteen missionaries and one 
businessman—arrived in Chongqing in late 1944 and immediately began work with 
the hostel program. Price put Reuben Torrey, a Presbyterian missionary, in charge 
of WASC liaison work and stressed to Chiang the importance of eliminating graft and 
improving the organization’s efficiency and standards.208 Torrey set up an intensive 
ten-day training program for hostel managers in Chongqing, which focused on 
ameliorating problems with food, sanitation, and living conditions.209 Under orders 
form Chiang, Torrey’s team began an investigation of sixty WASC hostels in January, 
and both Huang and Wedemeyer ordered their men to give Torrey’s team their full 
cooperation.210  
 Torrey’s liaison team concluded that the WASC’s difficulties stemmed largely 
from financial problems and a lack of cooperation from American servicemen. “A 
large percent of [U.S.] Army officers,” Torrey reported did not know of, or 
understand, the terms of the basic agreement the WASC had negotiated with the SOS 
in March 1944. As a result, the U.S. Army had failed to construct new facilities for 
American and WASC personnel or to perform necessary upkeep and repairs. And 
because so many American personnel were unaware of their responsibilities, they 
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blamed the Chinese for all their difficulties.211 Torrey went easier on the WASC, 
reporting to Chiang, “taken into consideration the many difficulties faced by this 
organization…we feel that commendable work is being accomplished.” Yet Torrey 
also warned that Chongqing had to continually adjust budgets in response to 
inflation and rising U.S. deployments. He recognized that the WASC simply might not 
be up for the task. “In view of the rapidly increasing number of Americans now 
being brought into China,” Torrey wrote, “it should be ascertained from [U.S] Army 
authorities whether they wish to take over more of all of the services now rendered 
by the WASC.”212 The U.S. Army still lacked the capacity to take over the WASC’s 
operations, but Wedemeyer agreed with Torrey’s recommendation to form a joint 
committee with WASC, FAB, Ministry of Finance, and U.S. Army representatives to 
enhance cooperation between the hostel program’s various stakeholders.213  
 Deep distrust continued to pervade further discussions of strengthening the 
hostel program and settling the WASC’s expenses. Huang and Moy took offense at 
the “form, the tenor, and tone” of U.S. revisions to the March 1944 agreement 
proposed during the first joint committee meeting.214 Meanwhile, when Kong 
Xiangxi finally reached an agreement with the U.S. Treasury on November 25, 1944 
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regarding costs associated with the U.S. Army in China, the settlement explicitly 
excluded WASC costs, which would be credited to China “as reciprocal aid under 
Article VI of the Mutual Aid Agreement of June 2, 1942.”215 Yet U.S. forces in China 
claimed that Kong’s figures for WASC expenditures were “a gross exaggeration,” 
which precluded any credit to China.216 According to U.S. Headquarters in 
Chongqing, the WASC never provided them with the detailed monthly expense 
reports the U.S. Army had requested starting in June 1944.217 Yet the SOS’s files do 
contain reports covering all of 1943, 1944, and part of 1945.218 Huang stalled when 
first asked to provide these reports, stating that they could only be furnished upon 
orders from Chiang, which certainly did little to alleviate American suspicions that 
the WASC was padding its accounts.219 It remains unclear whether the SOS simply 
never forwarded these reports to U.S. Army Headquarters in Chongqing, or if the 
reports simply failed to meet the Army’s standards.  
Regardless of what happened with the reports, Japan surrendered before 
Chinese and U.S. authorities could reach a satisfactory agreement on the 
reimbursement question. WASC expenses skyrocketed in 1945, as American 
deployments and Chinese inflation reached their peak. According to Huang, monthly 
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expenditures peaked in August 1945 at CN$4.5 billion, which was nearly double the 
expenditure for May and more than the entire total spent by the WASC between 
December 1942 and January 1945. In all, between December 1942 and early 1946, 
Huang reported that Chongqing paid more than CN$35 billion for the hostel 
program. President Harry Truman awarded Huang the Legion of Merit for his efforts, 
but the U.S. government refused to reimburse the Chinese government for any of 
these hostel program expenses.220  
Conclusion 
 How could a program undertaken by the Chinese government to strengthen 
Sino-U.S. ties and demonstrate that Chinese deserved to be treated as equals end up 
causing tensions in bilateral relations and reinforcing American assumptions about 
Chinese inferiority? After all, the hostel program succeeded in feeding and housing 
nearly 70,000 American servicemen, allowing them to enjoy living standards that 
were out of reach to nearly everyone else in China. Chinese soldiers went 
malnourished while GIs ate their U.S. War Department-mandated eighteen ounces of 
protein per day. The WASC achieved its aim despite intractable financial problems, 
commodity shortages, and political tensions. In so doing, it fulfilled the U.S. 
military’s most basic needs in China. No matter what American servicemen did in 
the country—the pilots who transported cargo or attacked Japanese targets, the 
instructors who trained Chinese troops, the military police, radiomen, drivers, 
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mechanics, navigators, medics, veterinarians, and other officers and men—they 
slept and ate in hostels operated and paid for by the Chinese government.  
 American servicemen in China deemed the hostel program a failure because 
its services fell short of their expectations and because they believed the WASC was 
a corrupt organization that sought to cheat the U.S. government. Ordinary 
servicemen disliked hostel food and living in unsanitary and uncomfortable 
conditions. Their complaints filtered up the chain of command, fueling tensions at 
the higher levels. In the U.S. Army’s official three-volume history of the CBI Theater, 
the WASC merited just a few sentences, all of which echoed wartime criticisms: it 
lacked the administrative ability to meet its commitments and provided GIs with 
substandard services.  Most damning of all, the authors concluded, “the WASC 
padded the daily returns on U.S. personnel accommodated, presumably with a view 
to postwar settlement.”221 American commanders and officials never trusted the 
Chinese government’s claims that the WASC provided board and lodging in order to 
demonstrate its commitment to the alliance. From the outset, they believed 
Chongqing intended to swindle them. Chongqing’s requests for a reverse Lend-
Lease agreement to settle the WASC’s expenses after the hostel became too heavy a 
burden on China’s treasury only added fuel to American suspicions, especially 
because of the Chinese government’s refusal to revise the official 20:1 exchange 
rate. In the end, American commanders left China with the lesson that the U.S. 
military needed to take charge over all functions formerly performed by the WASC 
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in future deployments in Asia, an endeavor that would begin when U.S. marines 
landed in China to accept Japan’s surrender in October 1945.   
 American servicemen came away disappointed because they saw corruption, 
incompetence, or ill will behind nearly all points of contention over the hostel 
program. Prewar stereotypes about Chinese deviousness and inferiority cast a long 
shadow. For example, U.S. officials both overestimated WASC corruption and 
misunderstood its roots. They concluded that the WASC padded its accounts 
regarding the number of American personnel accommodated and that Chongqing 
refused to adjust its exchange rates because it had no intention of cooperating with 
the United States. WASC lists of personnel accommodated, however, track closely to 
the U.S. Army’s charts on troop strength.222 Meanwhile, the discrepancy between the 
figures Kong Xiangxi reported to the U.S. Treasury Department for WASC 
expenditures up to June 1944—approximately CN$2 billion—were larger, but not 
quite the “gross exaggeration” that U.S. headquarters claimed. Kenneth Prettie, a U.S. 
Army’s liaison officer working with the Corps, estimated hostel program costs of 
over CN$1.618 billion.223 With large fluctuations in exchange rates and commodity 
prices, as well as significant differences from in costs from place to place, the 
                                                        
222 For comparisons, see the following files: Headquarters, Advance Section No. 1, SOS CBI Theater, 
Office of the Judge Advocate, Subject: Cost of subsistence at WASC Hostels, 27 August 1944, RG 493, 
SOS, China Theater/Interpreter Affairs Section, Correspondence 1942–1945, Box 246, Subsistence 
total costs 1942–1944, NARA; WASC Graphic Report of Four Years’ Service, Huang Papers, HI; 
Command in China Theater, undated, RG 493, China Theater of Operations/Office of the Commanding 
General, Black Book China, Box 15, Black Book China #1, NARA; Personnel Strength-China Theater, 
Jan. 1945 to Jan. 1946, RG 493, Records Related to Histories, 1943-1945, Charts on Strength, USFCT, 
NARA. 
223 Headquarters, Advance Section No. 1, SOS CBI Theater, Office of the Judge Advocate, Subject: Cost 
of subsistence at WASC Hostels, 27 August 1944, RG 493, SOS, China Theater/Interpreter Affairs 
Section, Correspondence 1942–1945, Box 246, Subsistence total costs 1942–1944, NARA. 




discrepancy in U.S. and Chinese calculations does not mean Prettie’s figure was 
correct and Kong’s was inflated.224 This is not to say the hostel program was free of 
graft. Most of the corruption connected with hostels, however, involved black 
market dealing between hostel staff and GIs or price gouging by wholesalers when 
selling meat and vegetables to the WASC’s abattoirs and cooperatives, rather than 
corruption at the organizational level. And the exchange rate issue—the key sticking 
point that prevented U.S. authorities from agreeing to a reverse Lend-Lease 
agreement—stemmed not from Chongqing’s unwillingness to negotiate but from a 
genuine conviction that an adjustment would lead to the Nationalist government’s 
collapse.  
 American servicemen also had unrealistic expectations about what the WASC 
could accomplish. What Huang Renlin told Raymond Wheeler in September 1942 
held true for the remainder of the war: in expecting the WASC to adhere to 
American standards, the U.S. Army refused to recognize the extreme hardships 
China faced. The country lacked the money, materials, and organizational capacity to 
run the hostel program in a way that could meet American demands. Understanding 
of hygiene and quality control also lagged far behind the United States. These were 
all structural and systemic problems, rather than the results of actions by 
unscrupulous or incompetent officials, as American commanders often believed.  
 From the Chinese government’s perspective, then, the WASC’s efforts failed 
to bring about the closer relations and mutual respect that Huang had aimed for. 
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The service-oriented nature of the hostel program replicated prewar patterns of 
unequal relations, with many GIs seeing WASC employees as servants rather than 
comrades. Cultural outreach efforts had little discernible effect on American 
impressions of China. Although Chongqing believed its insistence on providing free 
boarding and lodging would demonstrate goodwill, U.S. Army officers and Treasury 
Department officials saw it as a ruse. The hostel program, however, was not the only 
Chinese alliance-building initiative that failed to live up to Chinese and American 
expectation





II. Enabling Communication: China’s Interpreter Program 
 
Housing and feeding American servicemen was just the first step in building a 
functioning alliance. Chinese and American authorities also had to solve the 
communication problem. The entire U.S. military had perhaps two-dozen Chinese 
speakers when the Pacific War began, and few Chinese soldiers spoke English. 
Making matters worse, vast cultural differences compounded the linguistic barrier, 
dwarfing any disparities between the United States and its other allies. Once again, 
Huang Renlin acted on Chiang Kai-shek’s orders to implement a solution. In many 
past instances of Chinese-American interaction, Chinese interpreters had served as 
linguistic and cultural brokers.1 Huang had played this role before many times 
himself, and as he began training secretaries to work at American Volunteer Group 
(AVG) hostels in July 1941, he also established an interpreter program on the 
campus of Kunming’s Agricultural School. Over the course of the war, the Kunming 
program and a second training center that opened in Chongqing trained at least 
3,300 to 3,400 interpreters.2  
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Although most histories of the wartime alliance ignore the interpreter program, 
this chapter demonstrates its crucial importance.3 Interpreters translated 
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intelligence reports and telegrams at U.S. Army installations, allowing rapid 
communication with Chinese civil and military authorities. They assisted American 
instructors in training tens of thousands of Chinese soldiers for the 1943–1945 
campaigns to retake northern Burma and western Yunnan. They also enabled an 
even larger Chinese Army training program to be carried out in 1945. Some 
interpreters accompanied American liaison officers and Chinese soldiers into 
combat, ensuring air support and resupply. Others ventured into the field with men 
from the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and Office of War Information (OWI), 
sometimes operating in guerrilla units behind enemy lines. Dai Li, director of the 
Bureau of Investigation and Statistics, China’s most powerful secret police agency, 
relied on Chinese interpreters to work with the American sailors assigned to his 
Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO), which trained Chinese 
commandos for guerrilla and intelligence operations.4 Interpreters also worked at 
the hostels where American servicemen lived and ate. Operating at the boundary of 
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two social worlds, interpreters helped American servicemen navigate the contours 
of life in China while mediating friction arising from the enormous cultural distance 
between GIs and their Chinese counterparts. As Colonel John Middleton, infantry 
commander at Kunming’s Chinese Training Center, wrote in 1945, “[w]ithout 
interpreters the American mission in China will be most difficult to accomplish.”5 In 
short, by overlooking interpreters, scholars have understated China’s contributions 
to Allied victory over Japan.6  
Interpreters made the alliance a reality by enabling American servicemen to 
communicate with other Chinese, but problems besetting the interpreter program 
and conflicts between GIs and interpreters intensified over the course of the war, 
overshadowing the program’s considerable achievements. Historical memory 
weighed heavily on mutual interactions. Thanks in large part to decades of 
missionary work in China, Americans saw China through a paternalistic lens and 
assumed that Chinese wanted, or should want, to become more like Americans.7 
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Unsurprisingly, they judged interpreters and their administrators in the Chinese 
government by how well they conformed to American standards. For interpreters 
and their administrators, however, the legacy of Western imperialism and racism 
coalesced with the experience of Japanese invasion to heighten sensitivity toward 
unequal treatment.8 This volatile mix precipitated and exacerbated countless 
disputes between GIs and interpreters, which, in turn, weakened interpreter morale 
and fueled discord at the Alliance’s higher levels. Structural problems compounded 
these difficulties. The Chinese government struggled to meet its commitments to 
interpreters—timely and adequate pay, proper uniforms, sufficient food—and failed 
to satisfy U.S. Army demands in interpreter numbers. Chongqing’s credibility with 
its own people and its American allies suffered as a result. Even during the war’s 
final year, after the U.S. Army had taken over Chinese responsibilities to feed, pay, 
and equip interpreters, and Chiang Kai-shek had delegated supervision of the 
interpreter program to the talented He Haoruo, interpreter morale continued to 
plummet and disputes between GIs and interpreters occurred with greater 
frequency. By the time Japan surrendered, few American servicemen and Chinese 
interpreters regarded one another as allies.  
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Creating the Interpreter Program 
The interpreter program began during the fourth and most perilous year of 
China’s War of Resistance. Soviet aid had slowed to a trickle after Russia and Japan 
signed a non-aggression pact in April 1941. Soviet pilots, who had trained the 
Chinese Air Force and flown combat missions against the Japanese, returned home. 
As Chongqing’s winter fogs gave way to another summer of relentless Japanese air 
bombardment, the Chinese stood alone. But Moscow’s deal with Tokyo also impelled 
the Roosevelt Administration to abandon its two-faced China policy. No longer 
would the United States offer rhetorical support and non-military goods to China 
while providing fuel and iron to Japan’s military.9 The President now gave tacit 
backing to the American Volunteer Group (AVG), a handful of mercenary pilots and 
ground crews that Chiang recruited to support the Chinese Air Force.10 On July 8, the 
AVG’s first volunteers set sail for Asia, planning to make their way to Kunming. 
Among the AVG volunteers who boarded the Java Pacific Jagersfontein vessel were 
thirty-seven pilots, eight-four ground crewmen, and two female nurses. None spoke 
Chinese.11  
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In order to accommodate the AVG and find suitable men for interpreter training, 
Huang Renlin wrote to several university presidents in Sichuan and Yunnan on June 
25. Educational backwaters before the war, Sichuan and Yunnan provinces now 
provided a home for most of the seventy-seven colleges and universities that had 
relocated to the interior by early 1941 in order to escape the Japanese invasion.12 
From these schools, Huang sought English-speaking college graduates who were 
“obedient, of pure mind, and in good health.” After completing their training, new 
interpreters would receive between CN$140 and CN$180 per month (between 
seven to nine U.S. dollars at official exchange rates).13 This exceeded what fresh 
college graduates could earn as teachers or university instructors.14 New graduates 
would also receive honorary officer ranks and the official title fanyiguan, or 
“interpreting officer.” Chinese officials hoped this gesture would convince American 
officers to treat them as equals. In all, thirty-five volunteers passed the WASC’s 
written and oral exams and entered the Kunming training program.15  
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Huang established the interpreter training school with help from professors and 
administrators at Kunming’s Southwest Associated University, known colloquially 
as Lianda. The agglomeration of Beijing’s Peking and Qinghua universities and 
Tianjin’s Nankai University, Lianda was China’s leading wartime institute of higher 
education, and most of its faculty had attended graduate school in the West.16 Like 
Huang, the Lianda professors who helped set up and run the training program—Pan 
Guangdan, Wen Yiduo, Wu Zelin, and Mei Yiqi—had studied in the United States 
during the 1910s or early 1920s.17 Because Huang’s duties as WASC director often 
required his presence in Chongqing, Wu and Pan oversaw the school’s day-to-day 
operations.18 Ever since the 1870s, voices on both sides of the Pacific had supported 
educational exchange as a means to bring Chinese and Americans closer together.19 
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The transnational network of American-educated Chinese intellectuals that ran the 
interpreter training school fulfilled these aspirations by creating a program that 
allowed American servicemen to carry out their mission in China.  
The training program emphasized English proficiency, American cultural 
knowledge, and physical fitness. Language work made up forty percent of the 
course. Recruits also learned basic military affairs, meteorology, American history 
and geography. Huang himself lectured on American etiquette.20 The program’s 
athletic director, Ma Yuehan, a Springfield College alumnus who had coached 
China’s sports delegation to the 1936 Olympics, prepared graduates for the physical 
rigors of military life. He urged recruits to avoid showing weakness in front of the 
Americans and told them to “throw off the sick man of Asia hat by walking with their 
heads held high and their chests thrust forward.”21 Through physical fitness and job-
related competence, interpreters would show American servicemen that Chinese 
deserved to be treated as equals. In this view, the training program’s staff was very 
much in line with the Nationalists’ urge to refute depictions of China as an 
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emasculated non-military culture, a key element in their understanding of Chinese 
nationalism.22 
 Yet problems emerged even before the first interpreter cohort graduated in 
October. Elitist attitudes toward military service among China’s educated youth, 
symbolized by the popular saying “good iron isn’t wasted to make nails, and good 
men aren’t wasted to make soldiers (好铁不打钉，好汉不当兵),” discouraged 
students and college graduates from enrolling. Poverty, not patriotism, convinced 
most of the men who volunteered for the first training cohort. The manpower 
shortage pushed the National Military Council and Ministry of Education to impose a 
draft in October, calling on university foreign language departments to provide third 
and fourth year students for the second cohort. Those who refused to serve would 
be expelled from school.23 Lianda faculty supported the draft, but universities in 
Chengdu refused to cooperate. Because western missionaries ran most colleges in 
Chengdu, this decision left untapped a large reservoir of English-speakers.24 
Meanwhile, even though the National Military Council and Ministry of Education had 
imposed the draft, Chongqing did not appropriate money for the training school, 
compelling Huang to use WASC funds “informally and without authorization” to 
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keep it running.25 And although the training school’s instructors and staff had all 
spent many years in the United States, their understanding of American culture 
derived largely from their on-campus interactions with the American elite. 
Interpreters, however, would be working alongside Americans from all backgrounds 
and social classes. Life in China, with its poverty, disorder, and ubiquitous stench of 
human waste, was a far cry from the hallowed halls of America’s leading 
universities, a fact that would not be lost on the GIs serving in China. Shortcomings 
in training, finance, and manpower would bedevil the interpreter program 
throughout the war.  
Struggling to Meet the U.S. Army’s Interpreter Needs 
 Meeting the U.S. Army’s demands and fulfilling the promises it made to 
interpreters proved difficult for the Chinese government. In early 1943, U.S. troop 
deployments to China began outpacing the training of new interpreters, sowing 
discord between American military commanders and Chinese authorities. At the 
same time, Chongqing began falling behind on its commitments to pay, clothe, and 
feed interpreters, which affected morale and job performance while also 
discouraging new recruits from enlisting. Joint efforts to address these problems did 
not begin until mid-1943, and they yielded disappointing results, compelling the U.S. 
Army to take on an increasing share of Chongqing’s responsibilities. By late 1944, 
the interpreter program had become a major source of aggravation amongst 
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American officers, who blamed the Chinese government for all the program’s 
shortcomings.  
Between early 1942 and General Joseph Stilwell’s recall in October 1944, the 
American military presence in China increased from just a few hundred men to 
approximately 27,000 GIs plus 1,200 sailors.26 In India, where the U.S. Army 
operated its largest training center for Chinese troops, the American presence also 
expanded drastically. The Kunming school trained 206 interpreters in 1942, which 
proved sufficient for the 1,255 American servicemen stationed in China by the end 
of that year.27 In 1943, however, American deployments to the China-Burma-India 
(CBI) Theater climbed by over 600 percent, but only 104 new interpreters 
completed their training.28 The resulting shortage delaying training programs in 
both India and Yunnan, prompting complaints that worked their way up the U.S. 
Army’s command structure. On July 16, Stilwell warned Chinese Minister of War He 
Yingqin that, “the effectiveness of assistance to the Chinese armies by American 
instructors has been severely limited by the lack of qualified interpreters.”29 In 
                                                        
26 William George Grieve, “Belated Endeavor: The American Military Mission to China (AMMISCA), 
1941–1942,” PhD Diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1979, 17; Zhou Meihua ed. 周美華 
編輯, Jiang Zhongzheng zongtong dang’an: Shilue gaoben 59 蔣中正總統檔案：事略稿本 59 [Archives 
of President Chiang Kai-shek: Biographical Sketch Volume 59](Taipei: Guoshiguan 2011), 142–144; 
Undated troop strength graph, RG 38, Naval Group China Papers, Box 6, Chapter 6 Personnel S-1, 
Folder 15, NARA. 
27 Office of Interpreter Affairs, Interpreting Officers with United States Forces in China Theater, 1 
April 1945, RG 493, China Theater/Special Staff/Interpreter Affairs Section, Subject Files: 1944–
1946, box 651, Interpreting Officers, 1945, NARA. 
28 As of December 31, 1943, 8,174 American soldiers were stationed in China and 86,120 in Burma 
and India. See Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China, 267; Stilwell’s Command 
Problems 258; Administrative and Staff Narratives, 31 December 1943, Box 17–1, Stilwell Papers, 
Hoover Institute, Stanford CA (Hereafter HI).  
29 T.G. Hearn to FAB Director Shang Chen, 16 July 1943, RG 493, China Theater/Special 




Guilin, the key base for the U.S. 14th Air Force and the Services of Supply (SOS) in 
south-central China, American troops simply gave up on waiting for the Chinese and 
recruited ninety civilian interpreters on their own.30 Chinese authorities, 
meanwhile, insisted that the U.S. Army was undermining Chongqing by hiring 
civilian interpreters, who earned salaries “greatly in excess of those paid” by the 
Chinese government. Many Chinese-trained interpreters resigned in protest after 
discovering the pay discrepancy, thereby exacerbating the interpreter shortage.31 
 To make matters worse, many American servicemen found Chinese-trained 
interpreters poorly qualified. “Marvelous English these Chinese speak—the 
interpreters’ favorite is ‘about more than ten,’ or ‘I’ll meet you at approximately 
about after three o’clock,” wrote 14th Air Force technical sergeant Jan Peeke in a 
October 1942 letter to his wife, “incidentally I’m still waiting,” he joked.32 Because of 
China’s numerous dialects, Lieutenant Charles Lakin discovered when teaching a 
signal communications course that his interpreter, Li Huangtun, needed interpreters 
of his own. “And by the time it got down to the end,” Lakin recalled,” I’m not sure 
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any of it was accurate.”33 At the Heilinpu Infantry Training Center in the Kunming 
suburbs, where American advisors trained Chinese Army divisions stationed in 
Yunnan province (known as the Y-Force or Yunnan Force), a February 1943 report 
revealed that twelve of fifteen interpreters serving there had “no prospects of 
satisfactory deployment” due to their poor English.34 Yet despite shortages and 
reservations about interpreters’ qualifications, U.S. Army authorities never gave 
serious consideration to training American interpreters, reflecting the low strategic 
value American policymakers attached to China.35 
  American authorities also realized by 1943 that interpreters suffered from 
morale and discipline problems, both of which they attributed to the Chinese 
government. On January 8, Stilwell complained to He Yingqin that interpreters at 
Ramgarh, the main training center for Chinese troops in India, had gone months 
without pay or proper uniforms.36 Colonel Frank Dorn, who supervised the Yunnan-
Force training program, had similar criticisms. Interpreters in Yunnan got paid on 
time, but their salary, Dorn believed, was insufficient.37 A more pressing problem 
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stemmed from the fact that most interpreters in Yunnan had yet to receive the rice 
and clothing that the National Military Council’s Foreign Affairs Bureau (the Bureau 
or FAB for short) had promised them.38 “It is important,” Dorn told Stilwell in 
September, “that the Chinese government fully realize their interpreters cannot 
keep their backs warm or their stomach’s full on promises, they must have 
something more tangible.”39 Dorn blamed Kunming FAB branch office director Yao 
Kai, suspecting him of embezzlement.40 He also believed that Yao was at fault for 
interpreters’ disciplinary problems. “His [Yao’s] weakness in handling disciplinary 
cases among FAB interpreters,” Dorn wrote to Stilwell on December 4, “has caused 
unending trouble and actual closing down on several occasions of the entire 
[Yunnan Force] training program.”41  
 Clearly, American officers found the interpreter program a major source of 
frustration. Stilwell, Dorn, and more junior officers identified real problems. 
Interpreter shortages slowed down U.S. Army programs to train and equip Chinese 
soldiers. Delays in providing food, pay, and uniforms all contributed to poor morale. 
Low salaries, meanwhile, made it difficult for the government to entice new recruits. 
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But Stilwell and his deputies also had dismissive Orientalist views about the 
Chinese, which led them to understand these problems as the result of Chinese 
corruption or incompetence rather than as stemming from deeper structural 
issues.42 The Chinese government actually raised interpreter salaries several times 
in 1942 and 1943, but the new pay scales failed to keep pace with inflation. 
Bumping up salaries too quickly also carried a political risk for Chiang because it 
meant paying interpreters more than Chinese military officers.43 Logistical feats like 
feeding and equipping troops were easier for advanced economies like the United 
States, but by 1942 China’s productive output had dropped to levels not seen since 
the 1890s.44 The country’s backward transportation network further compounded 
supply difficulties. By assuming problems could be resolved simply by firing men 
like Yao Kai or raising salaries, Dorn and Stilwell failed to grasp the complex roots of 
the Chinese government’s weaknesses. And by overlooking how the interpreter 
program created and reinforced negative assessments about the Chinese amongst 
Stilwell, his deputies, and the men in the ranks, scholars of wartime U.S.-China 
relations have ignored a crucial source of discord in the Alliance.  
 In the summer of 1943, Chinese and American authorities finally began 
working together to address the interpreter program’s shortfalls. On June 25, U.S. 
Forward Echelon Headquarters in Kunming decided they would need 900 
                                                        
42 Ch’i, Jianbanuzhang de menghou, 76, 88, 182–185, 659–669; van de Ven, War and Nationalism in 
China, 8–11.  
43 Memorandum to Deputy Chief of Staff, Branch HQ Forward Echelon, USF CBI, 28 September 1943, 
RG 493, China Theater/Special Staff/Interpreter Affairs Section, Subject Files: 1944–1946, Box 648, 
July, August, September 1943, NARA. 
44 Ch’i, Jianbanuzhang de mengyou, 2–4. 




interpreters in order to meet their goals for an expanded Chinese Army training 
program. With around 160 interpreters currently on duty and only forty-five 
undergoing training, this proposal presented a daunting procurement challenge.45 
The task fell to Major Loren B. Thompson, whom Dorn designated as officer in 
charge of interpreter affairs. On September 3, Thompson met with WASC Director 
Huang Renlin, Generals Shang Zhen and Wang Shimin from the FAB, and Vice 
Minister of Information Hollington Tong (Dong Xianguang)—whose office carried 
out background investigations on interpreter recruits—in order to hash out a plan.   
 The five men devised a new framework for the program. To address the U.S. 
Army’s recruiting needs, “compulsory service to a necessary extent” would be 
required from Chinese college students, with all interpreters receiving academic 
credit for their duty, and the Chinese government paying for the top ten percent to 
earn graduate degrees in the United States after the war, an idea that Huang and 
Minister of Education Chen Lifu believed would motivate students to sign up. To 
centralize control, the FAB would take responsibility for all liaison work with the 
U.S. Army as well as for pay, procurement, and new interpreter duty assignments. 
Previously these responsibilities had been divided between the Bureau, the 
Commission on Aeronautical Affairs, and the War Area Service Corps. Wang told 
Thompson that he would present the plan to Chiang Kai-shek the next day. “The 
                                                        
45 T.G. Hearn to FAB Director Shang Chen, 26 June 1943, RG 493, China Theater/Special 
Staff/Interpreter Affairs Section, Subject Files: 1944–1946, Box 648, February, March, April 1943, 
NARA; Memorandum to Chief of Staff, 30 August 1943, RG 493, China Theater/Special 
Staff/Interpreter Affairs Section, Subject Files: 1944–1946, Box 648, July, August, September 1943, 
NARA. 




interpreter picture,” Thompson wrote in a report to U.S. Headquarters in Kunming, 
“looks better than at any other time.”46 
 Both Stilwell and Chiang supported the plan. Writing to FAB Director Shang 
Zhen on September 7, Stilwell described it as “sound and progressive.”47 Chiang 
organized a committee on Interpreter Affairs and ordered his lieutenants to 
implement most of the changes recommended on September 3. On September 29, 
the FAB and Ministry of Education sent orders to Lianda and other universities 
outlining a proposed student draft. On October 13, Chiang ordered Lianda to 
provide 100 students for the next interpreter training class, scheduled to begin soon 
in Kunming.48 Between July 1941 and October 1943, the War Area Service Corps had 
trained 429 interpreters in seven cohorts. From November 1943 onward, however, 
the FAB would supervise all interpreter training.49 
 Support from Lianda again proved critical. On November 11, just a few days 
before FAB interpreter training was scheduled to begin in Kunming, Mei Yiqi, the 
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chief administrator at Lianda, called together all Lianda students and urged them to 
“give up their studies and serve the country.”50 In a rousing speech, Mei told the 
students that the lack of interpreters was preventing the Americans from training 
and equipping China’s troops. It would be “a matter of humiliation for both China 
and China’s colleges” if English-speaking students allowed this to continue.51 British 
and American youth, he argued, had lined up to enlist when the war began, and now 
Chinese students must follow their example.52 Mei struck a nerve: over sixty 
students volunteered after hearing his speech.53 Two weeks later, Mei presided over 
a meeting of Lianda’s standing committee, which passed a resolution stipulating that 
all fourth-year male students would be drafted for interpreter duty after completing 
their end-of-semester exams.54 Lianda agreed to give draftees thirty-two academic 
credits in exchange for two years’ service.55 These draftees would made up the bulk 
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of the 461 recruits comprising the FAB’s second interpreter training cohort, which 
started classes in Kunming on March 1.  
 In late November, Chiang Kai-shek authorized the Chinese government’s first 
general plan for interpreter training, procurement, and accounting. The lack of 
standard procedures for dealing with interpreters had baffled American 
commanders since 1942, often provoking disputes with interpreters and Chinese 
authorities.56 Beginning December 1, the FAB would handle all pay, subsidies, 
medical care, clothing, and discipline. U.S. officers working with interpreters would 
write performance-rating reports each June and December to determine promotions 
and select the ten percent who would study in America after the war. The plan also 
set salaries and food subsidies, to be paid monthly by the FAB. To resolve the 
clothing problem, the Bureau would provide each interpreter with two sets of 
cotton and two sets of woolen uniforms upon graduation.57   
With the general plan now underway, Chiang finalized a nationwide draft in 
early 1944. All fourth-year male students except those attending medical, 
veterinary, or teacher training schools were eligible for conscription. Like the 
students at Lianda, these draftees would receive academic credit for their service, 
and the top ten percent could earn graduate degrees in America after the war at 
government expense. Any interpreters who failed to complete their service, 
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however, would be expelled from school.58 According to the National Military 
Council’s instructions, the draft rules applied to all private and public universities in 
China, but in practice only the universities in Kunming and Chongqing followed 
Chiang’s orders, with each school providing a quota of students in accordance with 
Ministry of Education and FAB needs.59 In Chongqing, in fact, just two schools—
Central University and Chongqing University—provided most of the city’s 
draftees.60 That schools in other cities were able to resist Chiang’s orders 
demonstrated the limits of Chongqing’s power.  
Yunnan-Force commander Frank Dorn’s response to the draft, meanwhile, 
revealed his desire to bolster U.S. power in China by making interpreters agents of 
Americanization. On March 4, he sent out a memo to his commanding officers and 
ordered them to read it aloud before their men. Interpreters, he wrote, were “the 
future of China.” During the next thirty years, interpreters and other educated 
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Chinese youth would supplant the “power cliques, incompetent, and selfish” men 
who controlled much of the country’s government and military, men whom Dorn 
loathed for “placing obstacles in the way of further American influence.” However, if 
GIs acted as “ambassadors of American goodwill and good intentions toward China” 
by treating interpreters “with thought for the future,” Dorn wrote, it would have 
great repercussions for the future of U.S.-China relations. He urged his men to speak 
informally with interpreters about “American methods, American living conditions, 
industrialization, farming methods” and other facets of life “in order that these 
young men may judge for themselves as to how our type of modernized civilization 
may be adapted to the future needs of China.”61 The Nationalists saw interpreters as 
a means allow Chinese and Americans to fight together while bolstering their 
regime, but Dorn now regarded them as tool for undermining the Nationalists over 
the long term.  
 By early march, more than 1,300 students were undergoing interpreter 
training. The FAB even opened a new training school in Chongqing to accommodate 
the city’s draftees.62 From the perspective of U.S. Headquarters, it appeared that the 
Bureau was finally ready to meet the U.S. Army’s interpreter needs. Stilwell thanked 
FAB Director Shang Zhen in an effusive March 3 note, also assuring him that the U.S. 
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Army had now stopped hiring its own interpreters—a longstanding Chinese 
complaint—thanks to the Bureau’s efforts to enlarge the program.63 
 Stilwell spoke too soon: the Chongqing interpreter school was a complete 
debacle. After spending just a few days at the Chongqing school, Colonel A.D. Fisken 
reported to U.S. command that no more than 150 of the 870 students enrolled there 
had any chance of becoming competent interpreters. The others “offered very poor 
material,” with most needing “a year or more of intensive English” before they could 
even begin learning military terms. Fisken convinced Hollington Tong, the school’s 
director, to send the best 130 recruits to Kunming in order to complete their 
training. Further study in Chongqing, Fisken believed, would be a waste of time. The 
school lacked textbooks, curriculum, or even a broad outline for the teachers. Tong 
claimed that after two months’ training at least 200 graduates would be ready for 
interpreter duty, but Fisken disagreed, writing, “I am sure he [Tong] is aware that 
we will not get one third of that number.”64  
 The draft failed in Chongqing for several reasons, each reflecting the central 
government’s weaknesses. Chiang wanted to provide the Americans with a 
sufficient number of qualified interpreters but he lacked the capability to carry this 
out. The Nationalist government had been at war more or less constantly since 1927 
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and it never had a chance to consolidate its bureaucratic structures.65 In Chengdu, 
schools refused to cooperate because their administrators distrusted the FAB. In 
Guangxi province, where many English-speaking refugees from Hong Kong resided, 
the FAB sought just twenty students.66 Nearly all draftees for the new training 
school came from universities in Chongqing, where Minister of Education Chen 
Lifu’s rigid political controls and efforts to eliminate foreign influence from higher 
education fell most heavily.67 The FAB and Ministry of Information showed no 
interest in recruits’ English proficiency, screening them for loyalty to the Nationalist 
government rather than language ability, a practice consistent with Chiang’s armed 
forces, where fealty often trumped competence.68 None of the 167 draftees from 
Chongqing University, for example, came from a department where English 
proficiency was emphasized, such as foreign languages, social sciences, or 
humanities.69 Students from Kunming also underwent a loyalty check, but the local 
training school faculty took care to weed out those with poor English. Kunming also 
had a far more talented teaching staff, which included many of China’s leading 
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intellectuals.70 Chongqing’s patchwork teaching staff—local businessmen and 
teachers, a few westerners—included many poor English speakers.71 The draft’s 
failure proved costly to Chongqing because it amplified existing tensions between 
U.S. forces and Chiang’s government while pulling hundreds of students out of 
school for nothing. It also did little to make up for recruitment shortfalls because 
U.S. demand for interpreters still exceeded supply.  
 The fiasco in Chongqing, however, was just one of the interpreter program’s 
failures in early 1944. Interpreters could not get paid unless their names appeared 
on the official payroll, which Bureau headquarters in Chongqing forwarded to the 
Kunming, Guilin, and India branch offices, a process that could take several months 
for interpreters on their first assignments.72 In Guilin, many went three months 
without pay.73 According to interpreter Weng Xinjun, a fellow interpreter hanged 
himself in front of the FAB branch office in Kunming in February 1944 after the 
officials there refused to pay the back salary he was owed. His death sparked a riot, 
leading other interpreters to burn down the office.74 U.S. authorities had believed 
the Bureau resolved this problem once and for all last December when Chiang 
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approved the general plan for interpreter training, procurement, and accounting. Its 
reemergence in early 1944 no doubt reinforced American assumptions about 
Chinese incompetence and corruption.  
 Tension continued into March, when recruits at the Kunming interpreter 
school held a mass meeting on the seventeenth to discuss mistreatment. Wu Zelin 
and Fan Jichang, the school’s current directors, told U.S. Army liaison officer H.M. 
Spengler that “reports from present interpreters concerning the subjects of pay, 
uniforms, rice, and hospitalization” had poisoned the atmosphere at the training 
center. These recruits, mostly draftees from Lianda’s class of 1944, “might refuse to 
be assigned if difficulties weren’t solved,” said Wu, who urged the Americans to help 
out temporarily with pay and uniforms.75 Stilwell, Dorn, Thompson, and other 
Americans dealing with interpreter affairs had pressed the FAB for months about 
these same issues. Despite the Bureau’s promise to give interpreters four uniforms 
upon graduation, Thompson discovered that the FAB was not procuring enough 
material to provide interpreters with even a single set of clothing.76 Many 
interpreters also went without food because the Bureau distributed monthly rice 
allowances in Kunming, leaving the men at remote posts with nothing to eat.77 For 
those who got sick—probably no small number given the lack of food and clothing—
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hospitals in Kunming charged exorbitant admission fees.78 Something had to be 
done, Spengler feared, to prevent the interpreter program from collapsing. Because 
of the draft’s failure in Chongqing, all plans for expanded military cooperation in 
1944 depended on these cadets undergoing training in Kunming.  
With interpreter discontent endemic across the CBI Theater, Major Loren 
Thompson began a weeklong investigation on June 6, traveling to Kunming, 
Chongqing, and Guilin. He found that earlier attempts to straighten out the FAB’s 
pay problems remained “hopelessly bogged down in red tape.” The Bureau’s failure 
to pay salaries on a timely basis was only part of the problem. Each interpreter drew 
his salary from one of three separate agencies—the Bureau, War Area Service Corps, 
or the Commission on Aeronautical Affairs. The Chinese government’s December 1, 
1943 directive to consolidate control under the FAB, Thompson discovered, had not 
yet been realized. The Bureau still supervised the bulk of interpreters but it paid 
them only one-third to one-half of what interpreters under WASC or Commission on 
Aeronautical Affairs supervision earned. This disparity contributed to low morale 
and encouraged interpreter recruits to slack while in training, since the least 
qualified graduates were assigned to work at WASC-run hostels. Thompson also saw 
“many indications which indicate heavy ‘squeeze’ is extracted” from interpreter 
salaries in both Kunming and Guilin. In all, prospects for attracting new recruits 
looked dim. “Due to the chain of broken promises made to the students by the 
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Chinese government,” Thompson wrote, many college presidents continued to 
oppose it.79 Only the continued support from Lianda’s professors at the Kunming 
training school, who in addition to running the training program held press 
conferences to address the program’s critics and traveled to various universities to 
recruit new students, kept the program afloat.80  
By late summer, however, continued support from Lianda was also in doubt. 
According to U.S. consular reports from Yunnan, representatives from Lianda and 
other Kunming universities had traveled to Chongqing in early July to press the 
government to honor its obligations to interpreters.81 On August 31, Consul General 
William Langdon reported “deep resentment” among Lianda’s students owing to the 
Bureau’s failure to provide salaries and uniforms. “Dissatisfaction with the 
treatment of student interpreters,” Langdon wrote in his report to Ambassador 
Clarence Gauss, “may cause an outbreak of trouble if the Central government 
attempts to enlist additional students [from Lianda] as interpreters.”82  
 As a result of these ongoing challenges, the FAB began turning over many of 
its commitments to the Americans. The Bureau phased out rice distribution and 
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started paying the U.S. Army to feed interpreters at WASC mess halls. Beginning 
August 1, U.S. forces also took over responsibility for paying interpreters’ salaries. 
Each month, the FAB gave the Americans a lump sum, but the U.S. Army’s finance 
officers distributed the money.83 The uniform problem dragged on until late 
October, when the U.S. Army agreed to loan shoes, uniforms, blankets, raincoats, and 
field gear to interpreters.84 The Chinese continued to run the interpreter training 
school in Kunming, but graduation numbers still failed to meet U.S. Army demands, 
and reservations over the quality of Chinese training persisted. The 200 civilians 
employed by the U.S. Army as interpreters in Guilin, Thompson noted, had 
“performed as interpreters in a more qualified manner than student graduates of 
interpreter training schools.”85 
These shortcomings in the interpreter program had a common logic: American 
servicemen believed that all fault lay with the Chinese government. When U.S. 
military and diplomatic officials spoke with interpreters, university faculty, and the 
Kunming training school staff, the complaints they heard confirmed this assessment. 
Such conversations also promoted the idea that English-speaking interpreters and 
America-educated Chinese intellectuals were partners in the Army’s contentious 
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dealings with the Chinese government. Meanwhile, the U.S. Army efforts to resolve 
the interpreter program’s problems in coordination with Chinese officials had failed 
to yield any real improvements. Instead, the Americans had simply taken over many 
of the Chinese government’s commitments. All this made it easy for American 
servicemen to underestimate the challenges required in administering the 
interpreter program while also encouraging them to see Chinese officials as 
untrustworthy, incompetent, and venal. Seeing Chinese officials through this lens 
also made it easier for Americans to dismiss complaints from the FAB and other 
Chinese government agencies. And finally, these factors allowed American 
servicemen to overlook how their own actions affected interpreter morale and 
performance.  
Clashing Views on Discrimination and Mistreatment 
Interpreters had many complaints when it came to their treatment at the hands 
of the Chinese government, but their interactions with American servicemen also 
gave rise to numerous grievances. Time and again, interpreters found evidence that 
GIs refused to treat Chinese as equals. American servicemen, however, generally 
dismissed mistreatment allegations. Whereas interpreters saw separate hospital 
facilities or different rations as evidence of anti-Chinese discrimination, American 
soldiers believed the Chinese should have been grateful for Uncle Sam’s generosity. 
Granted, some conflicts stemmed from outright bigotry, but those that resulted from 
clashing Chinese and American understandings of mistreatment or expectations 




about the sort of hardships interpreters should be expected to bear were both more 
frequent and intractable. In these situations, Chinese and American commanders 
tended to empathize only with their compatriots, making it exceedingly difficult to 
overcome cultural misunderstanding.  
Many interpreters reported mistreatment at the hands of American servicemen. 
A few American officers assaulted interpreters at Ramgarh and in Yunnan following 
verbal disagreements.86 Outright bigotry led to fistfights and even a few gunfire 
exchanges in India. Interpreter Liang Jiayou recalled in his memoir that “a serious 
conflict” broke out in Ledo, the main staging point for flights into China, when white 
American soldiers forced Chinese interpreters to sit together with black GIs at an 
outdoor movie theater.87 Interpreters saw further evidence of discrimination at 
Ledo’s General Hospital, where the U.S. Army kept separate wings for Chinese and 
American troops. Interpreters like Luo Daren resented the practice, and he fumed at 
seeing wounded Chinese combat soldiers being treated in a ward “that was more 
like a prison.” American patients, on the other hand, Luo observed, received 
treatment in what resembled a real hospital. And unlike the Chinese patients, none 
of the Americans had been injured in combat.88 Lu Shaochen, another interpreter, 
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requested a transfer from a nearby evacuation hospital because of the American 
staff’s discriminatory attitude toward the Chinese.89 Mistreatment and 
discrimination caused such resentment because interpreters understood it as 
insults to both themselves personally and to China as a whole.  
 Mistreatment and discrimination, however, were not always so clear-cut. 
Whereas interpreters saw segregated wards at the 20th General hospital as evidence 
of discrimination, the Americans working there believed they were giving Chinese 
soldiers the best medical attention the Chinese Army had ever received.90 Both 
groups were right. American and Chinese patients were treated in separate but 
unequal facilities. Treatment for Chinese soldiers, however, was no doubt superior 
to anything offered by the Chinese Army. The CBI Theater’s official historians noted 
that American servicemen described Chinese Army hospitals “as similar to the 
German extermination camps at Buchenwald and in Poland.”91 Hyperbole aside, 
most Chinese medical officers had received no formal training, and just 2,000 
qualified doctors served the entire Chinese Army. Unsurprisingly, being wounded 
often meant a death sentence.92 But at the 20th General, American medical staff 
reduced the death rate from wounds among Chinese troops to 3.5%.93 This statistic 
mattered far more to the American hospital staff than the conditions in which their 
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Chinese patients lived. American servicemen also expected interpreters to be 
grateful because U.S. Army medical staff gave Chinese soldiers far better care than 
the Chinese government could provide. Interpreters and many other Chinese, 
however, found this stance patronizing. As Luo Daren put it, interpreters rankled at 
Americans treating the Chinese “as if they were their saviors.”94 
These clashing perceptions existed across the board. Time-Life’s Theodore 
White reported that the Ramgarh Training Center was a “wonderland” for Chinese 
soldiers. “They were fed, for the first time,” he gushed, “as much food and meat as 
they could stuff into their hungry bodies.”95 Yet even if the rations at Ramgarh were 
as generous as White believed, interpreters judged the food there and at other 
facilities in India by comparing it to what the Americans gave to their own 
soldiers.96 If Chinese rations were in any way inferior to what Americans received, 
interpreters regard it as discriminatory. Dealing with theft was another point of 
contention. American servicemen searched Chinese civilian employees at the end of 
each day for stolen goods. GIs saw nothing wrong with the practice. After all, their 
superiors would hold them responsible if anything went missing. But interpreters 
found it racist and insulting because Americans themselves were never searched 
when their workday ended.97  
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Complaints about unequal treatment also sowed discord at the Alliance’s higher 
levels. On October 24, 1943, an interpreter named Cai Zukang told FAB branch office 
director Yao Kai that five American officers had abandoned him in western Yunnan. 
Cai alleged that the officers had “heaped insults on me and my country” throughout 
the journey before leaving him alone in the mountains when he refused to cross a 
dangerous river to set up an antenna.98 Major Fred Eggers, the American mission 
commander, challenged Cai’s claims. According to Eggers, Cai had agreed to join the 
mission after being “told of what could be expected in the way of hardships,” but 
refused to help the Americans set up an antenna because he would “not do coolie 
work.”99 Dorn sided with Eggers, noting that Cai’s attitude “was that he was on a 
higher intellectual plane than menials who might set up a radio or any other work in 
connection with training or the war effort in general. I consider him a traitor.”100 
Dorn expected Cai to act like a GI and bear whatever hardship American soldiers 
undertook. Cai and his supervisors in the FAB, on the other hand, saw manual labor 
as something beyond the scope of an interpreter’s duties—work fit for a coolie or an 
enlisted man, not a Chinese fanyiguan.  
 Interpreters’ sensitivity toward anything resembling discriminatory 
treatment stemmed from a deeply embedded sense of Chinese nationalism that few 
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Americans understood. Stilwell dismissed Chinese nationalism as a sham—a 
confidence trick Chiang and other government officials used to get more aid. But the 
century of unequal treaties, the May Fourth Movement, the War of Resistance, and 
the years of Nationalist rule fueled a pervasive desire to see foreigners treat Chinese 
as equals. As Ch’i Hsi-sheng has shown in his study of Chiang’s contentious 
relationship with Stilwell, the Generalissimo and his key advisors got offended 
whenever they sensed Americans looking down on them or treating them with less 
respect than they treated the British. This, in turn, aggravated their nationalist 
feelings.101  
This same sense of nationalism lay at the root of many disputes between 
interpreters and American servicemen. Instructors at the Kunming training school 
and other Chinese authority figures working with interpreters reinforced these 
sensitivities, warning interpreters to be on guard against mistreatment. According 
to Guo Guanqiu, an interpreter who volunteered for the WASC’s first training course 
in 1941, Lianda Professor Chen Futian warned the recruits that “American soldiers 
lived a ‘three W’ life: wine, women, and wealth.” As a result, they were likely to 
behave in ways that insulted Chinese honor.102 General Sun Liren, meanwhile, the 
American-educated commander of China’s crack 38th division in Ramgarh, told new 
interpreters arriving from China that “he would support them completely” if the 
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Americans did anything to them that damaged China’s national dignity.103 
Instructions like Sun’s and Chen’s heightened interpreters’ sensitivities to anything 
resembling unequal treatment. Some forms of unequal treatment were obvious, like 
segregated seating at outdoor movie theaters. Yet on other occasions interpreters’ 
heightened sense of nationalism led them to see insult where none was intended. 
For example, when U.S. Army quartermasters issued second-hand khakis to 
interpreters in Ramgarh in order to make up for the FAB’s failure to provide proper 
uniforms, interpreter Zhang Zhiliang felt insulted. “Because, the Americans looked 
down on the Chinese,” he complained, “they gave us their old uniforms.”104  
Historical memory weighed heavily on interactions between GIs and 
interpreters. Although Henry Luce’s publications, Pearl Buck’s The Good Earth, and 
wartime films refuted assumptions about Chinese racial inferiority, they also played 
into the idea of China and the United States enjoying a special relationship.105 So 
when interpreters or their administrators in the Chinese government failed to meet 
American standards of efficiency or manliness, it clashed with this teleological 
understanding of U.S.-China relations. Men like Frank Dorn responded by dividing 
the Chinese into two categories: those who opposed or facilitated Americanization. 
For others, such as ordinary men in the ranks, falling back on negative stereotypes 
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was easy whenever the special relationship myth fell apart. But interpreters and 
their administrators could also be too quick to fall back on negative assumptions. 
Not all disputes resulted from deliberate American efforts to insult China. As 
cultural brokers, however, interpreters were the men whom Chinese and American 
authorities relied upon to mediate such conflicts. Instead, interpreters found 
themselves caught in the middle of them. Expecting interpreters to understand all 
these nuances, however, was like expecting GIs to understand the roots of Chinese 
nationalism. But without shared understandings of mistreatment or interpreters’ 
responsibilities, these wary allies invited further trouble down the road.  
Operational Success at a Heavy Cost 
The numerous problems dogging the interpreter program did not preclude 
success in some training and combat operations. American officers praised 
interpreters for their contributions to the Chinese Army training programs in 
Ramgarh and Yunnan. These American-trained Chinese units went on the offensive 
during the Burma and Salween campaigns, and once again American commanders 
found interpreters indispensible. Interpreters, however, came away from these 
operations with mixed impressions, and operational success did not alleviate the 
frustrations American officers had regarding the interpreter program as a whole. 
Ousting the Japanese from northern Burma and western Yunnan, meanwhile, left 
central China weakly defended during Japan’s Ichigo campaign, dealing a crippling 




blow to the Nationalists and thereby throwing up new obstacles to cooperative 
relations between GIs and interpreters.  
Interpreters earned high marks in 1944 for their assistance with the U.S. Army’s 
Yunnan Force and Chinese Army in India training programs. Established in August 
1942, the Ramgarh Training Center in Bihar provided a space for American advisors 
to train the Nationalists’ 38th, 22nd, and 30th divisions.106 By October 1944, more 
than 53,000 Chinese officers and men had passed through its gates.107 Outside 
Kunming, the Field Artillery Training Center and Infantry Training Center both 
opened for Yunnan Force training in April 1943, and a mobile training program 
based in Midu County, about halfway between Kunming and Dali along the Burma 
Road, also trained Chinese soldiers from the Yunnan Force.108 In a July 9, 1944 letter 
to new FAB Director Yang Xuancheng, Stilwell wrote that performance reviews 
carried out by American staff showed “a very high degree of capable and loyal 
service on the part of the interpreter group at Ramgarh.”109 Brigadier General 
Thomas Hearn was no less enthusiastic in a September 11 report to Yang, writing, 
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“by far the greater portion of the group of interpreters” working with the Yunnan 
Force had “performed their duty in a manner which reflects good credit.”110   
The training programs in Yunnan and India were tested when the Chinese Army 
went on the offensive to retake western Yunnan and northern Burma. The Ramgarh-
trained divisions, also known as the X-Force, began moving into Burma in December 
1943, and the Yunnan Force crossed the Salween River into Japanese-occupied 
territory in May 1944. Instead of assisting with training, interpreters now 
accompanied American liaison officers, who served with and advised Chinese 
units.111 For their work in these campaigns, interpreters earned praised from 
American and Chinese commanders alike.112 Frank Dorn lauded Yunnan-Force 
interpreters for their service and bravery in a memo to the FAB that was 
republished in the Da Gong Bao, Chonqging’s paper of record: 
I desire to commend the exemplary spirit with which these young 
men have performed their important duties. As you well know, 
much of the Chinese-American cooperation in Chinese troop units 
depends on the efficiency and willingness of interpreters. They 
serve their country in a manner which has become as important as 
the actual combat soldiers.113 
 
On January 27, 1945, a week after defeating the last Japanese defenders at Wanding, 
on the China-Burma border, units from the Yunnan Force and the Chinese Army in 
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India linked up at Mangyou, allowing the Ledo Road connecting India and China to 
open to traffic.114 On February 5, the first truck convoy from Ledo reached 
Kunming.115   
Interpreters who participated in the campaigns and the Chinese Army training 
programs came away with mixed impressions. At the Field Artillery Training Center 
(FATC) outside Kunming, interpreters appreciated commander Jerome Waters’ 
willingness to provide them with comfortable living conditions and his humor in 
refereeing to the FATC as “Foolish Americans Training Chinese.”116 Zhang Xiangong, 
who interpreted in a mobile training unit, praised the American colonel he worked 
with for treating Chinese soldiers with respect and giving them the chance to put 
what they learned into practice.117 Zhao Yongnian, another mobile training unit 
interpreter, enjoyed his service thanks to Lieutenant George Brakley’s enthusiasm, 
work ethic, and cultural sensitivity.118  During the Salween campaign, American 
liaison officers inspired respect by going to the frontlines at the battle for 
Gaoligongshan.119 As before, however, unequal treatment remained interpreters’ 
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chief complaint. They viewed poor-quality instruction in the Chinese Army training 
programs as evidence that Americans looked down on the Chinese.120 It angered 
interpreters like Shen Youkan to see GIs escape punishment for theft by blaming 
Chinese soldiers.121 Disputes broke out over such theft accusations as well as over 
racism and GIs failing to respect interpreters’ honorary officer ranks.122 In short, 
only when interpreters thought the Americans treated them as equals did they came 
away with a positive impression.  
From a strategic perspective, however, success in western Yunnan and northern 
Burma came at a heavy cost for China, suggesting that interpreters’ efforts would 
have been better used elsewhere. The Burma offensive proceeded without the naval 
operations in the Bay of Bengal that President Franklin Roosevelt had promised 
Chiang during the November 1943 Cairo Conference, which would have severed 
Japanese supply lines and given the Allies control of the skies.123 After meeting with 
Soviet leader Josef Stalin at Teheran in December, Roosevelt agreed to cancel all 
plans for naval operations and to transfer all South East Asia Command (SEAC) 
landing craft to Europe for use in Operation Overlord. Chiang cautioned Roosevelt 
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on January 1 that this decision would allow the Japanese to mount an all-out 
offensive in China, a warning Roosevelt failed to heed thanks to faulty U.S. military 
assessments of Japanese intentions. In April, the Japanese launched the Ichigo 
campaign in central China, and Roosevelt strong-armed Chiang into launching the 
Salween campaign around the same time, preventing Chiang from using his best 
troops in China to resist the Japanese offensive.124 Chinese forces suffered heavy 
casualties during the Burma campaign, with the Nationalists reporting nearly 
30,000 men killed and the U.S. Army recording at least 25,000 dead.125 Total 
casualties may have exceeded 70,000, all in a theater irrelevant to Chiang’s survival 
and without the air and naval support his allies had promised him.126 In the 
meantime, the Ichigo campaign destroyed two of Chiang’s best remaining armies, 
causing some 500,000 military casualties, and allowed the Japanese to occupy 
Henan, southern Hunan, and parts of Guangxi and Guizhou.127 Ichigo also cut in half 
Nationalist-controlled territory, caused the loss of a full fourth of China’s factories, 
and severed remaining industrial plant from important raw material sources.128 As 
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Chiang told Roosevelt on October 9, 1944, “We have taken Myitkyina but lost all of 
East China.”129 This defeat caused irrevocable damage to Chiang’s reputation at 
home.130  
  Interpreters, in sum, despite continue complaints about mistreatment by 
American servicemen, performed well in training and operations, but the victory 
they facilitated in Yunnan and Burma proved to be of dubious value to Chongqing. 
Interpreters’ work on the campaign, meanwhile, did nothing to alleviate 
longstanding tensions at the Alliance’s higher levels over the interpreter program as 
a whole. On October 15, Chiang Kai-shek appointed He Haoruo director of the FAB 
and ordered him to make the interpreter program his top priority. Two weeks later, 
General Albert Wedemeyer replaced Chiang’s arch-nemesis Joseph Stilwell as 
commander of U.S. forces in China. Unlike Stilwell, Wedemeyer sought cooperative 
relations with Chiang, and He Haoruo, who had a PhD in Agronomy from the 
University of Wisconsin-Madison, was eager to cooperate with the Americans and 
resolve the interpreter program’s shortcomings. But with China’s military and 
economy in tatters, Wedemeyer and He faced a momentous challenge.  
Chinese and U.S. Authorities Get Serious 
He Haoruo’s appointment as FAB director initiated a period of close cooperation 
with the U.S. Army on interpreter affairs. His appointment also coincided with the 
arrival of a liaison officer group that Chiang’s American advisor Frank Price had 
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assembled to assist with the interpreter program and WASC hostel service. 
Together, He Haoruo’s FAB and Price’s liaison officer group addressed many of the 
interpreter program’s shortcomings. At the same time, some senior American 
commanders finally began empathizing with interpreters’ views of mistreatment. 
But thanks to China’s skyrocketing inflation and Chongqing’s ever weakening 
bargaining position vis-à-vis the U.S. Army, interpreters found themselves on the 
lowest rung as Chinese and American authorities struggled to manage the sharp rise 
in U.S. troops deployments to China. Having taken on nearly all of Chongqing’s 
commitments to interpreters, the U.S. Army now found itself the main target of 
interpreters’ complaints. GI-interpreter disputes intensified, and interpreters at U.S. 
Army facilities began staging strikes. As a result, American frustration over 
interpreters’ supposed immaturity and unwillingness to tough it out overshadowed 
nascent sympathy toward their grievances. And while He Haoruo sympathized with 
interpreters’ grievances, Chiang’s growing dependence on the U.S. Army meant that 
the FAB director’s hands were tied in addressing them.   
After taking up directorship of the Foreign Affairs Bureau on October 15, He 
Haoruo began tackling the interpreter program’s numerous problems. He convinced 
Chiang to set up a CN$10 million revolving fund to ensure that the U.S. Army had 
adequate money to pay interpreters’ salaries.131 On Chiang’s orders, he also arrested 
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Kunming FAB branch director Dai Zhaoran for corruption.132 In mid-November, he 
assembled a team of eight Chinese-speaking American missionary educators to 
serve as instructors and liaison officers at a new interpreter school in Chongqing, 
slated to open in early 1945. The old Chongqing interpreter school had failed in 
1944 in part because of teaching and curriculum problems, so these men wrote 
forty lesson modules for the new school.133 To keep classes full and ensure that 
recruits had the necessary English proficiency, the Bureau began holding weekly 
entrance tests.134 He Haoruo and Loren Thompson, now a colonel, also worked out a 
system by which the U.S. Army would feed, clothe, and equip all interpreters starting 
on January 1 in exchange for monthly gold and Chinese fabi reimbursements paid to 
the U.S. government.135 He Haoruo’s take-no-prisoners approach signaled 
Chongqing’s heightened attention to the interpreter program and helped pave the 
way for the large influx of American servicemen who arrived in China over the 
winter.  
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 He Haoruo also began drumming up public support for the program. He told 
reporters in Chongqing on November 6 that improvements in training, pay, and 
work assignments were now underway. “Some interpreters haven’t been paid for 
months,” he admitted, but from now on the U.S. Army would pay all salaries.136 On 
November 22, he announced that new interpreters could expect the U.S. Army to 
provide them with the same food, housing, and equipment that American officers 
received.137 Since 1941, Chinese authorities had stressed the significance of 
interpreters’ honorary officer rank. But going into the field without uniforms, living 
in squalor, or having to scrounge up food for themselves had humiliated 
interpreters and made it impossible for them to see themselves on the same plane 
as American junior officers. Director He’s effort to rectify the situation showed that 
he took interpreters’ grievances seriously. His willingness to address the public and 
make interpreter affairs his top priority also made He unique among wartime FAB 
directors. In the past, public relations had been left to Kunming interpreter school 
instructors like Mei Yiqi and Wu Zelin.  
He also coordinated the interpreter program’s overall operations as chairman of 
Chiang’s Special Committee on Interpreter Affairs. This new committee had at least 
one representative from each organization dealing with interpreters. Thompson 
represented the U.S. Army, Huang Renlin, the War Area Service Corps, and Vice 
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Minister Han Liwu, the Ministry of Education. Two other members, Frank Price and 
Chiang’s son, Chingkuo, were both confidants of the Generalissimo. Yuan Shouqian 
oversaw interpreters’ political training, which consisted primarily of reading and 
hearing lectures on Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People in English, while 
Xiang Liren served as overall director of training. Starting in January, the committee 
met monthly. To meet U.S. Army needs, He Haoruo sought to train 5,000 
interpreters in 1945, and in subsequent meetings, committee members assessed 
their progress toward this end while making necessary adjustments.138   
 In late February, He and Thompson attempted to mitigate recruitment 
shortfalls by traveling to Chengdu, the epicenter of Chinese opposition to the 
program.139 For years, U.S. authorities had pressured the Chinese government to 
recruit students from Chengdu, but due to “broken promises, graft, embezzlement of 
funds, and drafting of students for interpreter duty,” Thompson reported, Chengdu’s 
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universities had “consistently refused to encourage students to join the interpreter 
project.”140 During a February 23 press conference in Chengdu, Director He assured 
reporters the days of conscription and broken promises were over. He and 
Thompson also met privately with the presidents of Chengdu’s six universities.141 
Over the four-day trip, He spoke to around 1,500 students and 100 professors, 
answering their questions and encouraging volunteers to step forward. “Should 
there be no interpreters,” he reminded them, “our allies would become deaf.”142 
Because local officials had backed the universities in opposing the interpreter 
project, He and Thompson also met with Sichuan Governor Chang Chun and 
Commissioner of Education Guo Yushou. Thanks to He and Thompson’s efforts, 
these officials and administrators agreed to back the program, and many students 
expressed interest in joining. As a result, Thompson wrote, the Bureau would 
probably be able to recruit some 500 qualified interpreters.143 Eighty-two 
volunteers passed the first qualifying exam on March 6 and left Chengdu to begin 
training. 144 Guo Yushou continued to supervise recruitment and testing over the 
next few months.145 
                                                        
140 Rear Echelon Headquarters, USF China Theater, Office of Interpreter Affairs, 28 February 1945, RG 
493, China Theater/Special Staff/Interpreter Affairs Section, Subject Files, 1944–1946, Box 653, 
Chongqing-Chengdu Trip, NARA. 
141 Sichuan, West China Union, Nanjing, Yenching, Cheeloo, and Jinling universities. 
142 FAB Director General He Haoruo’s Speech, 23 February 1945, RG 493, China Theater/Special 
Staff/Interpreter Affairs Section, Subject Files, 1944–1946, Box 653, Chongqing-Chengdu Trip, NARA.  
143 Rear Echelon Headquarters, USF China Theater, Office of Interpreter Affairs, 28 February 1945, RG 
493, China Theater/Special Staff/Interpreter Affairs Section, Subject Files, 1944–1946, Box 653, 
Chongqing-Chengdu Trip, NARA. 
144 “Rong qu fanyi guan kaoshi ming qi booming liu ri qi bishi” 蓉區翻譯官考試明起報名六日起筆試 
[Registration Begins Tomorrow for March 6 Interpreter Exam in Chengdu Area] Zhongyang ri bao 




 U.S. military authorities also stepped up their efforts to bolster the program. 
On January 14, the U.S. Army opened an interpreters’ pool in Kunming, where 
American officers ran a four-week orientation course for new interpreters covering 
tactics, map reading, military technology, and weapons.146 This course addressed 
American criticisms about interpreters beginning their service without having 
knowledge of relevant military vocabulary and concepts. Nearly 1,800 finished it 
before the war ended.147 The interpreters’ pool also provided a space for veteran 
interpreters to live and train while awaiting redeployment or demobilization. 
Around the same time U.S. forces opened the pool, Thompson began holding regular 
meetings with representatives from all U.S. Army units using interpreters. In the 
past, disputes sometimes occurred when interpreters wanted something in 
accordance with a new rule, but the American unit they were working with had not 
yet heard about the change. Thompson sought to use these meetings prevent such 
misunderstandings from occurring in the future.148 
 None of these administrative efforts, however, could do anything to address 
the structural problems that existed regardless of any Chinese or American conduct. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
(Chengdu ban) 中央日報成都版, February 28, 1945; “Fanyi kaoshi jiexiao” 翻譯考試揭曉 [Interpreter 
Test Results Published] Zhongyang ribao (Chengdu ban) 中央日報成都版, 11 March 1945.  
145 “The Two-Fold Mission of the Interpreting Officer,” RG 493, China Theater/Special 
Staff/Interpreter Affairs Section, Subject Files, 1944–1946, Box 653, Chongqing-Chengdu Trip, NARA. 
146 Interpreters Pool, Chinese Training Center, USF China Theater, Subject: Report of Progress, 28 
February 1945, RG 493, China Theater/Special Staff/Interpreter Affairs Section, Administrative 
Correspondence 1944–1945, Box 646, Chinese Training Center 1945, NARA. 
147 Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs Out in CBI, 377–378.  
148 Minutes of American Representatives of Units Utilizing Interpreters, 29 January 1945, RG 493, 
China Theater/Special Staff/Interpreter Affairs Section, Administrative Correspondence 1944–1945, 
Box 646, Chinese Training Center 1945, NARA. 




Ever since the late Qing Dynasty, ordinary Chinese had regarded interpreters with 
suspicion owing to their close association with foreigners and foreign 
governments.149 This trend continued during the war, when Chinese soldiers and 
hostel workers often treated interpreters with outright hostility and many ordinary 
civilians saw them simply as a means for procuring U.S. military supplies.150 The 
most pressing structural problems, however, stemmed from China’s precarious 
finances and rising U.S troop deployments in China. Inflation rose sharply following 
the Ichigo offensive, so even though interpreters’ salaries increased by six hundred 
percent between October 1944 and July 1945, they lost half their value against the 
U.S. dollar in Chongqing over the same period.151 In Yunnan, where most 
interpreters worked, black market exchange rates were even worse, rendering 
interpreter salaries almost worthless.152 As an American quartermaster wrote in 
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February 1945, interpreters earned about the same wages as unskilled laborers, 
which was “not only ridiculous but also the source of much embarrassment to these 
officers.”153 Meanwhile, the U.S. Army presence in China increased from around 
28,000 men to over 40,000 between December 1944 and March 1945, hindering 
efforts to feed and house interpreters alongside American officers.154  
 These issues became explosive in February. Interpreter Huang Shang 
recalled that WASC hostel workers refused to feed and house interpreters along 
with American officers working in a mobile training group.155 At SOS Headquarters 
in Kunming, the WASC could barely manage the American troop influx, so 
interpreters found themselves living in tents and eating with enlisted men.156 To 
them, the situation was yet another insult by Americans who refused to give 
interpreters proper respect. Arguments broke out repeatedly, but because GIs 
attributed these disputes to interpreters’ refusal to tough it out, the two groups 
continued to talk past one another and relations remained strained.157 Up the road 
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from Kunming at OSS Headquarters in Gangtou Village, Americans dealt with 
overcrowding by feeding Chinese and Americans at different times and giving them 
separate toilet facilities. He Yizhong and other interpreters understood this as 
mistreatment and staged a strike.158 In Guizhou that same week, American enlisted 
men attacked five interpreters for trying to enter an American mess hall, leading to 
protests from Chinese Army commander He Yingqin.159 Ten days later in Ramgarh, 
Lieutenant Colonel Elmer Jantz, commandant of the Motor Transport School, 
reported that Yan Zuolin had organized his fellow interpreters against the 
Americans because he “appeared unable or unwilling to bear up under the 
hardships which every American officer and enlisted man of this command has had 
to endure since the establishment of this school.”160  
 These disputes highlighted the precariousness of interpreters’ position as 
well as the Alliance’s unstable foundations. Interpreters understood anything that 
associated them with enlisted men as evidence of mistreatment, and because the 
U.S. Army had taken over responsibilities for feeding and housing interpreters, the 
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Americans, rather than the FAB, took the blame when food and living conditions 
failed to meet interpreters’ standards. But of course the U.S. Army still depended on 
China’s overburdened War Area Service Corps for its food and lodging, so while the 
Americans took the blame for problems, the Chinese had to foot the bill. WASC 
employees, however, resented having to treat interpreters like American officers. 
They had often refused American requests to feed interpreters even after the U.S. 
Army and FAB had reached agreements on the practice.161 Adding yet another layer 
of confusion, some American servicemen were still unsure about interpreters’ status 
in part because the Chinese Army barred interpreters from wearing officer insignia. 
Still, thanks to He Haoruo and Loren Thompson’s efforts, at least now the Chinese 
and American authorities responsible for interpreter affairs got wind of what was 
happening.  
 After a month of near-constant disputes and agitation, Colonel John 
Middleton, commander of the Chinese Training Center (CTC), sent out a memo on 
March 1 that empathized with how interpreters understood mistreatment. The CTC 
oversaw all U.S. Army-run training centers for Chinese soldiers in Yunnan province, 
so each American officer under Middleton’s command worked with interpreters, 
and the largest training centers employed close to 100 of them at any given time. 
“The Chinese interpreter is a Chinese officer and must be given the courtesy and 
respect due his position,” Middleton warned. Interpreters should never be ordered 
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to do anything other than interpret, and should never be placed under the command 
of an American enlisted man.162 On April 24, the Chinese Combat Command, which 
oversaw the CTC and supervised Wedemeyer’s broader plans to train and equip 
thirty-nine Chinese Army divisions, issued similar orders.163 Up to this point, 
American commanders had blamed the Chinese government for interpreter morale 
problems and dismissed most interpreter grievances toward American troops. To 
his credit, Middleton attempted to see the issue from the ordinary interpreter’s 
perspective. But his exhortations came too late.   
 On May 12, interpreters at the Field Artillery Training Center (FATC) outside 
Kunming staged a strike to protest living and working conditions. In the past, 
interpreters had considered the FATC a cushy post. American staff, meanwhile, had 
little sympathy for the strikers, with one officer writing that interpreters 
“considered their station to be far above that of an army officer, and did not feel that 
they should be subject to any discipline whatsoever.” Americans provided them 
with bedding, recreational facilities and a post office, but “interpreters felt that they 
were not living in accordance with their just desserts.”164 Major Harry R. Smith, who 
replaced Loren Thompson as Officer in Charge of Interpreter Affairs for the China 
Theater in April, agreed, telling an officer who asked him for advice on dealing with 
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the disgruntled interpreters that “it has been my experience that most of the 
interpreters are a lot of greedy children and resent anything that does not benefit 
them directly.”165 Brigadier General Haydon Boatner, commander of the Chinese 
Combat Command, agreed, telling his men that interpreters were “immature in their 
thinking and actions.”166 
 So what exactly did American officers expect from interpreters? Comments 
from performance rating reviews and military award citations are instructive. 
Captain Roger Thomas recommended interpreter Pan Kunchi for promotion 
because he had “at all times demonstrated his willingness to serve in any 
assignment” and worked under difficult conditions without complaint.167 Captain 
William Yavelak urged the FAB to promote Huang Qianyi for his hard work and for 
being “very neat in his habits and appearance.”168 Fu Yuxin earned a Distinguished 
Service Medal for working competently on the Salween Campaign “without 
sufficient food or clothing.”169 Huang Yuanchi, another Salween veteran earned the 
same medal because of his “devotion to duty,” and his colleague, Yao Yuan, was 
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awarded for bravery during the Siege of Tengchong.170 Even when commending 
interpreters for facilitating cooperation between Chinese and U.S. forces, the real 
key was an interpreter’s skill in convincing the Chinese to do things the American 
way. Colonel Sheng, chief interpreter for the Armored Force Section at Ramgarh, 
“understands the American viewpoint,” wrote Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Trent, “he 
is a friend of our country. His loyalty to our standards is unquestioned.”171 In short, 
GIs judged interpreters by how well they conformed to American standards of 
soldiering and by their effectiveness in furthering U.S. efforts to Americanize the 
Chinese Army.  
 Higher ups in the Chinese FAB, however, clearly sympathized with 
interpreters’ complaints. Just because interpreters wore U.S. uniforms, He Haoruo 
reminded Wedemeyer on April 29, did not mean they should be treated as U.S. 
soldiers.172 Throughout the spring, He and his deputy in Kunming, Yao Guanshun, 
had pleaded repeatedly with Wedemeyer and less senior commanders to ensure 
that their men treated interpreters as equals and put a halt to violence against 
them.173 Clearly, senior FAB commanders empathized with the FATC interpreters 
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who went on strike on May 12. Yet the FAB nevertheless charged six instigators 
with a “serious offense” (大过) and issued demerits (记过) to another seventy-six 
strikers.174  
 The Bureau’s punishments demonstrated the limits to He Haoruo’s power as 
a mediator and revealed Chiang’s bottom line. The FATC strike occurred at a nadir in 
relations between GIs and interpreters, and as later chapters will show, ties 
between American servicemen and other Chinese groups—women, soldiers, 
civilians, and police—also reached a low point between April and June 1945. At the 
same time, Chiang Kai-shek’s opinion of the U.S. Army in China, as embodied by 
Wedemeyer, who served as both commander of U.S. forces in China and Chiang’s 
chief of staff, had never been higher. After three difficult years with Stilwell, Chiang 
finally had the American advisor he wanted.175 His overriding geopolitical 
imperative was maintaining good relations with sympathetic, important Americans 
like Wedemeyer and Ambassador Patrick Hurley. Chiang knew that Japan would 
soon fall but his weaknesses left him more dependent than ever on the U.S. Army. 
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The Ichigo and Burma campaigns had decimated his military. Mao Zedong’s Red 
Army, on the other hand, had grown far more powerful as the Nationalists bore the 
brunt of the war. Even beyond these pressing concerns, Chiang saw threats 
wherever he looked: Soviet encroachment in Xinjiang, the autonomy of regional 
militarists like Yunnan Governor Long Yun, hostile Western journalists giving his 
regime bad press, rampant inflation and intractable fiscal crisis, and a war-weary 
population chafing under his ever-harsher authoritarian rule. There was simply no 
way Chiang could allow interpreters to threaten military-to-military relations with 
the United States. His National Military Council warned them in May that, “[e]very 
word and action directly influences military affairs and friendly feelings between 
allies.”176 Interpreters would have to swallow their pride and take the lead in 
facilitating cooperative relations with U.S. forces in the China Theater.  
 Whereas much of the scholarship on wartime U.S-China relations portrays 
Chiang as uncooperative, the Generalissimo actually put the U.S. Army’s needs ahead 
of his own people when it came to interpreters. Granted, He Haoruo carried out 
many reforms that addressed interpreters’ complaints. But U.S. military officials like 
Thompson had also hounded the Chinese government for years about problems 
with interpreters’ pay, food, and uniforms. From January 1945 onward, Chiang’s 
Special Committee on Interpreter Affairs focused almost exclusively satisfying the 
U.S. Army’s demands. To his credit, He Haoruo also pleaded with Thompson and 
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Wedemeyer to make sure American soldiers treated interpreters with respect, and 
American commanders at the Chinese Training Center and Chinese Combat 
Command finally began recognizing that their men were sometimes at fault in 
disputes with interpreters. Despite this realization, China’s structural weaknesses 
and Chiang’s dependence on the U.S. Army hindered efforts to address interpreter 
morale problems. Demand for interpreters still exceeded supply, and Chongqing had 
to figure how to boost recruitment and morale without doing anything to anger U.S. 
commanders.177 A strident editorial in China’s paper of record put another obstacle 
in the way of this goal.   
Misery in the Ranks 
 On March 19 a man calling himself Interpreter Wang published a long 
editorial entitled, “On ‘Interpreting Officers,’” in Chongqing’s Da Gong Bao. Until 
then, most press coverage about interpreters had been positive or neutral, 
discussing contributions to the war effort, the progress of training classes, or 
outlining recruitment needs. Wang’s long editorial, however, blasted the interpreter 
program as an “inexplicable” waste of time and manpower. For years, U.S. Army 
authorities had pushed the Chinese to recruit more interpreters, but Wang insisted, 
“[t]he need for interpreters had been filled to the point of saturation.” The Chinese 
government and the interpreter program’s domestic supporters, on the other hand, 
had always stressed the program’s invaluable role in the war effort. But here, too, 
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Wang disagreed, writing that interpreters in the field performed only menial 
tasks—if they had anything to do at all—and those serving at military facilities were 
“little more than office boys to the foreigners.”178 Appearing in the country’s most 
important newspaper at the peak of China’s 1945 interpreter recruitment drive and 
just weeks after He Haoruo and Loren Thompson’s successful visit to Chengdu, 
Wang’s editorial set off a panic at both FAB and U.S. Army headquarters.179 Once 
again Chongqing had to impose a draft. To address morale, Chongqing also began 
propagating a new vision of interpreters’ role as cultural brokers and vanguards in 
China’s modernization. Frank Dorn, though recently dismissed by Wedemeyer, 
would have been pleased. The number of interpreters identifying with Wang’s 
editorial, however, far exceeded those who bought into Chongqing’s new vision. As 
the war drew to a close, interpreter morale was abysmally low and mistreatment at 
the hands of American servicemen remained the most common grievance.  
 After Interpreter Wang’s editorial appeared in the Da Gong Bao, U.S. and 
Chinese authorities scrambled to limit the fallout. Wang claimed to be an interpreter 
serving in India, so U.S. Headquarters pressed Zhou Mingheng, the FAB’s India 
bureau director, for answers. Zhou assured the Americans that Wang was wrong; 
the only interpreters with nothing to do, Zhou wrote, were those whose poor 
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English and laziness prevented them from carrying out their work.180 Loren 
Thompson agreed. He recommended keeping a close eye on the Chinese press “to 
preclude stirring up the student body in China against [the interpreter] project,” 
because only recently had the attitude toward the interpreter program in Chengdu 
“changed from hostile to positive.”181 In Chengdu, Sichuan Education Commissioner 
Guo Yushou spoke out against Wang, saying that all war was a waste of 
manpower.182 He Haoruo echoed Guo during a March 30 press conference but also 
noted that interpreting could be quite lucrative: fifty outstanding interpreters were 
now on their way to America and would earn a $3,200 annual salary to assist with 
Chinese Air Force Training.183  Promises of well-paid work in the United States 
failed to resolve the recruitment shortage, so on April 9 Chiang approved a plan to 
draft up to 1,000 workers employed by other government agencies and train them 
as interpreters.184 Another student draft was out of the question thanks to the FAB’s 
past failures, and thanks to these failures and Wang’s editorial, few volunteers 
would have come forward.  
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With interpreter morale still in the dumps and He Haoruo’s hands tied in 
dealing with interpreters’ complaints, Chongqing began stressing the need for 
interpreters to serve as cultural brokers and vanguards in China’s modernization. 
When Chinese Army commander He Yingqin spoke at the graduation ceremony for 
the FAB’s eighth interpreter training class in Kunming on July 9, he quoted at length 
from the National Military Council’s newly-published guidebook, How to Guide Our 
Soldiers to Get Along with Allied Troops [如何指導官兵與盟軍相處].185 General He 
told the graduates that they had to spread positive American values and habits, 
which he enumerated in great detail, among the Chinese populace. The guidebook 
he quoted from, a belated counterpart to the U.S. Army’s Pocket Guide to China, was 
actually written with Chinese soldiers and officials in mind, but its overall message 
stressing the need for Chinese to learn from GIs dovetailed with the imperative of 
finding new ways to keep interpreters motivated. He’s speech also addressed 
complaints from the U.S. military, telling interpreters they must “bear hardship 
without complaint” and that “only by being a model of discipline to Chinese and 
American soldiers could [interpreters] win their respect.”186   
The FAB’s firm stance against interpreter agitation prevented other large strikes 
from occurring over the summer, but morale remained in the dumps and few 
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interpreters identified with the cultural broker/vanguard of modernization role 
envisioned by the Chinese government. On June 28, a Guiyang newspaper published 
an appeal written by an anonymous interpreter who described his service with the 
U.S. Army Air Force and the Chinese military. “The difference of these two tribes 
causes trouble for us interpreters,” he wrote. Americans demanded speed and 
precision and criticized the Chinese for being slow and indirect. Chiang and He 
Yingqin had urged interpreters to absorb American values and habits, spread them 
among the Chinese troops, and then show GIS that Chinese culture also had much to 
offer. But in practice, the author wrote, Chinese and American soldiers refused “to 
yield themselves to each other” and blamed interpreters for differences of opinion 
and misunderstanding. “We have endured too much bitterness,” he argued, as a 
result of cultural differences between Chinese and American soldiers. Yet the author 
reserved most of his criticism for Chinese civilians. They treated interpreters like 
“brokers or wartime compradors,” constantly asking them to get hold of U.S. 
military equipment, chewing gum, or Camel cigarettes. Many civilians, he claimed, 
regarded interpreters with unfounded suspicion and contempt, calling them “false 
American soldiers” and accusing them of insulting China by having “a relation with 
allied forces as masters and slaves.”187 
A subsequent American investigation discovered that interpreters like this 
anonymous author and Interpreter Wang were hardly outliers. In July, two 
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American liaison officers working with the FAB—Perry Hanson and William 
Yavelak—left Kunming with Lianda Professor Dai Shiguang on a procurement trip 
for new interpreter cadets. The three men missed their recruitment target, but their 
journey allowed them to speak with “scores of interpreters nearly every day” 
working across southwest and central China: Yunnan, Sichuan, Guizhou, Guangxi 
and Hubei. Never before had American liaison officers met with so many 
interpreters. Hanson found the talks “tremendously enlighten[ing],” but “[a]lmost 
without exception,” he reported to Chiang’s American advisor Frank Price, “the men 
were disillusioned about their work and offered numerous complaints.”188  
Many interpreters identified with the March 19 Da Gong Bao editorial. 
Interpreters working with the SOS, Hanson noted, could not see any importance in 
their work. “Any GI could do it,” went the common refrain. Sadly, Hanson found, 
morale seemed to be getting worse. One interpreter told him that while working in 
Chongqing, he and his fellow interpreters “were incensed” by Wang’s editorial, 
“[n]ow we all think he was right!” To be fair, Hanson reasoned, SOS logistical work 
did not require much English, and most Americans in the SOS also disliked their 
jobs. But ever since Huang Renlin launched the interpreter program in 1941, every 
Chinese authority figure interpreters dealt with had invariably stressed the 
importance of interpreter service. Over the past few months especially, the highest 
Chinese officials had built up interpreter work to an almost sacred undertaking. Not 
                                                        
188 Perry Hanson to Frank Price, 8 August 1945, RG 493, China Theater/Special Staff/Interpreter 
Affairs Section, Subject Files: 1944–1946, Box 651, TIAO Section 1945–1946, NARA.  




only would interpreters enable the two armies to work together, they would be 
vanguards in China’s modernization and a cultural bridge to the United States. The 
young interpreter has volunteered, wrote Hanson, “often with high and real idealism 
to serve his country; he imagines himself as one who is about to do great things at 
great sacrifice to himself, but he finds himself checking trucks in and out of a small 
compound hundreds of miles from the front lines.”189  
Boredom was pervasive, but discrimination and mistreatment by American 
servicemen remained the most common grievance. Hanson reported that many 
misunderstandings stemmed from cultural differences but he also found ample 
evidence to support interpreters’ complaints. In Zhanyi, interpreters went on strike 
due to insults from an American sergeant and having to eat with black American 
truck drivers. Hanson wrote, “these men saw nothing amiss in the like segregation 
of the Negroes,” but their resentment was consistent with the overall pattern in 
China. Whereas anti-black racism in the U.S. military had bothered locals in Britain, 
Chinese, for the most part, accepted American assumptions of black inferiority and 
only took offense when GIs grouped Chinese and African-Americans together. To 
make matters worse, the procurement team found many hostels with signs reading 
“For American Personnel Only” posted outside latrines and washrooms. When one 
particularly embittered interpreter told Dai Shiguang about the mistreatment he 
had been subjected to over his eighteen months of service, Dai urged him “to think 
of all the evil the Japanese have done to our country and by comparison how small 
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your grievance is.” The man shot back: “The Japanese have never harmed me or 
mistreated me personally, yet the Americans have!”190  
Other complaints showed that longstanding administrative and 
communications problems still lingered. “One fact became evident,” Hanson wrote, 
“those in charge of interpreters at many places did not know what their status was.” 
As a result, many GIs treated interpreters as civilian employees and ordered them 
around, often telling them to do the sort of menial tasks that interpreters 
understood as insulting to themselves and their country. Thompson and other 
American officers had tied themselves in knots over the past six months to clarify 
interpreters’ status, to no avail. Interpreters’ naturally saw the issue as yet further 
evidence of mistreatment. Hanson also discovered that none of the interpreters he 
met had been issued officer insignia, despite the Chinese Army finally having agreed 
to start allowing the practice in July.191  
Relations with Chinese civilians also remained strained. Many American units 
employed Chinese laborers, “and one charge frequently made against civilian 
workers was that, being jealous of IO’s [interpreting officers], they had started a 
whispering campaign to the effect that the IO’s were in actuality government agents 
paid to spy on American activities.” These laborers, many of whom interpreters no 
doubt viewed as lowly coolies, actually earned far higher salaries than the 
interpreters. The extra money enabled them to interact with Americans socially 
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away from military facilities, something FAB interpreters could not afford to do 
unless they had some additional income source.192  
Interpreters also suffered from increasingly strained relations between Chinese 
and American troops. Hanson reported that he heard stories about Chinese soldiers 
robbing American troops “at least once a night.” Interpreters suffered in a variety of 
ways as a result, Hanson wrote, especially general unfriendliness on the part of 
American soldiers and “a desire to continue discrimination to the greatest extent 
possible.”193 The interpreter who wrote the June 28 article published in Guiyang 
confirmed Hanson’s findings, writing “for the worse acts done by our rotten 
comrades we had a lot of arguments with our Allied [American] friends.”194 
 Hanson’s procurement team found only a few encouraging signs. The 
American lieutenant in charge of interpreter affairs in Nanning, a man named 
Gallagher who had spent months fighting in the Burmese jungle before his 
deployment to China, had earned a stellar reputation for resolving disputes and 
treating interpreters with respect. According to Hanson, Gallagher had “the greatest 
respect and admiration for the Chinese” and always acted toward interpreters with 
understanding and patience. Interpreters who had worked with him in Zhanyi told 
Hanson that Gallagher also inspired the rest of his staff to follow his example. “If 
only we had more Gallaghers,” Hanson wrote. At Anshun, in Guizhou province, 
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Hanson’s team found the most contented group of interpreters they encountered, 
around twelve men working at Signal Corps school. They lived in a large, clean, well-
lit room. They suffered from no discrimination in the mess hall or latrines, and put 
in a full day’s work without any complaints.195  
 But Hanson recognized that these ideal living conditions and understanding 
attitudes were the exception rather than the rule. “I have come to the conclusion,” 
he wrote, “that basically the problems are insoluble arising as they do from the very 
situation in which interpreters are placed which in turn is immersed in cultural 
complexities of long standing, made more acute by the tensions of war.” The FAB 
and U.S. Army could do little other than attempt to boost interpreters’ spirits 
enough to enable them to withstand the hardships their position entailed. But as 
evinced by He Haoruo’s continued protests about mistreatment and abuse during 
the war’s final two months, even Hanson’s limited aims proved beyond reach.196  
Conclusion 
 The Pacific War’s abrupt end caught the Chinese government by surprise and 
brought the interpreter program to its conclusion. When the atomic bombs fell on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nearly 2,400 interpreters were working in the field and 
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several hundred more were undergoing training.197 On August 29, He Haoruo 
announced that the program would end once the last recruits finished their courses 
in Chongqing and Kunming.198 Starting on September 15, the FAB would discharge 
interpreters in batches and give each man a CN$100,000 severance payment. 
Director He mentioned nothing about sending the best interpreters to the United 
States for graduate school as the FAB had promised. Only the 100 interpreters 
already in the United States assisting with Chinese Air Force training would have 
this opportunity.199 On September 15, demobilization began with a riot at FAB 
headquarters in Kunming, where a crowd of 150 interpreters gathered to demand 
larger bonuses and travel arrangements to help them return home. Leslie Stewart, 
H.R. Smith’s chief deputy, blamed the FAB, telling Smith that the Chinese 
government had no money for severance payments or plans to feed interpreters and 
assist them with transportation. “I have reached the end of my patience,” Stewart 
wrote to Smith.200 For Stewart and other American officers dealing with interpreter 
affairs, the program’s shambolic final act was fitting. Once again, the Nationalists 
had let them down.  
 Yet despite its shortcomings, the interpreter program made the alliance a 
reality. Along with the students who filled the program’s ranks, and the intellectuals 
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who trained them, key figures in the Nationalist government also deserve credit for 
their long forgotten role. Huang Renlin launched the program and kept it afloat for 
years with little financial support from Chongqing. He Haoruo mediated between 
interpreters, the U.S. Army, and Chiang Kai-shek, during the program’s critical final 
year. By ignoring the interpreter program, scholars have bolstered a rendering of 
the war that understates China’s wartime contributions and impoverishes our 
understanding of the alliance. For more than fifty years, scholars in the west more or 
less accepted Stilwell’s conclusions that Chiang and the Nationalists sought to hoard 
Lend-Lease aid and let the Americans do all the fighting, taking this view as the 
starting point for their own studies.201 Interpreting work lacks the glamour of 
generalship or aerial combat, but as this chapter has illustrated, nearly everything 
the U.S. military and AVG volunteers did in China depended on interpreters. Without 
them, there would have been no U.S-China alliance.  
 The interpreter program was China’s most important alliance-building 
initiative, but it also became a leading source of friction at all levels of Chinese-
American interaction. The Chinese government’s failure to satisfy the U.S. Army’s 
demands frustrated senior American commanders throughout the war. At the same 
time, Chongqing’s inability to meet its commitments to interpreters angered 
interpreters, potential recruits, university staff, and American officers alike. Looking 
at day-to-day life on the ground reveals how disputes between GIs and interpreters 
convinced many Americans that interpreters were spoiled and weak. But to 
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interpreters, these disputes confirmed their fears that Americans looked down on 
them as inferiors, and Chinese officials saw it the same way. Because Chinese and 
American authorities failed to reach consensus about what constituted 
mistreatment or what hardships interpreters should be expected to bear, it followed 
that interpreters and GIs in the ranks would clash about these same issues. 
Interpreters enabled communication but not mutual understanding.   
 Taken as a whole, the interpreter program illustrates the difficulties of 
holding together an alliance between two peoples separated by vast disparities in 
wealth, power and ways of life. Huang Renlin and the Lianda staff who started the 
program sought to train interpreters who would prove to the Americans that their 
Chinese allies deserved to be treated as equals. What China lacked in military 
strength it would make up for by eliminating the language barrier with an elite 
cadre of cultural brokers. But the interpreter program, like other aspects of the 
alliance, reproduced patterns of domination and subordination that became more 
pronounced as the war went on. Occasionally, the stars aligned: interpreters found 
their work meaningful, lived in accordance with all the agreements negotiated by 
the U.S. Army and the FAB, and worked with respectful American officers who 
praised their hard work and treated them as equals. But more often than not by 
mid-1945, interpreters found themselves disillusioned with work, mistreated by 
their allies, and regarded with suspicion and resentment by their compatriots. 
Chiang’s dependence on the U.S. Army left interpreter morale subordinate to U.S. 




military needs and troop morale. But interpreters were not the only Chinese who 
found themselves shortchanged in order to keep the Americans happy.





III: American Servicemen and Chinese Civilians 
 
 Whether on duty or at liberty, American troops crossed paths with civilians 
daily. Civilian labor was indispensable to the U.S. military’s ability to operate in 
China. U.S. Army engineers supervised airfield construction projects that relied on 
civilian contractors and conscripts. Other civilians worked at U.S. facilities as truck 
drivers, mechanics, and unskilled laborers. Whenever American airmen bailed out 
over China, they counted on locals, often farmers or civilian search teams, to rescue 
them. Whenever GIs got behind the wheel, they jostled for space on narrow roads 
with pedestrians, oxcarts, and the occasional government official in his black Buick 
sedan. GIs at liberty encountered civilians spanning China’s entire social spectrum, 
from leading businessmen and intellectuals to beggars, streetwalkers, and thieves. 
Each interaction between a civilian and an American soldier shaped mutual 
impressions, and taken as a whole, these interactions were no less significant to 
forging the alliance’s overall dynamics than the WASC’s hostel program or relations 
between GIs and interpreters.  
 American wealth and power left GIs in a privileged position in almost every 
interaction with civilians. When the U.S. Army needed civilian laborers, the Chinese 
government provided them, often relying on forced conscription. U.S. military 
authorities possessed sole jurisdiction over all criminal matters involving American 
servicemen, so if a GI beat up a rickshaw puller or shot a farmer, Chinese police, 




investigators, and courts played no part in the judicial process. Exemption from 
Chinese law facilitated misconduct, including violence against civilians, reckless 
driving, and negligent, dangerous behavior, such as the indiscriminate use of 
firearms. Civilian victims, meanwhile, faced many obstacles when seeking justice or 
restitution. Anti-Chinese bias among Army criminal investigators, communication 
difficulties, and mild penalties for many courts-martial convictions all benefitted GIs 
in incidents involving civilians.  At work sites, American supervisors had the right to 
search civilian employees whenever they pleased, but U.S. Army vehicles and 
aircraft were exempted from inspections by Chinese authorities. This exemption, 
along with control over China’s sole air link to the outside world and access to 
valuable commodities like cigarettes, hard currency, and military equipment, left GIs 
well-equipped to profit from China’s black markets. American buying power and 
easy access to foreign goods also left many civilians dependent on GIs for their 
livelihoods, turning city centers into boomtowns that foreshadowed the seedy 
postwar entertainment districts like Angeles City’s Fields Avenue or Itaewon’s 
Hooker Hill near the U.S. military bases in the Philippines and South Korea.1 
 Yet the same factors that gave all American servicemen in China so many 
advantages also made them targets. Theft by Chinese civilians became a major 
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problem. By early 1945, no other factor had done so much to provoke American 
resentment against the Chinese. Making matters worse, bandits also robbed several 
American convoys around Yunnan Province, which caused outrage across the China 
Theater. Theft and banditry also heightened tensions between U.S. and Chinese 
authorities, as they rarely reached the same conclusions when investigating 
incidents. Meanwhile, both Chinese and U.S. authorities resorted to ever more 
draconian measures to address the problems, often resulting in severe or 
disproportionate punishments against civilians.   
 As a result of all the interactions among GIs and civilians, relations between 
the two groups became adversarial by the time Japan surrendered. The power 
asymmetry between China and the United States shaped every interaction except 
aircrew rescues, which upended traditional power relations and turned out to be 
the high water mark of cooperation between servicemen and civilians. And while 
countless GIs and civilians profited from black market activities and smuggling, U.S. 
and Chinese authorities unsurprisingly took a dim view of these “cooperative 
relations.” Meanwhile, the conscription, low pay, and harsh working conditions that 
characterized Chinese labor at many airfields fueled resentment against the U.S. 
Army. Pilfering and banditry made GIs see every Chinese civilian as a potential thief, 
while reckless driving and violence against civilians damaged the U.S. Army’s image 
in Chinese eyes. Managing interactions between American servicemen and civilians 
proved a difficult task for U.S. and Chinese authorities, one that only became harder 
as the war dragged on. From American perspectives, civilians became obstacles in 




the war effort. From Chinese perspectives, GIs resembled an occupation force, with 
the lowliest private living better than all but the wealthiest Chinese and all GIs 
seemingly able to mistreat civilians with impunity.  
 Analyzing interactions between soldiers and civilians is crucial to 
understanding overseas deployments and alliance building as it actually happens on 
ground, but scholars of wartime U.S.-China relations have overlooked this facet of 
the partnership. This chapter spans the entire social structure, looking at all forms 
of GI-civilian interaction except for sexual relations, which are explored in chapter 
four. These interactions offer a window into how alliance building actually works on 
the ground, how the odds are stacked against it, and how easily an alliance can be 
undermined by day-to-day interactions between American servicemen and host 
country civilians.  
The Jurisdiction Issue 
The legal framework governing American servicemen’s interactions with 
Chinese civilians reflected the unequal power relations between China and the 
United States. Ever since U.S. envoy Caleb Cushing negotiated the Treaty of Wangxia 
with the Qing Empire in 1844, American citizens in China had been subject only to 
U.S. laws.2 Chinese officials and intellectuals saw extraterritoriality as a source of 
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national humiliation, and the Nationalist Party made its abolishment a central 
element of its political program starting in 1924.3 Extraterritoriality, however, 
remained the law of the land when AVG volunteers and American servicemen began 
arriving in China in 1941 and 1942, providing fodder to Japanese propagandists and 
fueling relentless Chinese criticism against the United States.4 The U.S. government 
relinquished extraterritorial rights on January 11, 1943, but it had little effect on 
U.S. forces in China. Citing “international custom,” General Joseph Stilwell convinced 
Chiang Kai-shek in 1942 to allow U.S. military courts to exercise jurisdiction over all 
criminal matters involving American servicemen. The Stilwell-Chiang agreement 
provided the basis for a formal Sino-U.S. agreement regarding jurisdiction over 
criminal offenses committed by American troops, which Chinese and U.S. authorities 
signed on May 21, 1943. Just as the WASC hostel and Chinese interpreter programs 
had replicated the unequal relations of the prewar treaty ports, the May 1943 Sino-
U.S. agreement allowed the U.S. military to maintain extraterritorial privileges in 
China.  
The legacy of extraterritoriality in China made the extension of such 
privileges an explosive issue, but the U.S. military’s practice in China was hardly 
unique.  Starting in World War I, U.S. military and civil officials had demanded 
exclusive criminal jurisdiction over American servicemen stationed overseas. By the 
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time the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) arrived in France, numerous 
European countries had already reached agreements that gave their militaries 
immunity from local law while stationed in other countries. The U.S. and French 
governments signed a reciprocal agreement to this effect in February 1918.5 The 
British pushed back against this trend, with the Attorney General and Solicitor 
General ruling in June 1917 that it would be unconstitutional for Britain to 
surrender concurrent British jurisdiction over foreign troops on its territories. 
Negotiations over the issue between Washington and London were still ongoing 
when the Armistice was announced, and the British government tried to preserve 
the jurisdiction of British courts concerning crimes against British law after the 
United States joined the war against Germany and Japan. The U.S. government, 
however, insisted on exercising exclusive jurisdiction, and the Churchill government 
relented in the summer of 1942, when Parliament passed the United States of 
America (Visiting Forces) Act. This special bill exempted members of the U.S. armed 
forces from criminal prosecution in any U.K. court, a privilege that Britain’s weaker 
allies, such as the Canadians and Polish, did not enjoy.6 China had less to offer the 
United States militarily than Britain did, so Chongqing had little hope of resisting 
U.S. demands.  
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 On August 8, 1942, the National Military Council approved Stilwell’s request 
granting the U.S. Army exclusive rights to apprehend and prosecute any American 
servicemen that Chinese authorities suspected of committing a crime. Chinese 
authorities could not detain any American serviceman unless he committed an 
offense “which would be repeated or aggravated” if he were not taken into custody, 
and then only in situations “when United States military authorities are remote from 
the locality.”7 On such occasions, Chinese authorities had to notify the U.S. Army 
immediately and then turn the man over for prosecution by a U.S. court-martial. 
Chiang justified the National Military Council’s decision by stating that the 
agreement “was in accordance to international custom” and assured his 
subordinates that he “had told Stilwell that American servicemen in China should 
respect Chinese law and customs.”8 The Guomindang’s opposition to 
extraterritoriality had always rested on the principles that it violated Chinese 
sovereignty and had no basis in international law.9 The precedent established 
during World War I, however, supported Chiang’s claims.10 But members of the 
Chinese Foreign and Military Affairs ministries still had reservations about any 
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measures that could compromise Chinese judicial sovereignty or be associated with 
extraterritoriality in the Chinese popular imagination.11 
 On October 9, Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles informed Chinese 
Ambassador Wei Daoming that the Roosevelt administration intended to abolish 
extraterritorial rights in China, which pushed the State Department to reach a 
formal agreement regarding the jurisdiction over American military personnel.12 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull sent Ambassador Gauss a draft agreement on January 
4, 1943, a week before the treaty relinquishing extraterritoriality went into effect. In 
keeping with U.S. practice, Hull told Gauss that the principal consideration was “to 
provide for the exercise of exclusive jurisdiction over American military personnel.” 
But he instructed the ambassador to raise the issue informally with Foreign Minister 
Song Ziwen and make it clear that the U.S. had no intention of retaining any vestiges 
of extraterritoriality. The jurisdiction question, Hull wrote, was a matter of wartime 
expediency, and the U.S. had already entered into similar arrangements with a 
number of countries, including Britain and Australia.13  
 China’s National Military Council and Foreign Ministry approved Hull’s draft 
agreement but added a provision emphasizing reciprocal treatment. If the U.S. 
military exercised jurisdiction over American soldiers in China, then “the 
government of the United States will be ready to make like arrangements to ensure 
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to the Chinese forces which may be stationed in territory under American 
jurisdiction a position corresponding to that of the American forces in China.” Gauss 
told Hull that Foreign Minister Song “admitted informally that this provision for 
reciprocal treatment is a matter of face.” Hull approved these changes and 
authorized Gauss to move forward with the official exchange of notes.14  
 If Song really did tell Gauss that the provision emphasizing reciprocal 
treatment was simply “a matter of face,” then he understated Guomindang concerns 
and Chinese nationalism more broadly.  The National Military Council approved the 
agreement at its 105th executive meeting only because of the reciprocal provision. 
For the same reason, Chongqing objected to Indian government arrangements that 
allowed colonial authorities to prosecute Chinese soldiers stationed there for 
criminal offenses.15 As chapters one and two have demonstrated, the need to be 
treated as equals was the core principle underlining the Chinese government’s 
dealings with the United States. Terminating the unequal treaties, for that matter, 
was a Chinese war aim second only to defeating Japan. During 1942, Madame Chiang 
Kai-shek had attacked extraterritoriality with articles published in the New York 
Times and other major newspapers by stressing this point: “however much 
Westerners might respect China culturally, they seem constitutionally unable to 
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regard her as an equal.”16 Chiang himself welcomed the U.S. announcement 
abolishing extraterritoriality by emphasizing equality, saying “[s]ince this 
announcement our country has been gaining international equality. This is the 
result of five years of struggle and sacrifice by all the soldiers and people of China.”17 
Without the reciprocal treatment provision, the agreement would have been 
unthinkable to Chongqing.  In fact, when Vice Foreign Minister Wu Guozhen signed 
the agreement on May 21, he added a note stating that the National government had 
authorized him to do so because “of the provision for placing the said understanding 
on a reciprocal basis.”18 
 The reciprocal treatment provision allowed Chiang to present the agreement 
as evidence that the United States treated China as an equal ally, but other Chinese 
officials remained uneasy with the agreement’s similarities to extraterritoriality, 
particularly its implications for crimes against civilians. In order to stave off 
accusations that the agreement had extraterritorial implications, the Guomindang’s 
official newspaper, the Central Daily, published it in its entirety and noted that a 
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concurrent agreement was in effect in Britain. Both the liberal Da Gong Bao and the 
Communists’ Xinhua Daily reprinted the Central Daily article without further 
commentary.19  But Wang Chonghui, a leading jurist and the general secretary of 
China’s Supreme National Defense Commission, had two reservations about the 
agreement. He wrote that more clarification was needed regarding Chinese powers 
to arrest American servicemen. He also warned that the government should be wary 
of applying the legal privileges of American troops too broadly and should also 
differentiate between American servicemen’s official and off-duty activities.20  
Members of China’s Legislative Yuan took Wang’s suggestions to heart on 
September 9, when they met to finalize regulations in connection with the 
agreement. In addition to adding language placing further emphasis on reciprocity 
and equality, the Legislative Yuan amended the agreement’s fourth article, which 
originally stated only that U.S. military authorities would conduct speedy, open 
trials near to where the alleged offense took place in the event of crime committed 
against a Chinese civilian. The amended article noted that U.S. military jurisdiction 
“did not affect Chinese law regarding the powers to interrogate, apprehend, arrest, 
detain, search, or question any American servicemen who has committed or has 
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been suspected of committing a crime.”21 The U.S. Army, however, rejected this 
interpretation.22 
 The Chinese Foreign Ministry succeeded in negotiating an arrangement 
based on reciprocity but that did not change the fact that American military 
personnel enjoyed extraterritorial rights in China. Although the Chinese Communist 
Party accepted the May 21 Sino-U.S. agreement without complaint, a mid-June 
commentary in the Shen Bao, a newspaper published in Japanese-occupied 
Shanghai, highlighted the contradictions between the abolishment of 
extraterritoriality and the immunity from Chinese law granted to the U.S. military in 
China by the May 21 agreement.23 Chongqing’s dependence on U.S. power meant 
that such an agreement was probably unavoidable. But it nevertheless weakened 
Nationalist claims about achieving equal treatment. It also left the Chinese 
government entirely dependent on U.S. authorities when it came to protecting 
Chinese civilians from crimes committed by American servicemen.  
Rescuing American Pilots 
 No American serviceman left China with a greater appreciation for the 
country and its people than the airmen who were rescued by the Chinese after 
bailing out. Of all the interactions between American servicemen and the Chinese 
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during the Pacific War, airmen rescues were the least contentious. Some problems 
did occur, but as a whole, Chinese authorities oversaw an effective rescue 
framework stretching from Chiang Kai-shek all the way down to the village level. 
Rescues lacked the discord that plagued other areas of Chinese-American 
interaction because, for the most part, each party understood the other’s role 
clearly, both within the context of the immediate situation and the larger war effort. 
Rescuers saw airmen risking their lives against the common Japanese enemy, 
brushing up against death or injury, and now helpless and alone. Downed airmen 
were not the belligerent, arrogant GIs barking orders at hostel workers or banging 
on doors while demanding prostitutes and liquor. Airmen knew that their lives were 
in the hands of their Chinese rescuers, so prevailing U.S.-China power relations were 
upended. Civilians who rescued airmen were not the Chinese who stole from them 
or imposed bureaucratic obstacles that delayed their work. Few areas of wartime 
Sino-American interaction were so black and white.  
 Chongqing’s first priority was to make sure civilians understood that Chinese 
and American airmen were on their side. The Japanese quickly gained air supremacy 
in China after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and conducted heavy and 
indiscriminate bombing of Chinese cities in order to break civilian morale. Urban 
populations suffered tremendously at the hands of Japan’s bombers, arousing 
immeasurable hatred.24 On May 3, 1939, when the Japanese Navy launched the 
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year’s first large-scale bombing raid on Chongqing, Zhang Mingsheng, a vice 
squadron commander in the Chinese Air Force, was shot down over the city’s south 
bank, sustaining major burns before bailing out. After Zhang landed, locals mistook 
him for a Japanese and attacked him. Zhang’s experience led Chiang to issue orders 
stating that all airmen, whether Chinese or enemy, “must be captured alive or 
rescued” and brought to Air Force or civil authorities. Those who brought them in 
would receive large cash rewards.25 To identify themselves as allied troops and 
avoid Zhang Mingsheng’s fate, all American airmen carried a silk blood chit, which 
was a notice sewn onto either the back or the inside of their flight jackets identifying 
them as friendly armed forces in need of assistance. The original blood chit featured 
the Chinese flag, the Commission on Aeronautical Affairs’ official seal, and the words 
“This foreigner (American) has come to China to assist in the war effort. Soldiers 
and civilians, one and all, should assist and protect him” [see figure 3.1]. After the 
China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater was established, the blood chit added an 
American flag and sometimes the CBI theater emblem [see figure 3.2].26 Even if they 
could not read the message, ordinary civilians could recognize the flags. All around 
Yunnan, authorities also put up posters and distributed leaflets instructing people to 
look for the blood chit and showing them how to care for airmen. “Americans will 
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never forget the people who helped them,” read one poster, and “what we give, we 
get back,” read many others.27 
 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2:  (L) Blood chit carried by AVG volunteers in China. (R) CBI 
theater blood chit, which specifies that the bearer is a member of the U.S. Army Air 
Force. Yunnan Provincial Archives, Kunming, China.   
 
 Chongqing made civilian administrators responsible for the safety and 
wellbeing of downed airmen.  In early 1943, the Executive Yuan issued orders 
stating, “when Allied [American] airmen are forced down, the local government 
must promptly rescue, host, and keep them protected.”28 Local authorities also had 
orders to protect their aircraft and belongings.29 At the lowest level, rescue efforts 
relied on China’s baojia system, the country’s traditional arrangement of mutual 
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responsibility and surveillance that the Nationalists had revived in the late 1920s in 
order to restore control over local society. Every ten or so households were formed 
into a unit called a jia, and ten or so jia made up a bao.30 Chiang ordered baojia 
chiefs to send rescue teams to locate wrecks and search for survivors whenever an 
aircraft went down.31 Baojia chiefs also had orders to immediately inform county 
magistrates and nearby air force installations in the event of airplane crashes.32 
Over the course of the war, the rewards for rescuing airmen increased, and by the 
spring of 1945, the Commission on Aeronautical Affairs paid CN$100,000 for every 
Chinese or American airman rescued from Japanese-held territory. Setting an equal 
rate for Chinese and American airmen demonstrated Chongqing’s insistence that 
Chinese and American lives were of equal value.33 
The U.S. military reimbursed Chinese civilian officials and the Commission on 
Aeronautical Affairs for most of the costs incurred during rescue operations. 
Because some “local government and civilian organizations had spared no effort in 
hosting downed American airmen,” daily expenditures for these operations ran as 
high as CN$10,000 in 1944, leading Chongqing to crack down on lavish 
entertainment and negotiate a daily reimbursement rate of CN$500 per man with 
the U.S. Army. For medical expenses, however, Chiang and U.S. Army headquarters 
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in Chongqing agreed that GIs should receive whatever care they need, regardless of 
cost, with the Americans footing the bill.34 As in other areas of interaction with 
American servicemen, Chiang sought to base rescue efforts on the principle of 
equality: “[b]ased on the cooperative spirit between allies,” he ordered, “downed 
American airmen should be treated the same as Chinese soldiers.” He also suggested 
that if costs could be kept low, “we do not necessarily need the Americans to 
reimburse us.”35 Chiang’s instructions here reveal his sensitivity toward the 
perennial source of American grievance—the fear that Chongqing wanted to cheat 
them.  
  Most, but not all, rescues went smoothly. When one American airman died 
after bailing out near Chongqing in August 1942, the U.S. Army Air Force accused 
local villagers of murdering him. Chinese authorities rejected the accusation, stating 
that a medical examination had determined the man died from injuries sustained in 
the fall. This incident pressed Chongqing to strengthen its efforts to ensure that local 
authorities did their part in rescuing and protecting soldiers and in educating rural 
populations about how to deal with downed airmen.36 In Yunnan Province, where 
banditry sometimes caused tension between Long Yun’s government and U.S. forces, 
14th Air Force commanders warned their men that bandits would hold them for 
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ransom.37 As a whole, however, rescue efforts were successful. According to Chinese 
sources, Chinese civilians, soldiers, and irregular forces rescued more than 900 
American airmen during the war.38 Claire Chennault stated in his memoirs that the 
Chinese rescued ninety-five percent of the American airmen who bailed out while 
carrying out missions over Japanese-held territory, noting that these rescues “were 
by far the most convincing demonstration of Chinese good will toward 
Americans.”39  
 These successful rescue efforts earned lifetime gratitude. Edgar Lawman was 
shot down during the defense of Liuzhou in 1944, when Japan’s Ichigo offensive tore 
through Guangxi province.40 He kept in touch with Chinese he met during his rescue 
after the war.41 Milton McGee was shot down twice, once near Hong Kong, where he 
had to travel nearly two weeks by sampan, truck, and train to return to his base. 
“The Chinese would treat us like royalty,” he remembered.42 Villagers rescued John 
Gambardella after his B-24 went down in Yunnan, and he returned to the same 
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village for reunions much later in life.43 And whereas many of the U.S. units who 
cooperated with Chinese interpreters, soldiers, hostel workers, or civilians 
encountered problems, Ralph Wilcox reported that the Chinese he met on rescue 
missions “were supremely friendly and could not do enough for us.”44  
 Other scholars have described the Flying Tigers as the pinnacle of Sino-
American cooperation, but Chinese search and rescue operations actually deserve 
this honor.45 As this project has shown elsewhere, while the AVG established a 
superb air combat record in China, AVG pilots and ground crewmen themselves 
often had more fraught interactions with the Chinese.46 Aircraft rescue operations 
were the rare area of Sino-American interaction where no one came away feeling 
cheated, insulted, or otherwise let down. Airmen escaped with their lives. Civilian 
rescuers earned money—though further research is needed in order to determine 
how much of the reward money actually filtered down to the lowest levels—and U.S. 
and Chinese authorities cooperated over reimbursement with minimal friction. Even 
the Chinese Nationalists and Communists agreed about the importance of rescuing 
airmen.47 All other interactions between American servicemen and Chinese civilians 
were characterized by greater ambiguity.  
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 Airfield construction was another area where Chongqing mediated 
cooperation between American servicemen and Chinese civilians, but these 
interactions explicitly reflected the power asymmetry at the core of the alliance. 
Airfields were built or expanded based upon U.S. Army requests. The Chinese 
National Military Council’s Engineering Commission oversaw construction, but U.S. 
Army resident engineers exercised ultimate authority over all decisions at each job 
site. Civilians occupied the lowest rung. They were subject to conscription by 
provincial and county authorities for work as laborers, which took them away from 
their farms. They endured harsh working conditions, building runways without the 
aid of machinery. Clothing and housing proved inadequate during the winter 
months, while inflation ate away at their meager salaries. Construction projects 
affected surrounding communities in other ways as well, as the influx of workers 
caused sharp price increases. Land requisitions sometimes provoked backlash from 
farmers, and although they targeted Chinese engineers and soldiers, these laborers 
understood that the U.S. Army was responsible for the loss of their property. All 
these issues gave civilians reason to resent American servicemen. Most airfield 
projects, however, were still completed according to plans. On a few occasions, 
misconduct by resident engineers proved to be the chief cause of strained ties 
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between the U.S. military and local civilians. And while GIs found themselves in awe 
at the sight of thousands—or even tens of thousands—of Chinese laborers building 
runways with their bare hands and giant concrete rollers, such scenes also 
reinforced negative stereotypes about Chinese backwardness and low regard for 
human life. 
 Airfield construction and expansion in western China predated the AVG’s 
arrival in China, but U.S. military requests led to dozens of new projects over the 
course of the war, mobilizing well over one million civilian laborers.48 The largest 
project began in late 1943, when the Sichuan provincial government conscripted 
more than 375,000 civilians from six counties around Chengdu to expand four 
bomber and nine fighter support airfields for Operation Matterhorn, the U.S. War 
Department’s plan to crush domestic Japanese steel production with B-29 bomber 
raids.49 Smaller projects, some still requiring over 60,000 laborers, were carried out 
in 1944 and 1945. While conscript laborers carried out the majority of construction 
work, some projects relied on a combination of conscripts and contractors, a few on 
contractor work alone, and at least one was done entirely by a Chinese military unit 
stationed near the airfield.50  
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  According to Graham Peck, an employee of the U.S. Information Agency who 
spent the war years spreading positive propaganda about the war effort and China’s 
American allies, pro-American sentiment among Chinese civilians “was especially 
shaky” near the airfields.51 Peck attributed the resentment to poor pay and 
conscription.52 Chennault also admitted that airfield construction contributed to 
food shortages and inflation while aircraft noise, test firing, and emergency bomb 
jettisoning caused annoyance, property damage, and accidental deaths.53 When 
building or expanding airfields, Chinese or U.S. authorities compensated farmers for 
their land based on prevailing market rates, but disputes still occurred.54  Farmers 
attacked Chinese engineers carrying out preliminary surveys at Luxian in southern 
Sichuan and at Xinjin, near Chengdu. Laborers were paid in rice and money based on 
units of work accomplished, and large fluctuations in prices due to inflation caused 
tensions at numerous construction sights. At the Xinjin airfield, where construction 
went on for more than a year, U.S. and Chinese authorities made wage 
adjustments.55 At Huangping County Airfield in Guizhou, on the other hand, inflation 
far outpaced salary increases during the short construction period. Winter 
conditions made matters worse. Most of the 55,000 conscripts at Huangping had to 
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work barefoot in the snow, carrying all equipment to the construction site by foot. 
Half of them ran away for the Chinese New Year.56  Food shortages occurred at 
construction sites in Yunnan, a less productive agricultural region than the Sichuan 
basin, where Chengdu was located.57 The sanitary corps of the Sichuan provincial 
health bureau spent five months in 1944 providing sanitary services at the airfield 
construction projects around Chengdu, saving laborers from dysentery, typhoid 
fever, and other infections diseases, but 314 laborers still died.58 In short, airfield 
construction was miserable work and living near airfields exposed civilians to 
heightened inflation, noise pollution, and physical danger.  
 The National Military Council’s Engineering Commission, the link between 
U.S. Army supervisors and local laborers, reported mostly amicable relations with 
American resident engineers, but civilians ran into trouble with several of them. 
Captain James F. Byrne, the U.S. Army’s resident engineer at Luxian Airfield, beat up 
James H.S. Chang, manager of the guesthouse where Byrne resided, and threated to 
slit his wife’s throat after an argument over use of the guesthouse kitchen. A court 
martial imposed a one-time forfeiture on Byrne of one-half his monthly salary, a slap 
on the wrist in comparison to punishments for threatening and attacking fellow 
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American soldiers.59 The war ended before the provost marshal finished its 
investigation into Captain James Bohlkin, resident engineer at an airfield in Hu 
County, about twenty miles west-south-west of the ancient walled city of Xian, in 
Shaanxi Province. Bohlkin attracted the attention of U.S. Army counterintelligence in 
June 1945 when two separate sources told Special Agent Laurence Ballou that 
Bohlkin was throwing lavish parties for groups of prostitutes at the county 
guesthouse and funding his antics by either defrauding the U.S. government or 
withholding wages from the 30,000 Chinese laborers working under him.60 In the 
most serious incident, First Lieutenant Gerald Clark, the resident engineer at 
Chuxiong Airfield in Yunnan, was sentenced to three years’ hard labor for killing Yu 
Pinghui, a civilian contractor whom Clark had clashed with over price disputes and a 
labor strike. When CID agent Earl Miller investigated Yu’s death, he discovered that 
Clark was also misusing funds and padding the payroll at Chuxiong. Incidentally, CID 
agents at Baoshan, where Clark had served as resident engineer before coming to 
Chuxiong, had also investigated Clark for fraud.61 
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 American servicemen who witnessed airfield construction had never seen 
anything like it. The novelist Ernest Hemingway described the scene for an article in 
New York’s PM magazine in June 1941: 60,000 men hauling gravel to the airfield site, 
where another 35,000 crushed the stone with hammers, and “every carrying stick 
was bent to its breaking point under a double load as the men worked twelve-hour 
shifts.” The scene evoked in Hemingway the feeling of what it would have been like 
to see men building the pyramids.62 American officers and men also compared 
airfield construction to the pyramids.63 They admired what the Chinese had 
accomplished, but these labor-intensive projects also demonstrated the country’s 
backwardness. Chinese civilians had to build runways by breaking rocks with 
simple hammers and dragging concrete rollers because China was stuck in the 
Middle Ages and Chinese life was cheap. “Some of the officers who have been here 
for a while say that a couple of times one of the workers has slipped under the 
roller,” wrote cargo plane pilot Warren Arnett in 1945, “the others just plod along 
and would go back over him if they were not stopped. Death has no impression on 
them at all.”64 “It was amazing how they would work,” recalled B-24 bomber pilot 
Melvin Lees, “steady like ants.”65 Another pilot remembered the same thing: “They 
looked like ants going after sugar—one line going one way, one line going 
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another.”66 So while for many farmers U.S. military needs meant backbreaking labor 
or the loss of their land, for many GIs, airfield construction reaffirmed a neocolonial 
hierarchy that placed Americans at the top, educated Chinese in the middle, and 
insect-like Chinese laborers at the bottom.  
Smuggling and Black Markets 
  Whatever their shortcomings, airmen rescues and airfield construction 
contributed to Sino-U.S. military operations, but one area of mutually beneficial 
cooperation between GIs and Chinese civilians actually undermined the alliance and 
frustrated U.S. and Chinese authorities to no end: smuggling and black markets. 
Japan’s coastal blockade resulted in critical shortages of practically every imported 
good in China. Meanwhile, Japan’s occupation of Indochina and Burma added to 
China’s isolation while also cutting off traditional opium and tobacco smuggling 
routes between Yunnan and Southeast Asia.67 Between May 1942 and February 
1945, the country’s sole link to the outside world was the Hump, the ambitious 
airlift operation connecting China to India that delivered nearly 740,000 tons of 
cargo.68 All allied military operations in China relied on the Hump, as did the 
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unprecedented smuggling and black market trading that many GIs engaged in. 
Airmen took advantage of their exemption from Chinese customs inspections to 
sneak a wide range of small, high value items into China in order to sell them, mostly 
to Chinese civilians. Street-level black market dealing in military goods like 
handguns, canned food, and clothing also involved items that took up precious 
Hump cargo space, as did contraband smuggled through the Army’s postal service. 
The U.S. dollars that American troops and civilian employees were paid in also 
played a major role in wartime black markets. Measures taken by Chinese and U.S. 
authorities to deal with smuggling and black market activities had little effect.  
 Smuggling and black markets in wartime China predated the American 
arrival, but several AVG volunteers enthusiastically joined in. Although Governor 
Long Yun had established a provincial anti-smuggling office in late 1941, border 
guards let AVG trucks pass without inspection, allowing the American volunteers to 
smuggle in booty looted from Rangoon and Lashio.69 According to a theater provost 
marshal investigation, AVG transportation officer Raymond Hasty and several 
associates looted two warehouses in Burma containing large quantities of U.S. Army 
supplies and personal property belonging to American diplomats. Hasty set up an 
illegitimate business in Yunnanyi, a key airfield town 270 kilometers west of 
Kunming, to sell off his looted cargo supplies. After arriving in Kunming, Hasty 
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allegedly “turned fence” and began dealing in wide range of smuggled and stolen 
contraband. Hasty quit the AVG and left China by May 1942, acquiring an interest in 
a Karachi cabaret that catered to GIs and escaping punishment for his alleged crimes. 
As late a December 1943, the Army’s criminal investigation command in China 
believed that ex-AVG men were working with civilian Chinese smugglers based in 
Kunming and Calcutta.70 Rose Mok Carney, the Chinese civilian wife of ex-AVG 
volunteer Boatner Carney, came up in numerous smuggling investigations.71 The 
freewheeling atmosphere and lure of big profits in China during the AVG days made 
it easy for men like Hasty to make money by selling contraband. The Flying Tigers 
were practically untouchable—exempted from Chinese law under the system of 
extraterritoriality and subject only to discipline by Chennault, a notoriously 
easygoing commander. Not until November 1942 did the Judge Advocate General 
finish setting up a CBI Theater branch.72 So in the alliance’s early days, Americans 
could smuggle and deal on the black market with impunity. Rumor even had it that 
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Chennault himself engaged in smuggling, but an Office of Strategic Services 
investigation into the matter never found conclusive proof.73 
 Chinese civilians, on the other hand, faced potentially lethal consequences for 
smuggling. On November 25, 1942, an American pilot named William Kelling 
smuggled medicine worth CN$400,000 over the Hump and gave it to a Chuankang 
Civil and Commercial Bank employee named Ge Zunxian. Chinese authorities took 
Ge into custody and discovered through his personal correspondence that this was 
not the first time he had colluded with an American pilot to smuggle. Ge also 
admitted to his interrogators that a Calcutta-based Chinese businessman, Chen 
Mengzhao of the M.C. Chen Trading Company, was his partner on the other side of 
the Hump.74  Chinese Foreign Minister Song Ziwen arranged Chen’s extradition, and 
on October 16, Chen and Ge were executed.75 Because Kelling was a civilian 
technical representative attached to the 14th Air Force, the Judge Advocate General 
exercised no jurisdiction over his alleged crimes and recommended that no charges 
be brought against him.76 Of course China’s jurisdiction over ethnic Chinese civilians 
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living in British India was murky at best, but this did not stop Chongqing from 
spiriting Chen out of Calcutta and bringing him to justice in China.77  
 By 1943, both U.S. and Chinese authorities understood that smuggling over 
the Hump had become a serious problem, but the measures they took to address it 
were inconsistent and uncoordinated. Corruption at the highest levels of the 
Nationalist government undermined American trust. Until July 1943, Dai Li, head of 
the Juntong, China’s most powerful secret police organization, also directed the 
Nationalists’ Smuggling Prevention Office. Dai simultaneously oversaw a massive, 
nationwide smuggling operation. Chiang eventually removed Dai from his command 
of the Smuggling Prevention Office not for his illegal operation but for exposing 
smuggling activities involving the children of Chiang’s brother-in-law, Kong 
Xiangxi.78 Unsurprisingly, Stilwell showed no interest in Foreign Minister Song 
Ziwen’s December 1942 request to establish a joint Sino-U.S. inspection office in 
Kunming that would be responsible for searching U.S. aircraft.79 It took another year 
for Stilwell to begin implementing an anti-smuggling program, which focused on 
airfields in Assam, where Hump flights originated.80 For the remainder of the war, 
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U.S. Army aircraft remained exempted from inspections by Chinese authorities.81  
The 14th Air Force charged twenty-two men for Hump flight smuggling in late 1943, 
securing convictions or reprimands against thirteen. These men smuggled medicine, 
cigarettes, cosmetics, piston rings, and large quantities of gold, but none received 
more than an eighteen-month sentence.82 Others continued to fly.83 It took more 
than a year of training to prepare a pilot for combat, so discharging or court-
martialing every pilot caught smuggling could have led to a shortage of qualified 
personnel.84 
 For the enterprising smuggler, bringing contraband into China was not 
difficult. William Milner’s crew chief spoke Chinese and made a killing selling 
whiskey in Kunming. “He came back to the United States,” said Milner, “and 
probably spent the rest of his time fishing.85 Hu Guohua, a civilian airfield clerk in 
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southern Sichuan described the Yibin Airfield as “a wonderful place for smuggling.” 
Flight crews brought in gold tolas (an Indian unit equivalent to 0.375 troy ounces) 
and rupees on practically every flight and sold them to the first civilian clerks and 
mechanics to offer them a good price.86 Whitney Greenberg, a pilot based in 
Kunming during 1945, explained how the system worked shortly after Japan’s 
surrender: “I was an entrepreneur. Shanghai to Guilin to buy gold, take the gold and 
buy Chinese dollars in Kunming, take the Chinese dollars and exchange them into 
American dollars in Shanghai…tripled my money.” Greenberg, like many other 
American smugglers and currency speculators, relied on privileged access to 
airpower and information. “The Chinese didn’t know,” he recalled, “how much the 
dollar was worth, how much the gold was worth…[and] because I was crew chief, I 
could take the flight any time I wanted to.”87 Despite the provost marshal’s anti-
smuggling measures, U.S. Army Air Force planes were not normally searched.88 
Those who expected aircraft to be searched took precautions, like hiding gold in the 
plane’s tail section, or medicine in its heater tubes, which could pose a danger to the 
aircraft.89  
 Hump smuggling also fueled the street-level black market trade. In October 
1943, Staff Sergeant William Morris ran into Private Frank Berthaine and Staff 
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Sergeant Gene Yacavone, a couple of old acquaintances, at Billie’s Café in Kunming. 
Morris, an India-based crew chief who flew the Hump regularly, bragged that he 
“had brought a great deal” of smuggled goods into China and had even been caught 
once before. The three decided to cooperate in dealing contraband. They began by 
colluding with two enlisted men at an SOS warehouse to steal thirty-five cases of 
canned milk and sell them to M.B Tang, a “GI Street” pen and pencil shop owner 
whom Morris knew from previous deals. A Chinese mechanic who worked for 
Berthaine introduced them to other Kunming businessmen who wanted firearms. 
Over the next six months, Morris smuggled in cigarettes, medicine, cosmetics, and 
gold, and he and his partners-in-crime sold them to the civilians they knew around 
town. Eager to capitalize on these connections, the three men spent much of their 
free time in Kunming stealing from U.S. Army warehouses, medical dispensaries, 
and WASC hostels. Morris evaded the theater provost marshal’s anti-smuggling 
measures for more than six months before he was finally caught in June 1944.90  He 
then laid out the details of his smuggling operation and testified against an 
American civilian in Kunming who brokered sales in stolen goods in exchange for 
immunity.91    
 Even GIs whose duties were far removed from Hump operations found ways 
to profit from it. In September 1944, base censors in Kunming began intercepting 
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packages containing contraband mailed from the United States. GIs wrote to friends 
and family members back home requesting Parker pen sets, cosmetics, western 
clothing, sulfa drugs, jewelry, cosmetics, cigarettes, and other small, high-value 
items. “All the stuff from home brings a good price,” one corporal wrote, “a little ten 
cent lipstick brings $10 in our money…Parker 51’s bring $150 to $200…send them 
all right away.”92 The 407th Air Service Squadron of the 14th Air Service Group, a unit 
comprised almost entirely of Chinese-American troops, “acquired a notorious 
reputation for widespread black market activities” via the Army’s postal system. The 
base censor in Kunming confiscated twenty-five packages of contraband mailed 
from the United States to members of this unit during the summer of 1945.93  
According to provost marshal investigators, even First Lieutenant Joseph Horn, who 
served several months as Theater Postal Officer in 1945, was “alleged to have 
misused his official position to engage in black market transactions, such as the 
receipt through the mail of rupees [and] sending and receipt of black market 
items.”94 Meanwhile, three military policemen in Chengdu attracted attention for 
regularly sending home money orders and making deposits far in excess of their 
                                                        
92 Office of the Assistant Theater Censor, Subject: Black Market Activities, 4 October 1943, RG 493, 
Services of Supply, China Theater/Adjutant General Section, Decimal File 1942–1945, Box 64, 250 
Discipline 1943–1944 (second folder), NARA; Roy Farrell, letter passed by censor, Counter 
Intelligence Corps, RG 493, China Theater/Special Staff/Provost Marshal Section, Formerly Classified 
Correspondence 1943–1946, Box 667, Investigation, CIC, APO 629 Dec. 1943 to Sept. 1944, NARA. 
93 Regional Office, Theater Provost Marshal CID, Subject: Black Market Activities of the 14th Air 
Service Group, 14th Air Force, 12 August 1945, RG 493, China Theater/Special Staff/Provost Marshal 
Section, Formerly Classified Correspondence 1943–1946, Box 670, Black Market Activities of the 14th 
Air Service Group, NARA. 
94 Guanghan Army Air Base, Theater Provost Marshal CID, Subject: Suspected Black Market Activity, 
22 July 1945; RG 493, China Theater/Special Staff/Provost Marshal Section, Formerly Classified 
Correspondence 1943–1946, Box 663, Correspondence June to August 1945 from Regional Offices, 
NARA. 




salaries. They, too, were discovered to “have been receiving an excessive number of 
packages from the United States every month” and disposing of their contraband 
during frequent trips into the city. 95 The lure of easy money tempted many 
servicemen, including those who were supposed to be enforcing the law.  
 A tremendous amount of the goods that came over the Hump for U.S. military 
use ended up for sale in Kunming and other towns, inflaming tensions between U.S. 
and Chinese authorities. Ordinary civilians offered good money for rations, firearms, 
khakis and other items.96  Owners and managers who ran businesses that catered to 
GIs, like Billie’s Café in Kunming, the Leisure Hour Café in Luliang, Zhanyi’s Snow 
White Restaurant, and Guilin’s Broadway Inn approached American servicemen 
with propositions for underground deals in U.S. government property.97 Other 
civilians opened such businesses using the capital they accrued through black 
                                                        
95 Guanghan Army Air Base, Theater Provost Marshal CID, Subject: Suspected Black Market Activity, 
22 July 1945; RG 493, China Theater/Special Staff/Provost Marshal Section, Formerly Classified 
Correspondence 1943–1946, Box 663, Correspondence June to August 1945 from Regional Offices, 
NARA. 
96 See, for example, Joe Virgilio Collection, AFC/2001/001/68485 and John Salerno Collection, 
AFC/2001/001/47924, VHP; Headquarters, USF, China Theater, Subject: Report of Alleged Illegal 
Activities of American Motor Vehicle Drivers, 5 April 1945; RG 493, Records of the Special 
Staff/Adjutant General, General Correspondence, Box 98, Morals and Conduct Dec. 44 to 15 May 
1945, NARA; Headquarters, SOS, China Theater, General Court Martial Orders Number 18, 21 May 
1945, RG 493, Chinese Combat Command/Adjutant General Section, General Correspondence, 1944–
1945, Box 85, 250 Discipline 1945, NARA. 
97 Sworn Statement Made by Ho Shet Yu, 12 November 1943, RG 493, China Theater/Special 
Staff/Provost Marshal Section, Formerly Classified Correspondence 1943–1946, Box 665, China 
Theater HQ Intelligence Reports October-November 1943, NARA; .A. Duff to Colonel Ownby, 25 July 
1945; RG 493, China Theater/Special Staff/Provost Marshal Section, Formerly Classified 
Correspondence 1943–1946, Box 663, Correspondence June to August 1945 from Regional Offices, 
NARA; Regional Office Theater Provost Marshal, CID USF in China, Statement of Private John Doe, 23 
May 1945; RG 493, Records of the Special Staff, Adjutant General, General Correspondence, Box 139, 
Investigations to August 1945, NARA. 




market dealings with GIs. 98 The sight of so many goods intended for U.S. military 
use being sold by Chinese civilians frustrated American commanders—who 
attributed most of the problem to theft—and led them to pressure provincial and 
central authorities to crack down. The Tobacco Monopoly Bureau barred sales of 
foreign cigarettes in May 1944.99 In September, the Yunnan provincial government 
promised “confiscation and severe punishment for anyone caught buying or selling 
U.S. military goods.100 In early 1945, local police carried out sporadic raids on areas 
known for selling American products, and U.S. military investigators attempted to 
locate the suppliers for such markets.101 His earlier efforts having done little to keep 
U.S. goods off the market, Long Yun imposed a strict prohibition on all trading in U.S. 
military goods starting June 1, backed up by Sino-U.S. joint patrols.102 But markets 
that were broken up in one place quickly returned or reappeared elsewhere.103  
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 The Sino-U.S. focus on breaking up black marketeering and smuggling by 
targeting Chinese civilians also provoked resentment. Despite going along with the 
Army’s requests for a ban, Long Yun and National Military Council Foreign Affairs 
Bureau Director He Haoruo laid much of the blame for China’s black markets on 
pilfering by American servicemen. Both men argued that the problem would persist 
so long as U.S. authorities failed to stop their own men from stealing and selling 
American goods.104  A writer named Wang Pingshun criticized Long’s June 1 
prohibition in the pages of the Grand View Mansion Weekly, arguing that 
“enforcement of the measure should begin with the party initiating the deal—the 
[American] seller.” Wang wrote that it was “quite ridiculous” to ban the sale of 
articles with no military use, such as candy, cigarettes, and daily necessities. He 
sympathized with the plight of ordinary civilians, who oftentimes had few 
alternatives to black market dealing thanks to unemployment and the worst 
inflation rates of the entire war. Besides, he insisted, “in view of the vast population 
in China—at least 300,000 strong in Kunming alone”—It would be far easier to 
make GIs the targets of discipline.105 
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 Chinese officials also blamed the U.S. Army for pervasive hoarding and 
speculation in the U.S. currency black market. Chongqing and the local governments 
in Guangxi and Yunnan had tried for years to eliminate black market trading in U.S. 
dollars, to no avail.106 The U.S. Army experimented with paying soldiers in Chinese 
fabi, but it undermined morale. Starting in January 1944, the Army paid all 
salaries—including those to civilian Chinese employees—in U.S. dollars. The dollar’s 
value skyrocketed in early 1944 as hoarding and speculation intensified, making 
local “people look on Chinese currency as simply scraps of paper.”107 Hundreds of 
civilian moneychangers lined the streets in Chongqing, Kunming, and Guilin, as no 
soldier was willing to get ripped off by going through official channels and paying 
the outrageous 20:1 rate.108 
 Black market trading and smuggling rings were not the sort of mutually 
respectful, cooperative relations between GIs and local civilians that Chinese and 
American officials had hoped for, but it was what they got. American servicemen in 
China walked into a situation in which the lure of easy money and control over the 
country’s sole link to the outside world gave them privilege that almost no Chinese 
had. Many of their Chinese business partners, however, resorted to black market 
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trading out of desperation. It would be impossible to determine the exact scale of 
Hump smuggling and black market trading involving GIs and Chinese civilians 
during the war. According to the Zhengyi bao newspaper in Kunming, the U.S. 
military police unearthed more than three hundred smuggling cases involving 
Hump aircraft between June 1942 and January 1945, with the total value of goods 
seized exceeding four million dollars.109 No doubt this figure represented but a tiny 
fraction of the actual total. Smuggling and underground trading might have 
benefitted the GIs and civilians who participated but it undermined allied 
operations and contributed to tensions at the alliance’s higher levels.  
Theft and Profiteering 
 Smuggling and black market trading were intertwined closely with theft, an 
issue that caused even greater mutual resentment between GIs and Chinese civilians 
as well as between authorities from both countries. Theft arose from the same 
power disparity that fueled smuggling networks and black markets. The U.S. Army 
and its soldiers possessed goods that commanded high prices, and many civilians 
were drawn to theft out of opportunism or desperation. Of course theft among GIs 
was also widespread in China—American servicemen pilfered many of the U.S. 
military goods that ended up for sale around the country. Yet by early 1945, theft 
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committed by Chinese probably did more than any other factor to create hostility 
toward Chinese civilians amongst American servicemen in the country. Chinese 
soldiers also stole from the U.S. Army, which will be addressed in chapter five, and 
the frequency of theft by soldiers and civilians convinced many GIs that Chinese 
officials must have been involved as well. 110 Rampant theft sometimes led GIs to 
take matters into their own hands by searching Chinese shops or homes and 
confiscating American goods. These actions violated Chinese sovereignty and 
outraged the Chinese government. Chinese and American officials also clashed over 
shootings of suspected Chinese thieves by American sentries. But as theft continued 
to climb over the war’s final months, some Chinese commanders agreed that 
shootings were sometimes justified.  
 Like smuggling and black market trading, theft emerged as a serious problem 
early on and only grew worse over time. Stealing ranged from pilfering of individual 
items to sophisticated, large-scale operations involving local businesses and Chinese 
civilians employed by the U.S. Army. 111 In December 1943, the arrest of one Chinese 
driver working for the U.S. Air Service Command in Kunming for siphoning gas from 
Jeeps revealed a conspiracy involving eighteen other civilian drivers.112 Gasoline 
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fetched high prices on the black market, and after the Yunnan-Burma Pipeline 
opened in February 1945, losses due to theft were staggering. During just two days 
in early June, thieves made away with 150,000 gallons.113 U.S. Army jeeps and trucks 
also proved to be popular targets. Twenty-five were stolen in Kunming alone in just 
two-and-a-half months over the winter of 1943 to 1944.114 In June 1944, an 
American major told Chinese journalists at a Kunming press conference that “so 
many vehicles have been stolen that it has affected the capacity of Chinese and 
Americans to wage war.”115 In April 1945, Chennault told Wedemeyer, “One of the 
principal problems confronting this command is the continuous loss of government 
equipment and personal property at all of our air bases by thievery.”116 Chennault, 
who rarely criticized the Chinese in public, called in Chinese and American 
newsmen on April 7 and requested their help in halting theft, which he warned had 
convinced the average American serviceman “that every Chinese he sees about him 
is a potential thief [and] makes highly difficult American Army policy indoctrinating 
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him with [the] necessity of treating all Chinese courteously.”117 Wedemeyer lashed 
out at Chiang in June about theft at the Yunnanyi air base, writing “the many 
depredations constantly occurring at Yunnanyi are giving rise to violence and 
bloodshed.”118 Yet theft only increased during the final months before Japan’s 
surrender.119  
 Theft aroused resentment among American personnel, and along with 
growing frustration over price gouging and stealing by Chinese soldiers, it 
convinced GIs that Chinese were dishonest and untrustworthy—adversaries rather 
than allies. “There is really only one bad thing that we have found here in China, that 
wasn’t so important a problem in India,” Earl Revell wrote to his wife in 1944, “and 
that is stealing.”120 “Like the Hindus,” Warren Arnett wrote in a letter to his mother, 
“they [the Chinese] are dirty and are born thieves.”121 Flight engineer Joe Virilio 
recalled that while serving in China “the only real problem we had was with the 
Chinese civilians…they would come in and steal clothing and stuff from all of us.”122 
Howard Rubin, an aircraft recognition instructor in Kunming, agreed, “you couldn’t 
trust them. They used to steal us blind.”123 In April 1945, the U.S. consulate in 
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Kunming warned that “growing criticism among our servicemen of the Chinese war 
effort and particularly of the profiteering and thievery of certain Chinese elements” 
had made it all the way back to the United States. Theft added to widespread 
resentment about what soldiers perceived as Chinese profiteering and price gouging 
in everything from rickshaw fares to foodstuffs and construction supplies.124 Price 
increases, however, often stemmed from inflation rather than deliberate attempts to 
cheat GIs, but American servicemen nevertheless regarded these issues as evidence 
that the Chinese—whom they had journeyed across the Pacific to save—were 
unworthy of American aid.  
 These frustrations pushed a growing number of GIs to take matters into their 
own hands, which only made matters worse. In Zhanyi, northeast of Kunming, the 
American airbase commander twice searched Chinese businesses with the aid of 
armed GIs and confiscated American cigarettes, uniforms, and other goods.125 Long 
Yun also reported that U.S. military police “sometimes exceeded their authority” in 
similar incidents.126 Wedemeyer’s headquarters apologized for the search at Zhanyi, 
and all U.S. commands in China sent out instructions reminding their men that only 
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local authorities had a right to search homes and businesses.127  Chinese officials 
regarded these incidents as blatant violations of Chinese sovereignty. And according 
to He Haoruo, GIs continued carrying out illegal searches around China well into the 
summer of 1945.128 Such searches underscored to the Chinese that their guests had 
become much more like occupiers.  
Killings of suspected thieves by American servicemen also drew the ire of 
Chinese across the social spectrum. According to a set of U.S. Army regulations 
promulgated on January 18, 1944, firearms could only be used in self-defense and to 
prevent prisoners from escaping. Yet after GIs shot two Chinese for stealing bricks 
in August, the judge advocate argued that U.S. military law allowed the killing of 
felons fleeing the scene of their crimes, and that any theft of U.S. military goods 
constituted a felony. Chinese law, however, only sanctioned lethal force in self-
defense.129  The legalistic American approach failed to take account of Chinese 
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nationalism: the scars of colonialism and unequal treatment ensured that the killing 
of unarmed citizens on Chinese soil would provoke outrage, regardless of legal 
justification. Chinese authorities immediately seized on the double standard, 
reminding the Americans that Chinese guards frequently caught GIs pilfering in 
warehouses. “If Chinese guards would have also adopted the same method toward 
those U.S. soldiers of alleged burglary [sic] who used to creep into depots,” China’s 
Fifth Route Air Force Headquarters reasoned, “it would be very hard for this 
headquarters to make good arrangements for any such result.”130 Meanwhile, at 
Yunnanyi, the base cited by Wedemeyer as a site of near-constant theft, GIs killed a 
number of suspected civilian thieves in May and June, including one man named Liu 
Kaiqi, who was carrying water for sale at the airfield. “They [the Americans at 
Yunnayi] don’t only neglect human beings,” stated Liu Kaiqi’s father, “but also look 
down on our nation.”131  
The deep distrust that characterized all levels of Sino-American interaction 
by the spring of 1945 meant that Chinese and Americans rarely reached the same 
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conclusion when investigating these incidents. After GIs killed two suspected 
thieves at Yunnanyi on July 12, Chinese investigators lambasted American 
authorities for not capturing the men alive and voiced doubts that the suspects had 
attempted to steal at all.132 American investigators displayed similar bias about 
Chinese eyewitness reports. “The undersigned has considerable experience dealing 
with the Chinese,” wrote one investigator regarding a shooting that left one civilian 
dead and another injured, “from which he has learned that they frequently 
knowingly give false information.” The allegations that GIs had shot the men over an 
alleged theft of a 100 rupee note, he concluded, “were a complete fabrication.”133 
The adversarial state of relations during the war’s final year made it almost 
impossible for Chinese and U.S. authorities to see eye-to-eye. As with the smuggling 
and black market issue, Chinese authorities concluded that American servicemen 
bore responsibility for a far larger share of theft than U.S. commanders were willing 
to admit, with one Commission on Aeronautical Affairs study arguing that American 
personnel committed more than 46% of thefts involving U.S. Army Air Force 
goods.134 
Chinese authorities nevertheless began employing harsher measures against 
thieves in 1945, moving in step with their actions against black market trading and 
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smuggling. The Chinese Army crossed a new threshold on June 28 during a meeting 
about gasoline theft from the Yunnan-Burma Pipeline. General Huang Qixiang, 
commander of the Chinese Combat Command, requested that American personnel 
“shoot offenders who resist arrest, preferably wounding them so they could be 
interrogated as to accomplices.” Huang’s suggestion took American participants at 
the meeting aback, and they told him to put it in writing.135 For a Nationalist general 
to authorize foreign soldiers to shoot unarmed Chinese suspects on Chinese soil 
indicated the gravity of the theft problem and its impact on military operations.  
Theft poisoned ties between GIs and civilians and undermined trust at all 
levels of Sino-American interaction. Nothing Chinese or American authorities did 
had much effect on resolving the problem. And while theft by civilians frustrated 
American servicemen to no end, GIs actually bore a large share of responsibility for 
the problem—both as a result of their own pilfering and, according to Wedemeyer, 
their negligence in guarding U.S. government property.136 Theft was also a 
consequence of the U.S. strategy to operate the China Theater on a shoestring. With 
inadequate personnel, American commanders had no choice but to rely on poorly 
paid Chinese guards, who had little training or incentive to take risks. Personnel 
shortfalls also compelled American commanders to employ large numbers of 
civilians, including many men who stole or colluded with GIs in black market deals. 
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From the perspective of ordinary GIs, theft resulted in what Chennault warned 
about in April 1945: the conviction that all Chinese civilians were potential thieves. 
The Chinese, on the other hand, saw GIs’ reactions to theft as evidence that 
Americans were hypocrites and had a low regard for Chinese life.  
Vehicle Accidents 
China’s roadways also became a source of friction between servicemen and 
civilians. Upon arriving in China, GIs were shocked by the way Chinese drivers and 
pedestrians navigated the streets. They interpreted the chaos they saw as further 
evidence of Chinese backwardness and indifference toward human life. Yet GIs 
themselves quickly developed a reputation for reckless driving and disregard 
toward pedestrians. Efforts to bring the problem in line by lowering speed limits 
and devising other regulations did not lead to a reduction in traffic violations or any 
changes in in the Chinese perception that reckless driving was needlessly killing and 
injuring civilians.  
American servicemen found China’s roadways no less unpleasant than the 
country’s pervasive stench of human feces and equally indicative of the Chinese 
people’s ignorance and low regard for life. “The slope head driver,” wrote Jan Peeke 
in 1942, “gets in his car, puts one hand on the horn button and takes off—right 
down the middle of the street—[it] looks as a result, like a snowplow going up the 
sidewalks of 14th and F Streets during rush time.”137 It was also the custom, Peeke 
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said, for pedestrians to walk in the street, “and if the walkers don’t get out of the 
way, nothing to fear, just a few less mouths to feed in China.”138 Behavior on Chinese 
roads frustrated GIs to no end, but rather than seeing the obvious explanations—no 
history of car culture, less concern for personal space and the rule of law—they 
drew conclusions that conformed to prevailing ideas about Chinese inferiority. “The 
Chinese had a folk superstition that they picked up devils during the year,” recalled 
a soldier in a 14th Air Force communications unit, “and whenever possible they 
would rush across in front of a vehicle or airplane at a great risk to themselves in 
order to cut themselves free of the devils who shadowed them.139 Norman Key, a 
quartermaster major who trained Chinese drivers, repeated the same story, 
remarking, “life is so cheap, it was no big deal.”140 Warren Arnett put it in 
characteristic bluntness in 1945: “A Chink will cut across your path so his spirit will 
follow you and not him…a lot of them get killed this way. Crazy people!”141 If 
Chinese drivers and pedestrians had such low regard for the law or life, as many 
Americans believed, then why should GIs bother to care?  
Yet reckless driving by AVG volunteers and American soldiers aroused 
resentment across the country. Police in Chongqing gave two AVG volunteers a 
break after they seriously injured two civilians on May 22, 1942, noting that 
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“American AVG vehicles have been driving on the right when in the city, in 
accordance to the American custom,” even though Chinese law required traffic to 
keep to the left.142  However, providing English translations of Chinese traffic 
regulations did nothing to halt drunk driving, and after two intoxicated AVG 
volunteers hit a civilian near Chongqing’s Russian Café just a week later, Chinese 
authorities warned the Americans that “further drunk driving incidents will damage 
the AVG’s reputation.”143 As more American troops arrived in China and deployed at 
bases around the country, more accidents occurred. Chiang himself addressed the 
issue in October 1944, stating “all allied vehicles must respect traffic rules and 
safety.”144 Months later, Chongqing’s March 1945 Traffic Supervision Conference, 
where several government agencies discussed traffic problems associated with 
American servicemen, failed to stem the increase in accidents.145 “In recent days,” 
the Chongqing Police Bureau reported on April 26, “accidents involving U.S. military 
vehicles have been happening one after another.”146 Reports from Yunnan Province 
showed that the problem was not limited to Chongqing. “Ever since the highway in 
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Luoping [near the American airfield] was opened to traffic, reckless driving has 
caused a number of injuries and deaths,” reported the village headman in Shawan 
Cun on May 4, after “a fast running car belonging to the U.S. Army engineering 
section” killed a local woman.147  The magistrate of Kunming County urged the 
Foreign Ministry to take up the matter with U.S. forces “in view of the fact that 
pedestrians have often been knocked down and killed by American military 
trucks.”148   
Chinese and U.S. authorities’ measures for dealing with traffic violations 
failed to bring the problem under control. Stilwell told the Chongqing Police that he 
had formulated new regulations to prevent further drunk driving accidents in early 
1943, but as late as June 1945, courts-martial punished drunk-driving violations 
with just a $15 forfeiture.149 Fourteenth Air Force investigations in Kunming during 
August 1944 found U.S. base areas “characterized by reckless driving, speeding on 
narrow roads, and almost a total absence of military courtesy.”150  But not until May 
1945, did the Army begin referring soldiers to summary courts martial for speeding 
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and reckless driving.151 By then, the Army’s reputation for dangerous behavior on 
China’s roadways was well established. The Army experimented with imposing a 
ten mile-per-hour speed limit earlier in the year, but it hampered operations and 
“was very commonly violated.”152  Meanwhile, with no jurisdiction, the Chinese 
government could do nothing but raise requests with U.S. authorities and publish 
propaganda pieces, such as an April 28 article in the Central Daily News about a 
supposed accident in Chengdu, where GIs immediately gave first aid to injured 
civilians and voluntarily handed over their driver’s licenses pending legal 
settlement. “The town folk were deeply moved by their law-abiding spirit,” the 
article claimed.153 
Despite American servicemen’s reputation for lawlessness on the roads, the 
Army did pay medical expenses when GIs injured civilians and provided 
compensation payments in the event of fatal accidents.154 Compensation payments 
placed an actual dollar value on Chinese life and they varied widely. Li Benmao’s 
family received $483.33 after an American vehicle killed him in a hit-and-run 
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accident near Zhanyi Airbase.155 The Army paid CN$10,000, or just $15.50, for 
funeral expenses after an Army truck crushed Liu Dongshi, a refugee woman 
without any relatives in Kunming.156 When Sidney Rittenberg, a Chinese language 
specialist with the judge advocate’s office paid the $26 compensation to the family 
of twelve-year-old girl who died after GI ran her over while trying to scare her, her 
father told him, “our life is nothing.”157 American servicemen interpreted Chinese 
behavior on the roads as evidence of a low regard for life, but their own actions 
indicated the same thing in Chinese eyes.  
Violence Against Civilians 
 Traffic violations damaged the U.S. military’s reputation in China, but 
violence against civilians went much further in making ordinary Chinese see GIs as 
adversaries rather than allies. Like smuggling, theft, and vehicle accidents, violence 
against civilians increased over the course of the war. The Judge Advocate allowed 
the problem to fester by generally meting out light discipline. Many crimes went 
unpunished, as Chinese complaints often took weeks or months to reach the 
relevant American authorities, rendering proper investigation nearly impossible. By 
the summer of 1945, American servicemen might have seen all Chinese civilians as 
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potential thieves, but civilians could not help but seeing all GIs as potential threats 
to their wellbeing.  
Indiscriminate shooting endangered civilians and increased tensions 
between the U.S. military and Chinese authorities. Intoxicated GIs shot off firearms 
in densely populated areas, which aroused resentment and threatened local 
order.158 In Chongqing, the problem became such a nuisance that the Police Bureau 
imposed citywide limits on alcohol sales and ordered restaurants to stop serving GIs 
at 9:30 pm each night. However, a lack of police officers and equipment in the 
Bureau’s Foreign Affairs Department made enforcing these regulations difficult.159 
American servicemen also liked shooting off firecrackers from moving vehicles, 
which posed less danger but nevertheless disturbed the peace and risked starting 
fires.160 GIs also enjoyed hunting and target shooting—both while at liberty and 
sometimes from moving vehicles while on duty. Phone lines, porcelain insulators on 
telegraph poles, and road signs were favorite targets. Minister of War He Yingqin 
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and Foreign Affairs Bureau Director He Haoruo pleaded with Stilwell and 
Wedemeyer numerous times in 1944 and 1945 to halt the practice.161 Between 
February and June 1945 alone, phone lines between Kunming and surrounding 
cities were severed by shooting ten times, delaying telephonic and telegraphic 
communication.162 American commanders admitted that GIs were probably at fault 
for these incidents, as the practice was quite common in the United States.163  A 
circular order issued on May 17, 1945 finally banned indiscriminate shooting, 
although according to earlier regulations, a GI was permitted to fire his gun only in 
self-defense.164 Yet random shooting continued for the remainder of the war, and 
American servicemen simply ignored requests by Chinese gendarmes to stop.165  
According to He Haoruo, even high-ranking officers violated the indiscriminate 
shooting ban.166 
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Random shooting caused injuries and deaths. A September 1943 incident 
that left one civilian dead and another hurt affirmed some of the misgivings 
expressed when Chinese officials debated the May 1943 Sino-U.S. jurisdiction 
agreement. An American Army engineer shot off a few rounds in grassy area near 
the garage where his vehicle was being repaired, killing Li Fengshi and wounding 
Lei Zhilin, two civilians who had been shopping across the street. Citing relevant U.S. 
federal and state legal codes, the Chinese Foreign Ministry expected the Army to 
court-martial the GI in question for involuntary manslaughter. But U.S. 
Headquarters in China demurred, arguing that there had been no criminal intent.167  
The Army paid for Lei’s medical expenses and gave around $320 to Li’s family, an 
amount the Foreign Ministry found scandalously low in comparison to fines for 
involuntary manslaughter in accordance with U.S. law.168  Again and again, random 
shooting injured or killed civilians. If no English-speakers witnessed the incident, it 
often took months for word to work its way up to the Ministry of War or FAB before 
reaching U.S. Army Headquarters or diplomatic posts.169 In such cases, carrying out 
the investigation needed for a successful court martial was practically impossible—
witnesses could no longer be found and soldiers had often been transferred to other 
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commands. Other cases were never resolved because Chinese reports never reached 
the right U.S. investigating authority. 170 He Yingqin’s frustrations over his 
government’s impotence in dealing with these crimes was evident in a July 1945 
report to Wedemeyer about three civilians injured by random GI shooting: “Please 
advise what action is to be taken if such an incident should recur…or when Allied 
personnel misbehave when they are drunk.”171 Stilwell and Wedemeyer had failed 
to aggressively supervise their men and punish malfeasance, allowing violence to 
get out of control and confirming Chinese fears that Americans would never regard 
them as equals.  
U.S. Army Headquarters in China never took effective measures to eliminate 
indiscriminate shooting. Penalties for pilfering, sleeping on post, being absent from 
guard duty, or disobeying orders from an NCO were stiffer than penalties for 
accidentally injuring or killing a Chinese civilian. Even at the end of the war, after 
months of repeated pleas by Chinese authorities and pressure to put and end to 
random shootings, GIs still got off easy. In August 1945, Private Joseph 
Wyszomierski was convicted of wrongfully shooting a civilian while drunk. The 
Judge Advocate imposed a $20 forfeiture on his salary for three months.172  
Wedemeyer himself was outraged the same month when a 14th Air Force private 
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was punished with just seven days’ restriction on base for shooting an elderly 
civilian. But Wedemeyer took no real steps other than recommending actions 
against the private’s base commander be “taken or contemplated.”173  
Other violence was intentional and often committed by intoxicated 
servicemen. In Chongqing at around 2:40 am on October 7, 1942 Shi shi xin bao 
[New Paper on Current Affairs, 時事新報] general manager Zhang Wanli noticed two 
armed, intoxicated GIs trying to break down the door to the nearby Central Bank’s 
personnel office. When a paperboy from the Central Daily News, the Nationalist 
government’s press organ, stumbled upon the Americans, they took his bike and 
beat him up. The two soldiers then chased away a rickshaw driver pulling a load of 
rocks and began throwing the rocks through Zhang’s office windows. After breaking 
into the office, the Americans smashed up its front desk, broke lights and 
gramophone records, and then fired off several rounds before leaving. Chinese 
soldiers and police could do little but protest to U.S. Army authorities, who later 
disciplined the perpetrators and promised to halt further violence.174   
These incidents provoked lasting resentment, ruined businesses, and caused 
injuries and deaths. Chinese police or gendarmes who tried to stop rampaging 
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American servicemen ended up getting assaulted themselves.175 GIs, like Corporals 
Leroy Reece, John Taylor and Sergeant Mead France, avoided being locked up for 
these crimes by paying for damages and medical costs.176  Local policemen grew 
terrified of American servicemen as a result of these beatings and other incidents 
where GIs killed police and escaped punishment, so even in circumstances where 
Chinese police or gendarmes had the authority to take GIs into custody—when U.S. 
military police were not around and violence was likely to be continued or 
aggravated if nothing was done—they were afraid to act.177  Private First Class 
Norman Byrn spent a half hour destroying merchandise in Lin Sheng’s store in 
Kunming before American MPs took him into custody. “This is only a small store and 
my whole family depends on this,” Lin told investigators after the intoxicated Byrn 
broke 402 phonograph records and caused total damages of CN$530,000 during the 
April 1944 rampage. 178 And because GIs tended to congregate in crowded city 
centers while at liberty, large civilian crowds witnessed these assaults, like when 
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Sergeant James Gingell attacked Liang Nan, a crippled cigarette vendor, in front of 
Kunming’s Nanping Restaurant and then broke one of Liang’s crutches over the 
head of another crippled Chinese who got in his way.179  These incidents reinforced 
the unequal nature of the alliance, demonstrating that while Chinese and U.S. 
authorities would take aggressive measures against theft by Chinese civilians, 
stopping violence against Chinese civilians was a lower priority.  
Even minor confrontations, like when an American MP stopped Malay 
Language Professor Yang Chenren as Yang was riding his bicycle to work, stole his 
glasses, and then waved him away, deeply alienated Chinese civilians from their 
American allies. “Although the loss of a pair of spectacles is a trifle matter, yet such 
behavior on the part of a member of Allied [American] military police constituted a 
contempt for the Chinese people,” Yang wrote.180 Tone-deaf American investigators 
deemed the MP’s actions “excusable” because Yang was wearing glasses “identical to 
the type issued by the United States military authorities.”181 Their reasoning 
overlooked the likely possibility that Yang had purchased the glasses. It also ignored 
strict regulations against GIs confiscating property from Chinese civilians, 
regardless of whether or not it belonged to the U.S. government.  
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Penalties for violent crimes against civilians were almost invariably lighter 
than those for violent acts committed against fellow soldiers. For example, the 
Kunming SOS Judge Advocate court-martialed four GIs for assaults on fellow 
soldiers in February 1945, sentencing each man to confined hard labor for three to 
six months plus a monthly forfeiture of $15 to $30 during the confinement period. 
The only soldier convicted of assault on a civilian that month was sentenced to a 
one-time $30 forfeiture.182 Earlier in the year, technician James Humphries was 
sentenced to three years’ hard labor for assaulting a fellow soldier with a weapon, 
but Charlie Goodrich, another technician, was given a six-month sentence for hitting 
a civilian in the face with a wine bottle.183 Private First Class Omer White, on the 
other hand, spent just one night in the Kunming stockade for trying to hit a Chinese 
woman and her husband with a wine bottle.184 Meanwhile, soldiers who received 
light sentences or escaped without punishment for violent crimes against the 
Chinese often became repeat offenders. Chennault recommended enacting a 
theater-wide policy to transfer from China immediately any GI “who became 
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involved in serious difficulties with Chinese civilians or military personnel,” but this 
recommendation never became official policy.185 
All the factors that facilitated violence against civilians were present in a 
murder case that drew nationwide attention in mid-1945. On April 23, Privates John 
Brennan and James Cooper got drunk and left the Army’s 95th Station Hospital near 
Kunming to buy more liquor at a village that was marked out of bounds by the U.S. 
Military Police. Brennan was actually a prisoner patient with four prior courts 
martial, and Cooper had been convicted twice of assaulting Chinese. Cooper should 
have been in the stockade serving six months for numerous crimes, including 
attacking a Chinese officer, but the finding against him was overturned. If Chennault 
had had his way, Cooper would have been transferred out of the China Theater long 
ago, and if American guards at the hospital had been doing their jobs, Brennan 
would have never left confinement that day.  
As the two stumbled back, they noticed an ox belonging to a farmer named 
Zhang Guoshui and decided to steal it and ride it to the hospital. Zhang, his sister, 
and his mother, Zhang Guoqing, gave chase, and other Chinese attracted by the 
commotion also gathered around. As the two GIs punched and kicked the three 
Zhangs, other Chinese—including soldiers—were “afraid to intervene for fear of 
being shot or harmed.” The crowd witnessed the two GIs use bricks to beat the 
seventy-one year-old Guoqing to death in front of her children. Unlike other violent 
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crimes against civilians, the Zhang Guoqing murder was publicized in newspapers. It 
occurred at the peak of the Jeep Girl Crisis—a nationwide panic over rape at the 
hands of American servicemen—which compelled Army authorities to make 
examples of Brennan and Cooper (On the Jeep Girl Crisis, see chapter four). A June 
19 court martial sentenced the two men to death, making them the only GIs in the 
China Theater to receive a death sentence for crimes the Chinese. But their 
sentences were later commuted to life. 186 Military and government-controlled 
newspapers highlighted the verdict as evidence that the U.S. Army took the 
protection of Chinese life seriously, but civilians who had lived with the U.S. military 
for years knew better.187 
GI violence against civilians, including the crimes against women that are 
covered in greater detail in chapter four, did more than anything else to damage 
American servicemen’s reputation in the eyes of Chinese civilians. Although U.S. 
military violence against civilians was not unique to the China Theater, Chinese 
understood each crime as the latest indignity in a long history of unequal treatment. 
In Britain and Australia, where locals had never been subjected to racist American 
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immigration policy or extraterritoriality backed by marines and gunboats, GI 
misconduct strained relations with local civilians but it did not arouse such loaded 
resentment.  
American policy and practice regarding crimes against local civilians also 
differed in crucial ways. Most important, perhaps, Australian and British possessed 
the power to investigate, detain, and arrest American servicemen.188 Chinese police 
had no powers of arrest, and they could detain a GI only if he committed a crime that 
would be repeated or aggravated if he were not taken into custody, and only then if 
the offense took place in an area not policed by American MPs.189 In Australia, 
American military commanders accepted the sharing of police duties on grounds 
that the U.S. Army lacked sufficient MPs to carry out policing on its own.190 The 
Army had the same problem in China, so clearly, American officers saw the Chinese 
police as inferior to the Australian police. Punishments were also more lenient in 
China. In all Allied countries, GIs frequently escaped punishment for crimes like 
assault, theft, and robbery. But in Britain and Australia, courts martial imposed 
severe punishments, including the death penalty, for murder and sexual assault.191  
No GI in China received the death penalty for a crime committed against a Chinese 
civilian or soldier.  
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 American servicemen in China never faced the specter of random violence 
that Chinese civilians had to live with but they were not entirely safe either. A series 
of bandit attacks on American convoys in Yunnan from 1943 to 1944 nearly derailed 
the U.S. Army’s training programs in the province. These attacks were the result of 
the same juxtaposition of American wealth and Chinese want that provoked 
widespread theft by civilians, and the measures Chinese authorities took to address 
the problem also reflected the stark power asymmetry between allies. Bandits in 
Yunnan province attacked three U.S. Army convoys between October 1943 and 
February 1944. Only one GI was injured in the attacks, which occurred in three 
separate districts in the eastern half of the province. The bandits were civilian 
militiamen, deserters from China’s Eighth Army, and peasant conscripts who had 
deserted while en route to basic training. They stole firearms, military equipment, 
and other supplies.192  
 Despite the low number of casualties, these attacks outraged American 
commanders. After the second attack, which occurred on January 11 when around 
thirty Chinese armed with Bren guns and riles held up a convoy, Y-Force 
commander Brigadier General Frank Dorn instructed the U.S. Consulate General in 
Kunming to inform Long Yun “that he will accept no excuse or apology other than 
the immediate dismissal from office of responsible officials.” Dorn also wanted the 
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consulate to warn Long the he intended to give the press “the complete details” of 
the January 11 attack and the earlier incident on October 16 as well as the details “of 
certain unsavory episodes of the Chairman’s [Long’s] sons.”193  Dorn and other 
commanders suspected that Long Yun’s two oldest sons were involved in smuggling 
and running a brothel that catered to American servicemen. Ambassador Gauss 
talked Dorn out of taking these steps, but after another bandit attack occurred at 
Kaiyuan in southeast Yunnan on February 19, the U.S. Army suspended its training 
program for Chinese forces in southern Yunnan.194 When GIs fell victim to bandit 
attacks, commanders like Dorn demanded that heads roll and threatened to 
embarrass Chinese officials. They also downgraded ties with the Chinese military by 
shutting down programs of crucial importance to the Chinese government. But 
when Chinese fell victim to attacks by American servicemen, the Chinese 
government did its best to suppress information from leaking to the press and 
simply pleaded with American authorities to do something to halt misconduct.  
 The measures taken by the Chinese government against bandits also 
contrasted sharply with the U.S. military’s response to violence committed by 
American servicemen. In response to the first bandit attack, Long Yun discharged 
the Lunan County magistrate and charged the new magistrate with exterminating 
the remaining bandits.195 Militias from several counties joined together to round up 
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the deserters involved in the January 11 attack, and magistrates from three counties 
lost their jobs.196 The Chinese government responded to the Kaiyuan bandit attack 
with a bloodbath, vowing to exterminate all bandits in the region, and eventually 
killing or capturing more than sixty alleged participants. Chiang and He Yingqin 
personally ordered a battalion of soldiers from the Yunnan-Guizhou Pacification 
Headquarters to carry out the mission.197 And whereas Chinese officials simply 
repeated the same requests as anti-Chinese violence or car accidents occurred again 
and again, Dorn was impressed with Chongqing’s efforts to wipe out the Kaiyuan 
bandits, reporting that the Chinese had “taken most energetic steps to rectify this 
incident.”198 
Conclusion 
 Interactions between American servicemen and Chinese civilians played a 
crucial and overlooked role in the alliance’s deterioration. With the exception of 
civilian rescues of American airmen, other encounters between GIs and civilians 
were characterized by greater ambiguity. Efforts by Chinese and U.S. authorities to 
manage these interactions became increasingly difficult as the war dragged on, U.S. 
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troop deployments in China grew larger, and the Chinese economy deteriorated. 
Many problems were inevitable, but choices taken and ignored shaped the overall 
framework. The Chinese had no say when it came to granting the U.S. military 
exclusive jurisdiction over all criminal matters involving American servicemen in 
China, but by failing to adequately supervise their men, punish malfeasance, or treat 
violent crimes against Chinese civilians with the same severity as similar crimes 
committed against other GIs, U.S. military authorities in China undermined the 
alliance. Meanwhile, rampant theft and occasional banditry made American 
servicemen look at civilians as obstacles rather than partners in the war effort. 
Reckless driving, negligence, and violence made civilians see GIs as physical threats. 
And while many soldiers and civilians cooperated in smuggling and trading in black 
market or stolen goods, these relationships had a negative effect on military 
operations.





IV: GIs and Chinese Women 
 In China, as elsewhere, American servicemen at liberty sought out female 
companionship. But the wartime policies and social mores governing relations 
between American servicemen and Chinese women circumscribed the range of 
acceptable interaction. Anti-Asian racism and anxieties about interracial unions 
underlay a de-facto U.S. marriage ban in the China Theater that persisted until mid-
1945. And while some Chinese intellectuals saw mixed marriage with American 
whites as a means to strengthen the country and improve cultural ties with the 
United States, most ordinary Chinese deemed such relationships impractical and 
shameful. But prostitution serving American soldiers still flourished, giving rise to 
the most intractable source of on-the-ground tension in the alliance.  
Sex between American soldiers and Chinese prostitutes was not a problem per 
se. Prostitution had been an integral part of the Chinese social system for thousands 
of years, and it thrived during the Republican Era (1911–1949) despite the 
Nationalists’ abolitionist inclinations.1 Few, if any, Chinese would have been 
surprised to find American troops any less interested in prostitutes than China’s 
own soldiers were. After all, besides prostitutes themselves, no other group in China 
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had higher venereal disease rates than soldiers and merchants.2 Yet as Christian 
Henriot has shown, China’s sex trade was extremely sensitive to changes in the 
social and economic order.3 Japan’s invasion, of course, wrought profound hardship 
and social leveling in China while also subverting traditional gender roles. Forced 
migration broke families apart, women began working in factories, and opportunists 
and war profiteers rose to the top of the economic pile. To make matters worse, 
China’s longstanding economic crisis became acute over the winter of 1944–1945, 
following Japan’s Ichigo Campaign, just as U.S. troop deployments to China soared, 
with numbers doubling between January 1944 and May 1945.4  
The sharp rise in U.S. troop numbers combined with China’s runaway inflation 
to foster a booming and highly visible sex-and-alcohol trade. Low wages forced 
military officers and government officials to obtain other work on the side or engage 
in unauthorized forms of trade.5 Houseboys employed by GIs could triple their 
monthly salaries by hawking a few bottles of bathtub gin. The wives of salaried 
workers could make more for a ten-minute sex act than their husbands earned for 
ten days’ labor. Americans’ preferred liberty destinations—downtown Chongqing 
and the area surrounding Kunming’s Nanping Theater—overflowed with pimps, 
bootleggers, and streetwalkers. The dance halls and cafes that catered to GIs also 
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brought in their share of Chinese customers, including young women who 
disregarded social mores and dated American servicemen. Many Chinese, 
unaccustomed to public interaction between the sexes, let alone mixing between 
local women and foreign men, found these changes unsettling, symptoms of Chinese 
culture gone awry under American influence.   
Misconduct by American troops compounded the problem, sowing fear and 
distrust among the Chinese populace. The average American serviceman came to 
China convinced he was doing the locals a favor, but the hardscrabble reality of life 
in a backward military theater weakened morale and amplified anti-Chinese 
resentment. With few recreational diversions to alleviate their boredom, many 
American servicemen found relief in sex and alcohol. This led to predictable results. 
Intoxicated GIs harassed women in public and fought with rickshaw pullers. Some 
stumbled through cities and villages while searching for prostitutes late at night, 
terrorizing civilians. A few even committed rape and murder. And thanks to China’s 
poor communications network—which meant that news often traveled slowly—and 
the U.S. Army’s bewildering command structure, it took months before many 
allegations reached the proper investigating authority, rendering such cases 
impossible to solve. Meanwhile, Chinese and American authorities seldom reached 
the same conclusions when investigating alleged sex crimes. But by March 1945, as 
rumors swirled around China about American misconduct, the China Theater Judge 
Advocate General admitted that violent offenses were increasing at an alarming 
rate. Army investigators finally looked into the matter and soon discovered through 




press clippings, police reports, and conversations with Chinese officials that a panic 
over rape had swept the country. By late April, Army investigators reported to U.S. 
headquarters in Chongqing that Chinese were making almost daily allegations of 
kidnapping and sexual assault.  
Backlash against American servicemen ensued. Each night in late April, Chinese 
men and boys gathered near the restaurants frequented by American soldiers in 
Chongqing. Some just stood by watching, but others came to harass the Chinese 
women who fraternized with the soldiers. Violence often followed. Sometimes 
Chinese men and boys from the crowds attacked both the women and the GIs 
accompanying them. On other occasions, Americans threw the first punches in 
response to insults from the crowd. The women in question, whom the Chinese 
called “Jeep girls” because they often rode alongside GIs in the U.S. Army’s 
ubiquitous quarter-ton trucks, became the topic of derisive and satirical newspaper 
columns in Kunming and Chongqing, where authors blasted them for “sniggering at 
their fellow country folk and flirting with foreigners.”6 Many Chinese assumed that 
all women who fraternized with Americans were whores, but they worried more 
about the Jeep as an instrument of rape: the vehicle American soldiers used when 
kidnapping innocent Chinese women.   
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Within a few weeks, both Chinese President Chiang Kai-shek and Lieutenant 
General Albert Wedemeyer, commander of U.S. forces in China, recognized that they 
had a crisis on their hands. Wedemeyer and his staff admitted that American 
misconduct had played a role, but they also believed that local hoodlums and 
rumormongers had stirred up trouble, leading Chinese authorities to draw 
conclusions without sufficient evidence. Wedemeyer ordered his commanders to 
bring the men into line but he also pressured Chiang to crack down on the Chinese 
press and the crowds threatening American troops in Chongqing, lest his GIs be 
goaded into retaliating. 
But Chinese and American efforts to resolve the crisis made little headway. The 
number of violent crimes committed by American servicemen actually increased in 
June and July, though not drastically.7 U.S. commanders tried to crack down on 
discipline violations, but they believed intensifying longstanding programs to 
educate their men and about Chinese culture and contributions to the war effort 
while scrambling to expand recreational opportunities offered the best solution. 
They requested more movies, sporting equipment, and on-base recreation rooms. 
Chiang, for his part, bowed to Wedemeyer’s pressure, launching a propaganda 
campaign that extolled GI virtues and outlined differences in Chinese and American 
gender relations. At the same time, the Generalissimo cracked down on the 
prostitutes and anti-American crowds in Chongqing. But Chiang’s crackdown 
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prompted prostitutes to claim rape in order to avoid arrest for solicitation. His 
propaganda campaign also fell on deaf ears, convincing more and more Chinese 
soldiers to take matters into their own hands as American misconduct continued. In 
the end, friction over sexual relations between GIs and Chinese women poisoned 
relations between American servicemen and the Chinese more broadly, provoking a 
crisis that Chinese and American authorities failed to resolve. Chinese and 
Americans had regarded one another warily since the Alliance’s early days, but with 
victory just over the horizon, many now saw the other as an adversary.   
Scholars have explored sexual tensions elsewhere during the Second World 
War, but have largely ignored China.8 Yet the crisis over sexual relations in China 
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illuminates not only a long understudied source of friction in the Sino-American 
alliance but also the underbelly of America’s rise to power in Asia. It reflected the 
radical asymmetries of power between China and the United States and established 
a pattern of divisive sexual relations that followed the U.S. military across Asia 
throughout the Cold War, stirring up trouble from Seoul to Saigon to Subic Bay. 
Wherever GIs were deployed, their buying power distorted traditional 
socioeconomic patterns. Many local people—the poor and the well connected, the 
criminal and the upright—became dependent on them for their livelihoods. In China 
as elsewhere, few markets proved as lucrative as quenching the servicemen’s 
demand for sex and alcohol. Camptown economies based on prostitution and 
alcohol sprung up wherever American servicemen deployed. The brothels and bars 
of Itaewon, Yokosuka, and Okinawa, near the major U.S. bases in South Korea and 
Japan, as well as the sex tourism centers of Bangkok, Pattaya, and Angeles City—all 
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sites of former U.S. bases or popular R&R destinations for American troops—remain 
their legacy to the present day.  
Patterns of Interaction 
 U.S. policy toward marriage in the China Theater reflected prevalent racism 
and sexual taboos in the United States. The War Department laid out its guidelines 
in a June 8, 1942 circular: no military personnel on duty overseas could get married 
without first securing their commanding officer’s approval.9 During World War II, 
thirty of the forty-eight American states enforced laws barring interracial marriage, 
so it was hardly surprising that the War Department regarded “miscegenous 
unions” as the “most distressing of all the marriage problems.”10 Given this concern, 
military commanders vigorously discouraged interracial relationships between 
American servicemen deployed overseas and non-white local women.11 Prior to the 
December 1943 repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act, Raymond Ludden, a U.S. 
diplomat in Kunming, told U.S. Army chaplains that the law deemed all foreign-born 
Chinese ineligible for citizenship.12 Even if a Chinese-American soldier somehow got 
permission to marry, he could not return to the United States with his bride. Chinese 
spouses of American citizens could only be admitted to the United States if the 
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marriage had occurred before the passage of the Johnson-Reed Act in May 1924.13 In 
Australia and Britain, U.S. Army chaplains had the power to adjudicate marriage 
applications, and both American and local officials eventually supported marriage 
between white American servicemen and local women.14 But in China, the War 
Department required military personnel to get approval from the Theater 
Commander before marrying, and not until late spring 1945 did an American 
serviceman obtain permission to wed a Chinese woman.15 This change in theater 
policy came two years after the repeal of Chinese exclusion.  
 Intermarriage was also frowned upon in China. Chinese laws passed in 1910 
and renewed as late as 1936 prohibited Chinese exchange students from marrying 
white women abroad.16 While overseas, male Chinese exchange students taunted 
and sometimes threatened their female compatriots for socializing with Western 
men. In China, mixed couples could expect to be harassed when appearing together 
in public, and in general, people considered marriage with a foreigner as shameful 
for the individual and for the country.17 Chinese views on Western sexuality had 
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roots in the nineteenth century, when Chinese literature and anti-foreign leaflets 
portrayed Westerners as devils and barbarians who represented a sexual threat to 
Chinese women and children.18 Of course not all Chinese considered Americans 
devils and barbarians in the 1940s, but most still opposed the idea that a 
respectable Chinese woman could marry an American serviceman. Fraternization 
with GIs thus placed Chinese women beyond the bounds of respectability.  
 And while American commanders might have opposed intermarriage, they 
knew their men would have sex with Chinese women. Indeed, as Susan Zeiger’s 
careful research has shown, one reasons that the U.S. military tolerated prostitution 
was that it presumably discouraged marriage and dating.19 Sexual mores in the 
United States had liberalized in the years since World War I, when Progressive 
reformers had tried to sublimate sexuality among the American Expeditionary Force 
serving in Europe through athletics, education, and “wholesome” recreation.20 The 
military continued and expanded such recreational work during the Second World 
War, but it also provided condoms and chemical prophylaxis to the troops, an 
implicit recognition that Uncle Sam could not control the men’s libidos.21  
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The U.S. Army’s Pocket Guide to China even enticed GIs with the prospect of 
exotic sexual adventure: “The modern Chinese girl,” the guide noted, “in her closely 
fitting gown, her bare arms and short hair, is often very pretty.” More than a few 
soldiers sailing aboard China-bound transport ships no doubt yearned for the Pocket 
Guide’s promise of “Chinese girls in cabarets and amusements who may be used to 
free and easy ways.” But not enough would heed the warning that “the average 
Chinese girl will be insulted if you touch her, or will take you more seriously than 
you want to be taken. A mistake in this may cause a lot of trouble.”22  
Even before Pearl Harbor, American servicemen had angered Chinese civilians 
and police because of their violent tendencies when in the company of prostitutes. 
In 1940, the twenty-four American sailors of the USS Tutuila, a Yangtze River 
gunboat stranded in Chongqing, served as the U.S. military’s unofficial face in China. 
Complaints regarding the men’s nightly revelry led to a police investigation, where 
Detective Zong Yongyu reported that “[e]very night without exception, [American] 
sailors here indulge in food, wine, woman and gambling.” Zong was not bothered by 
the sex trade itself, but rather by the drunken sailors’ proclivity for pushing 
prostitutes into the Yangtze River.23 Their behavior resembled the alcohol-fueled 
                                                        
22 Special Services Division, Army Service Forces United States Army, Pocket Guide to China 
(Washington DC: War and Navy Departments, 1942), 5.   
23 Chongqing Municipal Archives, Chongqing, China [Hereafter CQA] 0061.0015.02080, 職蒲崗呈唐毅
電 [Officer Pu to Chongqing Police Chief Tang Yi], 18 October 1940. On June 18, four sailors from the 
Tutuila had beaten people with bottles and harassed women outside Chongqing’s Tai Theater after 
drinking heavily. The crew had also injured a Chinese dockworker during a military exercise earlier 
that spring. See Sichuan Sheng renmin zhengfu waishi qiaowu (Gang Ao) bangong shi 四川省人民政
府外事侨务（港澳）办公室, Waiguoren fei fa, fanzui an jiaoshe 外国人非法，犯罪案交涉




violence of Japanese troops looking for women in Chongqing shortly before the war 
started in 1937.24  
 Of course not all contact between American servicemen and Chinese women 
involved violence, but this did not mean Chinese men found such interaction non-
threatening. Before it fell to the Japanese in November 1944, the city of Guilin 
enjoyed a freewheeling reputation thanks to its autonomy from Chongqing.25 By 
March 1944, at least seven or eight illegal dance halls had opened in Guilin, all 
ostensibly catering to American servicemen. A columnist for the Guangxi Daily found 
this troubling. In a May 15 editorial, he rebuked the young Chinese women who 
danced with GIs: “They need to know that if all they can do with American 
servicemen is dance with them, and then feel proud about it, then they are not 
winning glory for China’s New Women, they are actually humiliating China’s New 
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Women.”26 American troops in Guilin had barged into a longstanding debate about 
the role of women in Chinese society. Progressive Chinese intellectuals advocated a 
notion of modern womanhood represented by the “New Woman.” Well-educated 
but selfless, New Women put China’s needs before their own and found personal 
fulfillment in serving the country.27 Guilin’s dancing girls had forsaken their duty by 
selfishly flirting with foreigners while other Chinese were sacrificing for the war 
effort. And to Chinese social conservatives, the mere idea of young Chinese women 
aping Western ways and dancing with GIs was an affront to proper social order and 
national morality.28 Women’s voices, however, were conspicuously absent from this 
discussion.  
 Sexual relations between American servicemen and Chinese women were 
clearly fraught with tension even before GIs deployed to China in large numbers. 
Prostitution serving GIs in China was inevitable even without the de-facto marriage 
ban and mutual racism. But American participation in the sex trade, and social 
interaction between GIs and women who were not associated with prostitution or 
ancillary sex trade jobs, like taxi dancers or massage girls, tapped into anxieties 
about the role of women in society as well as the Nationalist state’s capacity to 
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uphold Chinese sovereignty. The incidents in Chongqing revealed the potential for 
larger problems. If the Tutuila’s twenty-four man crew could cause so much trouble, 
what would happen when thousands of American troops deployed to Chongqing? 
Controversy over Guilin’s dance halls, meanwhile, reflected a power struggle among 
men. If ordinary Chinese women danced with GIs, what else would they be willing to 
do with them? These questions foreshadowed problems that would become 
explosive during the Pacific War’s final year.  
Origins of the 1945 Jeep Girl Crisis 
 When Lieutenant General Albert Wedemeyer arrived in Chongqing to take 
command of the China Theater on October 31, 1944, his soldiers’ relations with local 
women were among the least of his concerns. The way he saw it, Japan’s Ichigo 
campaign, the largest operation the Japanese Army had ever carried out, appeared 
close to knocking China out of the war. The Japanese occupied Guilin and nearby 
Liuzhou on November 10, threatening Chongqing and Kunming. Wedemeyer feared 
that either city’s loss would mean the end for the Nationalists.29 Fortunately the 
threat to Sichuan and Yunnan subsided by late December when the Ichigo campaign 
ground to a halt, but Wedemeyer now devoted his energies to Chinese Army reform. 
His ambitious plan to train, reorganize, arm, and feed thirty-six Chinese divisions 
(the Chinese ALPHA forces), all operating with American liaison officers, left the 
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general with little time to attend to American interaction with Chinese civilians or 
the off-duty recreational pursuits of his own troops.30 
 Adding to his already considerable burdens vis-à-vis the Chinese military, 
Wedemeyer inherited a theater in disarray, awash with poorly disciplined and 
dispirited soldiers. In early October 1944, just a few weeks before he arrived in 
Chongqing, the U.S. Army’s Services of Supply (SOS) carried out a study that 
revealed the awful state of morale.31 Most enlisted men, the researchers found, had 
no idea why they were in China. Half complained that more should have been done 
to “place them in jobs for which they were best fitted” and a third admitted to 
working “just hard enough to get by.” To make matters worse, enlisted men 
considered their non-commissioned officers (NCOs) inept and their officers lacking 
in leadership qualifications.32 During his first inspection tour in late December, 
Wedemeyer found a pervasive “disregard for uniform regulations, military courtesy 
and discipline.”33  
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The men serving in China had reasonable grounds for their complaints. After all, 
China was a backwater with little to motivate the average GI. As their comrades 
smashed Hitler’s armies in France and island hopped across the Pacific, the 
American units assigned to China consisted mainly of rear echelon forces. Most men 
belonged to non-combat units supporting the 14th Air Force, where pilots made up 
just a fraction of overall troop strength. The daily grind of logistical and advisory 
work was made worse due to shortages caused by the Japanese blockade. American 
forces in almost every other operational theater had access to mountains of 
supplies, but the Japanese occupation of Burma meant that supplies for American 
troops in China had to be flown in over the Himalayas from air bases in India. 
Military necessities took precedence, leaving little cargo space for creature 
comforts, sporting equipment, or other recreational goods. Army hostels in major 
cities had basketball courts and film projectors, but they still lacked basic amenities 
available even in impoverished places like India, where goods could arrive by ship 
or rail. If a soldier in Kunming wanted a cold beer, he had to fly to Calcutta. The lack 
of opportunities for heroic action combined with Spartan living conditions—China 
probably ranked only with the Aleutian Islands when it came to isolation—wore the 
men down. As Time magazine China correspondent Theodore White told his editor 
back home, “life in China is rather dull.”34 But even if China had had more sports 
                                                        
34 Thedore White to David Hulburd, 20 February 1943, Correspondence, Time, 1/43-2/43, Box 3, 
Theodore White Papers, Harvard University Archives [hereafter HUA].  




facilities and other kinds of relaxation available, sexual exchanges between 
American troops and local women would have inevitably taken place.  
 Most Chinese, however, had more pressing concerns than an absence of 
excitement. Over the winter of 1944–1945, China’s war-ravaged economy took a 
turn for the worse. The Ichigo Campaign left the 1944 harvest in large swathes of 
Hunan, Guangxi, and Jiangxi in Japanese hands, placing enormous pressure on 
Sichuan and Yunnan. The grain tax burden reached its peak just as large numbers of 
refugees poured into China’s beleaguered southwestern cities.35 In January 1945 
alone, food prices in Kunming nearly doubled, and during February they increased 
another 70 to 240 percent.36 According to statistics compiled by the Farmers Bank 
of China, average retail market prices around the country rose at their sharpest 
rates of the entire war in February and March. And as the cost of living in Chongqing 
doubled between January and April, Arthur Young, Chiang’s American financial 
advisor, feared that hyperinflation could break out.37 By July, it took around 3,250 
Chinese fabi to purchase a single U.S. dollar on Chongqing’s black markets, up from 
around 470 per dollar in January.38 As a result, more Chinese than ever before 
became dependent on GIs in order to earn a livelihood. Entry into prostitution 
offered a harsh but available safety net.  
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Chinese desperation and American boredom and hormones fueled a flourishing 
sex trade over the winter as U.S. Army troop strength in China swelled from around 
28,000 in December to over 40,000 by early March.39 The availability of local 
women at bargain basement prices was a powerful motivating factor for American 
servicemen. The Chinese, meanwhile, had other ways of making money from GIs, 
but the sex-and-alcohol trade was easy to enter and offered relatively high returns. 
From the perspective of pimps and prostitutes, selling sex to American soldiers 
appeared to carry less risk than stealing from them, for which one could easily end 
up dead or sentenced to several years in prison.40 Without connections in India, or 
with venal American pilots, chances to break into the lucrative smuggling racket 
were hard to come by. For women, alternatives to prostitution existed, but they 
were hardly less exploitive. Work in Chongqing’s cotton mills—the largest 
employers of wartime female industrial labor—required standing for twelve-hour 
shifts in unventilated rooms that absorbed Chongqing’s intense heat. Accidents 
happened regularly, and workplace conditions fostered skin ailments and other 
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illnesses.41 The sex trade was also far more lucrative than laboring in the 
countryside. Huang Shang, a Chinese interpreting officer who worked with the 
Americans in 1945, was not too far off when he wrote that prostitution “was the 
only option” for young, impoverished refugee women in China. But he was right on 
the mark in arguing that for prostitutes, American soldiers were “naturally quite a 
catch.”42 At black market exchange rates in the spring of 1945, an American private 
earned ten times more than a full Chinese general.43 Flush with cash, American 
soldiers made great customers. According to Huang, prostitutes converged on the 
area surrounding Kunming’s Nanping Theater, filling the nearby coffee shops, and 
enticing GIs with catchy English chants: “clean sheets, no disease, secret door, no 
MPs.”44 Restaurants and clubs catering to GIs in Chongqing—The Victory House, the 
Two Hearts Café, the Sino-Russian Café—also grew crowded with pimps and 
prostitutes.  
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If the sight of so many Chinese women throwing themselves at American 
soldiers was not unnerving enough, misconduct by American personnel also 
increased over the winter, pouring further salt on Chinese wounds. In mid-
December, Chongqing Police Chief Tang Yi reported to Mayor He Yaozu that 
“frequent late night public drunkenness by American servicemen” had “threatened 
public safety” to the point that he had to request American MP assistance in carrying 
out joint patrols.45 Tang also ordered a crackdown on American soldiers bringing 
prostitutes into hotels without registering.46 And despite repeated Chinese requests, 
many GIs still flouted the rules about keeping prostitutes away from military 
facilities.47 At Kunming’s Wujiaba Airfield, the main airbase in China, American MPs 
turned out to be the worst offenders. PFC Fred Mason, a member of the MP company 
guarding Wujiaba, twice punched out Chinese sentries who tried to stop American 
servicemen from bringing women into the airfield.48 A Chinese investigation 
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revealed that American “military police had frequently and deliberately allowed 
prostitutes to enter the airfield.”49  
These incidents harmed Chinese-American relations on several levels. They 
made adversaries out of the Chinese and American enlisted men who were sharing 
the responsibility to guard facilities together. They also undermined cooperation 
between American military police and Chinese gendarmes, the men tasked with 
managing friction between Chinese civilians and American servicemen. And finally, 
they alienated Chinese commanders, who took offense not only at GIs’ sexual habits 
endangering military security but also at the behavior of Americans like Mason, who 
treated Chinese soldiers like second-class citizens in their own country.  
Civilians also suffered due to American misconduct. On December 19, an 
American sergeant searching for a brothel near Dali entered the home of a man 
named Wang Anlin by mistake and killed him after an argument. Wang’s wife 
declined to press charges only after the sergeant paid her CN$50,000—seventeen 
dollars for her husband’s life—but news of the incident still made its way to the 
Foreign Affairs Bureau (FAB) in Chongqing.50 On January 21 in Baoshan, the next 
major town after Dali on the Kunming-Burma Road, T/4 Thomas Davis and three 
privates from the 127th Signal Radio Intelligence company rampaged through 
Qingbai Village [清白村]. Drunk on homemade Chinese liquor, they shot out locks 
                                                        
49 General C. J. Zhou, Director, Commission on Aeronautical Affairs, Republic of China to Wedemeyer, 4 
March 1945, RG 493, China Theater/Special Staff, Formerly Classified General Correspondence, 1942-
1946, Box 314, Morals and Conduct from 10 December 1944 to 15 May 1945, NARA. 
50 He Haoruo to Albert Wedemeyer, 26 January 1945, RG 493, Records of the China Theater of 
Operations, Records of the Special Staff, General Correspondence Decimal File, Box 95, 1944-1945, 
NARA. 




and eaves on random houses, kicked down doors, killed farm animals, stole food, 
and struck a Chinese in the face with a rifle butt. The four had entered Qingbai 
Village in order to track down a fellow enlisted man who had separated from the 
group earlier because “he wanted a girl.”51  
Some crimes were especially heinous. On February 23, three enlisted men 
named Harvey Miller, James Daffin, and Harold Hughes spent the day drinking at 
Yangkai airbase in eastern Yunnan. They usually purchased their liquor from a 
Chinese man in Longyuan Village (龍院村), which was just down the road, so they 
dropped in that evening to buy a few bottles of rum. The three men drank at the 
man’s house for a while, but they departed around midnight to search for 
prostitutes. Brandishing clubs and a bottle of rum, they forced their way into two 
houses but left each one after Chinese residents “rais[ed] considerable hell.” At 
around 12:30 a.m. they kicked open the door to the home of a farmer named Yang 
Zhengcai. The three beat Yang with clubs and the bottle. Daffin then dragged Yang’s 
wife to a nearby rice paddy. He and Miller then took turns raping her. Hughes 
attempted to rape the Yangs’ nine-year-old daughter, Xiulian, and forced her to give 
him oral sex. Xiulian resisted, so Hughes left her alone in the rice paddy and took a 
turn raping her mother. The three fled when they saw Jeep headlights approaching: 
the village magistrate had alerted the base, and an MP was on his way. The 
perpetrators evaded the MP and returned to the base undetected but confessed to 
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the crime the next week after medics reported that Miller and Hughes were the only 
men to have taken prophylactics at the base dispensary on February 24.52  
Miller and Daffin were sentenced to just six months’ hard labor. Hughes 
received a five-year sentence, later reduced to six months.53 These short sentences 
belied the Pocket Guide to China’s claim that Americas treated “the Chinese as we 
treat any of our allies, and that we respect them as human beings on an equality 
with ourselves.”54 Much of the Chinese opposition to the May 1943 China-United 
States agreement on US military jurisdiction over its forces in China stemmed from 
fears that American servicemen would evade punishment for crimes against the 
Chinese. Had Miller, Daffin, and Hughes committed a similar crime in Australia or 
Britain they might have faced a firing squad. After all, the 92nd Article of War 
mandated a death sentence or life imprisonment for rape.55 But in China and India, 
US courts martial gave far more lenient sentences for crimes against locals than they 
did for crimes against fellow GIs.56 
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By provoking disputes and committing crimes as they hunted for prostitutes, 
GIs alienated each Chinese group with whom they interacted: police, soldiers, and 
civilians. GIs had never enjoyed stress-free relations with any of these groups, but 
their actions made matters worse by contributing to growing fears that China’s 
American allies were sexual predators. One effect was to make Chinese more likely 
to presume American guilt whenever they heard allegations or rumors of 
misconduct.  
 Structural factors made matters worse. Getting to the bottom of any Chinese 
allegation against American servicemen was no simple task, making it easer for GIs 
to get away with misconduct and more likely for Chinese to assume the worst about 
American intentions. Chinese authorities had no power of arrest, so unless 
American MPs were on hand to catch suspects red-handed, allegations had to flow 
up the chain of command to the central government in Chongqing, where the 
Foreign Affairs Bureau (FAB) of the National Military Council could pass them to U.S. 
Headquarters. This often took two or three months, rendering investigation nearly 
impossible to pursue. Alerting American MPs was easier in places like Chongqing 
and Kunming, where many soldiers and interpreting officers were present, but more 
difficult in the field, where the language barrier often precluded communication. 
Divided responsibility over American personnel presented another obstacle. By 
early 1945, the men scattered around China belonged to a dizzying array of 
commands—Army Headquarters, the 14th Air Force, Chinese Combat Command 
(CCC), the Chinese Training Center (CTC), the SOS, the Office of War Information 




(OWI), Navy Group China (SACO), and various intelligence agencies, plus a large 
number of transient personnel working for motor transport and the Air Service 
Corps—leaving the Chinese “bewildered” and unsure to whom they should take 
their complaints.57  
The confluence of misconduct, communication problems, and unclear authority 
structure are illustrated by two accusations that FAB Director He Haoruo forwarded 
to Wedemeyer on January 26. In the first case, the Chongqing Gendarmerie alleged 
that at “about noon on October 20, a Jeep belonging to the U.S. Air Force drove along 
the road to Baishiyi. As it was nearing the Second Main Station, the occupants of the 
car dragged a respectable lady, who happened to be walking on the way, into it and 
made away with her.” Luckily, Gendarmerie Headquarters reported, a Chinese guard 
stopped the Jeep and forced its occupants to release the woman. The second 
accusation stated that American personnel from 1st and 4th Squadrons of the Sino-
American Composite Wing “are recently in the habit of going in small groups, 
roam[ing] about the streets in Baishiyi in the evening, and try[ing] to get women by 
fair means or foul. Sometimes they even go so far as to knock at the doors of 
respectable citizens in their search for objects of desire, not hesitating to use 
firearms as a method of intimidation. This state of affairs,” Gendarme Headquarters 
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warned, “may lead toward untoward incidents in which the safety of American 
personnel may well be involved.”58  
 These accusations revealed some uncomfortable truths about American 
attitudes toward the Chinese. American servicemen’s experiences in China varied 
considerably, but most felt a strong sense of superiority over the Chinese. No less 
common was frustration over the presumed ingratitude of the Chinese for American 
assistance, a belief that price gouging directed at GIs deeply aggravated. Perhaps 
most pervasive, however, was the American perception that the Chinese placed a 
low value on human life. Slight variations on quotes like “death has no impression 
on them at all,” or “ life in China was pretty cheap,” come up over and over again in 
American soldiers’ diaries, letters, and memoirs.59 This stereotype dated to the anti-
Chinese agitation in the 19th-century American West, informed the writing of 
Lothrop Stoddard and Madison Grant in the 1910s and 1920s, and persisted up to 
the Vietnam War, as evinced by General William Westmoreland’s famous line in 
Hearts and Minds: “The Oriental doesn't put the same high price on life as does a 
Westerner. Life is plentiful. Life is cheap in the Orient."60 In all, these beliefs helped 
dehumanize the Chinese in the eyes of many Americans, who saw women as a 
sexual outlet and had nothing to fear from Chinese authorities. We cannot be sure 
about what happened in Baishiyi, but the cases illustrated above show that similar 
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crimes occurred around China that winter. Assuming that life was cheap in China, 
and that the Chinese themselves had little regard for Chinese life, led many GIs to 
treat them with callous disregard.  
 From the Chinese perspective, the accusations from Baishiyi left no room for 
doubt, but U.S. authorities saw things differently. More than three months had 
passed between the alleged incidents and He’s report to Wedemeyer. And before 
Wedemyer forwarded them, neither the Air Force’s Crime Investigation Department 
(CID) nor the Chinese-American Composite Wing’s commanding general had heard 
anything about the allegations. They replied to Wedemeyer a month later: “due to 
the length of time passed since the alleged incident set forth in the attached letter, it 
is most difficult to conduct a complete investigation.”61 Chinese gendarmes offered 
no specific information like license plate numbers or suspect descriptions, so CID 
agents probably concluded that the Chinese were simply reporting unfounded 
rumors.  
 But months passed before Chinese gendarmes heard any word from U.S. 
authorities, which no doubt aggravated longstanding resentment about being 
treated as inferiors. The most common Chinese complaint about American soldiers 
was that they behaved arrogantly and looked down on the Chinese. Of course many 
GIs did look down on the Chinese, but it was also true that many Chinese were too 
quick to blame American arrogance when dealing with difficult problems. Still, from 
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the Chinese authorities’ perspective, the report’s unambiguity and the lag time 
before the Americans took action also held out the possibility that GIs could rape 
Chinese women with impunity and that their commanders considered the problem a 
low priority. Many people in Sichuan and Yunnan, particularly away from the cities 
the Japanese had bombed, had no direct experience of suffering at the hands of 
Japanese soldiers. But they had seen American misconduct with their own eyes.  
Over the next few months, rumors of rape spread across the country, but U.S. 
authorities still had their doubts. Their response to allegations remained reactive 
rather than proactive, indicating that they still considered the issue a low priority. 
Baishiyi remained a hotbed of complaint. But CID agents investigating accusations 
there that GIs were now “molesting Chinese women” in their homes found “little or 
no definite information.” CID also concluded that a rumor prevalent in Baishiyi of 
American servicemen raping and murdering a Chinese girl on April 25—allegations 
quite believable thanks to the February attack near Yangkai Airbase—“started as a 
result of jealousy of the local Chinese over the fact that Americans have been seen 
with prostitutes and other Chinese women.”62 He Haoruo also sent Wedemeyer 
reports from Hunan and Sichuan alleging rape and assault.63 But once again He’s 
reports arrived too late and with too few details for CID to conduct an investigation.  
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Meanwhile, CID investigation into an alleged rape in Baoshan reinforced 
American suspicions about Chinese credibility. At 8:30 p.m. on February 26, a 
Chinese man named Ma Weihan entered the CID’s Baoshan office. He told CID agents 
that he had been walking in the city that night with his wife when four GIs pulled 
their Jeep over, assaulted him, and then kidnapped his wife. Ma returned to the CID 
office around 4:00 a.m. the next morning with his wife, Shagwan [sic], and the two 
claimed that she had been raped. Later that morning a CID agent named Herman 
Smitley visited Ma’s home with an interpreter and requested that Ma and Shagwan 
return to the CID office for further questioning. While Smitley was waiting for the 
couple, an unknown Chinese told him that Ma “was a known pimp and his wife a 
notorious prostitute.” When Smitley questioned Ma and Shagwan separately, 
Shagwan admitted to being a prostitute and “explained that she had spent the night 
with the Americans” and had “gone of her own free will.”64 Ma, the CID agents 
discovered, had reported the kidnapping because a GI had slapped him across the 
face to end an argument the two were having over how much the American should 
pay Ma to have sex with his wife.65 Ma Weihan and Shagwan’s wretched lot was one 
that other Chinese couples would share as inflation continued unabated.  
According to the Chongqing press, however, one group of women seemed to be 
benefitting from the growing American presence: “Jeep girls.” The earliest articles 
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about Jeep girls blended satire with male anxiety. Zhu Junle’s March 20 piece in the 
monthly News Universe [新聞天地], entitled “Jeep Girls and Jeep Cars,” poked fun at 
the Society of the Friends of the Allied Forces, the organization established the 
previous year by War Area Service Corps (WASC) Director Huang Renlin to provide 
“wholesome” entertainment to GIs. “Our Jeep girls,” Zhu argued, are the real 
“Friends of the Allied Forces.” Zhu depicted Jeep girls as women who looked down 
on ordinary Chinese while aping Western ways and enjoying smuggled goods. They 
walked around Chongqing, Zhu wrote, their purses full of “French perfume, Three 
Flowers powder, Tangee lipstick…Foreign sentiment making them look down on 
everything: black haired, black eyed, yellow skinned everything.” Zhu also noted 
that the Canadian government had recently passed a law welcoming war brides 
from England, which gave him hope: “As to the allied [American] soldiers in 
Chongqing, Kunming, and Chengdu, will their government make a law welcoming 
Jeep girls? Amen!”66 For Zhu, these women had forfeited their claims to Chineseness 
through their willing association with GIs.  
The next issue of News Universe promised to show the Jeep girl’s perspective. 
According to the editors, Shen Lusha, a “real Jeep girl,” had written in response to 
Zhu’s article and hoped to set the record straight about her “international love.” 
“Harry is wonderful,” she began, “only he can make all my worries disappear.” She 
listed the luxury goods and money that “Harry” gave her each month, bragging that 
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all his extra rations belonged to her.67 While such satire reinforced prejudices 
regarding Chinese women who associated with GIs—they were all whores—it also 
touched a raw nerve with the growing masses of the destitute in China’s inflation-
ridden cities. Coolies in Kunming, another author reminded readers, were dying in 
the streets as Jeep girls enjoyed gifts and flowers from “Allied friends.”68 The Shen 
Lusha story was most likely satire, written by a man or group of men who resented 
interaction between GIs and Chinese women.   
Mixed in among the satire and Jeep girl condemnations were more worrisome 
articles reflecting fears over race mixing and rape. The Modern Woman [現代婦女], a 
progressive feminist biweekly edited by underground Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) members, weighed into the Jeep girl debate with an unattributed article 
claiming that “many unwilling women are being dragged away to be ‘Jeep girls’ and 
deflowered” by American troops.69 Some women, the author admitted, became Jeep 
girls willingly, “but in our society full of things that should not be, the phenomenon 
of women freely seeking companionship from foreigners is not something that can 
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be stamped out in one fell swoop.”70 The Nationalists’ papers never expressed such 
direct hostility toward race mixing, but a May 13 letter to the editor in the Central 
Daily News [中央日報], their main press organ, warned that “disturbances beyond 
imagination would arise” if the government failed to halt GIs in Jeeps from 
kidnapping Chinese women off the street, which the author claimed was happening 
every night in Chongqing.71  
Women’s perspectives remained conspicuously absent from the public furor 
over Jeep Girls in the Chinese press. Yet one short article published in the U.S. 
Army’s Stars and Stripes newspaper in late 1945 showed that not all “Jeep girls” 
were prostitutes, rape victims, or gold-diggers. The author, who chose to remain 
anonymous, had worked for the U.S. Army in Kunming since late 1944. A gainfully 
employed fluent English speaker, she took pains to separate herself from less 
respectable women. “While in Kunming there was always a shortage of girls (decent 
ones) and so whenever there were parties given by Army personnel, most of us 
obliging civilians attended just to be sociable and make the party a success.” She and 
her colleagues “understood how it was for the boys with not much chances for 
entertainment and so we gave up a lot of our time to be good company with them at 
dances.”72 The author framed her interactions with GIs as simply a matter of 
patriotic duty, but the American presence nevertheless provided a wedge for her to 
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maneuver away from local men’s control. At a time when female employment and 
leisure options were scarce, she was able to work in a relative safe environment and 
attend western-style social events.   
The Jeep Girl Crisis 
Chinese backlash against American servicemen finally broke out in mid-April. At 
around 8:40 PM on April 20, three GIs accompanied by three Chinese women left 
Chongqing’s Two Hearts Café. As the group walked toward Jifang Road, several 
Chinese men confronted them, insulting the women and spoiling for a fight. The 
Americans took offense, and fists started to fly. By the time men from the Chongqing 
Gendarmerie arrived, more than one hundred onlookers had surrounded them, 
pelting the Americans with rocks and other debris. The soldiers and their 
companions only made it out alive because American MPs and Chinese gendarmes 
broke up the riot.73  
The next day, the provost marshal in Chongqing requested that Army 
counterintelligence determine the underlying causes of American-Chinese friction. 
The counterintelligence section had been investigating the problem since late March 
and had already reported that American servicemen invariably caused disturbing 
scenes whenever they became inebriated. Over the past few weeks, 
counterintelligence agents recounted, intoxicated GIs in downtown Chongqing had 
molested women in public, trashed shops and restaurants, crashed parties, brawled, 
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and harassed high-ranking Chinese officers.74 On April 23, two counterintelligence 
agents—Pardee Lowe and Andrew Lee—accompanied a high-ranking official from 
the Chongqing Police Bureau, referred to as Mr. X, to the Sino-Russian Café, where 
angry Chinese crowds had gathered each night for the past ten days. Lowe, Lee, and 
Mr. X discovered 300 to 500 Chinese men and boys standing near the café that night, 
observing the comings and goings of GIs and their female companions.  
Mr. X investigated all evening before reporting back to Lowe and Lee. The 
Chinese crowds, he contended, consisted of “street urchins, shoe-shine boys, and 
street loiterers,” who gathered out of curiosity and sometimes cursed the soldiers’ 
female companions for “making money from foreigners in wicked ways.” He insisted 
that the crowds had first assembled because of rumors that Americans were forcing 
women into Jeeps against their will and molesting “decent girls” as they passed by. 
Mr. X also criticized the easygoing attitude with which American MPs approached 
the problem, allowing soldiers to get drunk and rowdy. Police Chief Tang Yi, Mr. X 
reported, “was extremely concerned about the situation” and hoped that the Chinese 
could set up a red light district under police supervision. Local Chinese authorities 
had done this in other areas where Americans were stationed, Mr. X stated, “with 
rather satisfactory results.”75 
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The counterintelligence agents, however, still disagreed about the nature of the 
Chinese-American friction. Lee concluded that it was “caused firstly by the 
unfriendly attitude of young Chinese hoodlums, and secondly, by intoxicated 
American soldiers.” He assumed that placing the Sino-Russian Café out of bounds for 
a few weeks and barring prostitutes from soliciting there would solve the 
problem.76 Lowe, on the other hand, criticized MPs for allowing enlisted men and 
officers “to become disgustingly drunk” and recognized that “ill considered” 
American conduct now threatened to do grave damage to relations between the 
Chinese government and the U.S. Army. He recommended not only placing the 
restaurants in question out of bounds, but also limiting the number of men allowed 
to enter downtown Chongqing, increasing liaison with Chinese law enforcement, 
and barring restaurants from serving liquor to American troops.77 Ironically, 
Chongqing’s Police Bureau had been pushing U.S. Army authorities to carry out 
these last two recommendations, to no avail, since December.78 
The most damning counterintelligence report was submitted the next day. It 
warned that “the relatively few United States personnel in the general area of 
Chongqing have recently committed almost every major offense that visitors to a 
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foreign country are capable of performing,” including rape. The unnamed agent also 
warned that the theater provost marshal lacked sufficient military police to bring 
the problem into line.79 If the situation was this bad, it no doubt imperiled the 
alliance between Washington and Chongqing.  
The Counterintelligence Section submitted its final report to Wedemeyer ten 
days later, on May 5. It concluded that American misbehavior lay at the root of 
friction between soldiers and the Chinese. Violations fell into four categories: 
inconsideration [sic], offensive boisterousness, drunkenness, and law breaking. 
Counterintelligence estimated that a third of the men serving in the China Theater—
over 18,000 troops—were violators in one or more category. Boisterousness, as 
they defined it, included making lewd and vulgar remarks toward women, and 
drunkenness included whoring and accosting women in public. For the 
counterintelligence section, inconsiderate behavior and boisterousness were really 
just matters of cultural difference. Americans, they insisted, had grown used to 
socializing in bars and other entertainment venues where these two problems 
“would be entirely expected and strike no discord.” In China, however, no such 
places existed.80 The Counterintelligence Section did not recognize that many 
Chinese understood lewd remarks as threatening behavior and accosting women as 
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attempts to kidnap and rape. Perhaps American women would have understood 
such behaviors the same way.  
These Chinese views were apparent in a May 10 report submitted to 
Counterintelligence by a confidential Chinese informant. The informant, a highly 
respected civilian employee of the U.S. military, spoke with numerous Chinese 
officials, police, and ordinary people, all of whom reported seeing American 
servicemen abducting or attempting to abduct Chinese women during the previous 
two weeks. Zhong Zhongli and Peng Yizhen, for example, employees at the Li Xin 
Industrial Shop, claimed that GIs exited their Jeeps each night near the Cathay 
Theater and tried to force women to leave with them. To Zhong and Peng, this 
behavior looked like attempted kidnapping, but the Americans responsible for it 
probably had no so intentions. More likely, they were harassing women while 
intoxicated, secure in knowing that neither Chinese police nor civilians would 
intervene to stop them. Counterintelligence agents gave American troops the benefit 
of the doubt, contending that they had yet to find any evidence that supported the 
informant’s findings, but they admitted that if the Chinese continued to believe that 
such a situation existed it would injure the common war effort.81   
The scene outside Chongqing looked no better. In Kunming, GIs clashed with 
locals over interaction between American servicemen and female students at 
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Yunnan University.82 On April 23, two intoxicated enlisted men with lengthy rap 
sheets and histories of violence against the Chinese beat an elderly peasant woman 
to death in front of a large crowd outside Kunming.83 Friction over sexual relations 
also compelled U.S. authorities to place most of Baoshan off limits starting April 
28.84 On May 10, according to Chinese military sources, intoxicated GIs stationed at 
Laifeng Airfield near the Hunan-Sichuan border attempted to kidnap the wife of a 
local restaurant owner.85 Two days later, U.S. Army censors obtained a letter from a 
Chinese stationed in Guizhou addressed to a comrade in India: “Two girls of my 
department were surrounded by a group of American soldiers who tried to drag 
them away. The girls got away when twenty or more boy students came to their 
rescue…Any girl who is now seen riding in a Jeep with Americans should be 
ostracized.”86 All across the country, Chinese now saw their allies as lustful 
adversaries eager to harm Chinese women. In Chongqing itself, Chinese even began 
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attacking the MPs and counterintelligence agents who were cooperating with 
Chinese gendarmes to end the crisis.87  
Neither Wedemeyer nor Chiang could afford to ignore the crisis any longer. 
American troops and Chinese were at one another’s throats all across the country, 
with tension highest in Chongqing itself. Not even on Wedemeyer’s radar when he 
arrived six months before, friction over sexual relations had become the main 
source of tensions between American servicemen and the Chinese they interacted 
with. 
Wedemeyer and Chiang Take Action 
 On May 16 Wedemeyer sent out a memo addressed to all Army personnel in 
the China Theater. “Public incidents which discredit America in the eyes of the 
Chinese,” he warned, “have been increasing to an alarming degree in the last month 
or two.” He blamed a “small minority” of officers and men, not the one-third of his 
troops that Counterintelligence had estimated were responsible for various 
violations. Little things, he wrote, such as yelling, public drinking, and slapping 
strangers on the back had lowered Americans “in Chinese public opinion to a 
noticeable degree.” More serious, however, were the behaviors Wedemeyer 
believed lay at the roots of the Jeep girl crisis: 
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Accosting women in public places, often very offensively and in the 
presence of an escort. Public appearances with notorious prostitutes; fast 
and reckless driving—noisy joy-riding with cheap women sometimes in 
Army cars or Jeeps; drunkenness to the point of actually passing out in 
public; over-bearing and arrogant attitudes toward Chinese officers or 
police who are doing their duty. 
 
Present conditions, he concluded, “cannot and will not be allowed to continue.”88 In 
addressing his own men, Wedemeyer put the blame squarely on the shoulders of the 
“small minority” of American personnel responsible for crimes and discipline 
violations. But when writing Chiang Kai-shek to address the problem on May 18, 
Wedemeyer took a different line.  
 Cultural differences and a Chinese newspaper campaign directed against 
American personnel, Wedemeyer contended, had created ill will between the 
Chinese populace and American personnel. Newspaper accounts alleging that GIs 
had committed sex crimes, he continued in his letter to Chiang, were unduly vague 
and impossible to verify. “We cannot help but suspect that some undesirable 
elements are using this as a pretext for anti-American activity,” he charged. 
“Americans hold Chinese women in the highest regard,” Wedemeyer continued, 
arguing that, “in reality, the great majority of cases in which Chinese women have 
felt disrespected have stemmed from cultural differences.” He admitted that some 
Americans had caused trouble but assured the Generalissimo that he had taken 
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action to halt his soldiers’ misconduct and improve their relations with the 
Chinese.89 Now he expected Chiang to do his part.  
 Wedemeyer urged Chiang to use his Ministry of Information to reinforce 
Chinese-American friendship. He said that his men were disgusted by the term “Jeep 
girl,” which implied that all women who rode in Army Jeeps were prostitutes. By 
coining this term, Wedemeyer argued, Chinese journalists had damaged “all the 
harmonious relations built between Chinese and American men and women.” 
Chiang now needed to ensure that Chinese newspapers portrayed American 
servicemen “in the most positive rather than the most negative light.” Failure to 
bring the Chinese press into line, Wedemeyer warned, would lead to serious 
consequences, and his men would “retaliate against embarrassment at the hands of 
crowds.”90 Given Chiang’s near total dependence on American goodwill, he had little 
choice but to give into Wedemeyer’s demands. Domestic critics and foreign 
journalists had long subjected Chiang’s government to withering critiques for its 
press censorship. Few would have guessed that Chiang’s American chief of staff lay 
behind this latest press crackdown.  
 Over the next few weeks, Chiang’s Ministry of Information reined in the 
press. Some articles belittled those who took offense at interaction between 
American servicemen and Chinese women. “The sight of American soldiers and 
Chinese women buzzing around Chongqing in Jeeps has caused a lot of 
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misunderstanding among unreasonable people,” declared The Women’s Monthly [婦
女月刊]. “Chinese people who laugh and applaud when others get hurt or even have 
their heads cracked open in accidents,” the article continued, “find it humiliating 
when an American soldier and a Chinese woman walk together.” Such an attitude, 
the piece concluded, resulted from shallowness and jealousy.91 Echoed The 
Fortnightly Comment [兩週評論]: “Angry rumormongers are trying to destroy 
Chinese-American relations by believing that all Americans in uniform are 
womanizers and all the women who accompany them are whores.”92 The Sunday 
Weekly [星期週刊] also betrayed Wedemeyer’s influence: “What difference does it 
make if women socialize with Americans? Damaging Chinese-American cooperation 
is our enemy’s main design.”93 
 Other publications took a more didactic approach, urging readers to 
empathize with GIs and consider the benefits of interaction between American men 
and Chinese women. In the popular West Wind Monthly [西風], Yan Jun explained 
the differences in male-female interaction in China and the United States, echoing 
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Wedemeyer’s conclusion that cultural differences had caused the crisis.94 The Shi Shi 
Xin Bao took a similar line, arguing that misunderstandings were inevitable, 
“especially in view of the vastly dissimilar customs, cultural traits, and language 
barrier existing between the Chinese and the Americans.”95 Writing in the Da Gong 
Bao [大公報], Chongqing’s paper of record, Dong Shijin, who had earned his PhD in 
agronomy at Cornell, compared GIs to Chinese students studying overseas. Chinese 
students, he noted, married foreign women, “so why is it okay for us to have foreign 
wives but it’s not okay to let our daughters be wives to foreigners?” Intermarriage 
between GIs and Chinese women, he wrote, would not only help the war effort but 
also “the friendship between the two countries, because no relationship is closer 
than marriage.”96  
 In addition to using the press to quash all criticism of Jeep girls and American 
misconduct, Chiang also ordered Chongqing Mayor He Yaozu to stop further attacks 
on American personnel. The Chinese Foreign Ministry passed Chiang’s orders to He 
on May 21, requesting that he preside over a meeting with representatives from 
relevant government organs to hash out a plan for ensuring cordial relations 
between GIs and the people of Chongqing.  
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 At 9:00 a.m. on May 26, Mayor He opened the meeting at the Chongqing 
government’s conference hall. Around thirty officials from various municipal 
bureaucracies participated: the Chongqing Police Bureau, Garrison Headquarters, 
Gendarmerie, Party Committee, Social Affairs Bureau, and district offices. 
Representatives from China’s leading secret police forces—Dai Li’s Juntong and the 
C.C. Clique-dominated Zhongtong—also attended. The key issue, He stated, was 
rebuilding relations with American personnel and stopping “ignorant crowds” from 
creating disturbances over social interaction between Americans and Chinese 
women. The minutes from the meeting mention American misconduct only once, 
noting that foreign affairs police should accompany American MPs on regular 
patrols to make sure both that GIs and Chinese civilians were obeying the law.  
 Mayor He and his colleagues devised a plan to resolve the Jeep girl crisis. To 
ensure “correct” public opinion, they recommended a ban on Jeep girl satire. Print 
media in Chongqing should convince the masses that social interaction between 
Chinese women and GIs was normal and unobjectionable. To get middle and lower 
officials on board, police, gendarmes, and authorities at the city, district, and baojia 
levels needed to be educated about Chinese-American cultural differences.97 The 
police had to break up crowds before they caused trouble, and interpreters or 
                                                        
97 The baojia system was a traditional system of local mutual surveillance that the Nationalists began 
implementing after the Northern Expedition of 1926–1928. See Hans van de Ven, War and 
Nationalism in China, 1925–1945 (London: Routledge, 2003), 14.  




foreign affairs police had to be posted at all substations to prevent the language 
barrier from generating any difficulties.98  
The city government began implementing the plan the next day. On May 27, 
cinemas around the city displayed slideshows that warned people to keep clear of 
American soldiers and vehicles or face severe punishment.99 Two days later, the 
Chongqing Police Bureau began deploying men from the paramilitary Peace 
Preservation Corps to stand guard each evening near the bars, cafes, and restaurants 
frequented by American soldiers in order “to stop ignorant people from flocking 
around Allied soldiers.”100 On May 31, posters went up around the city warning 
against harassing or attacking GIs. If minors bothered American personnel, the 
posters warned, their parents would be held responsible.101  
 Official efforts to sway public opinion also began shortly after the meeting 
adjourned. On the afternoon of May 26, FAB Director He Haoruo accompanied 
Mayor He to the Victory House for a press conference. He Haoruo opened with a 
statement that contrasted sharply with what many Chinese had observed over the 
past few months: “The Allied [American] troops that have come to fight in China are 
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noted for their strict observance of discipline, and their friendly feeling and polite 
behavior toward the Chinese people are especially well-known.” He Haoruo knew 
this was nonsense, as his own messages to Wedemeyer attest, so he must have been 
speaking on orders from higher authorities. He assured the audience that U.S. 
authorities would severely punish “anyone who is proved with undeniable evidence 
to have acted against military discipline,” and blasted “certain ignorant rogues” for 
ridiculing the so-called Jeep girls.102 His message may have satisfied Wedemeyer 
and other American commanders, but it bore no resemblance to how many Chinese 
understood the troubled state of relations between GIs and locals.  
It did not help He Haoruo’s case that the Victory House itself, where he held the 
press conference, had been the scene of some of the worst episodes of recent 
American misconduct. On the evening of May 12, Chinese couples attending a 
Victory House dance were interrupted by a crying prostitute displaying bite marks 
on her skin. She entered the first-floor dining hall, where the couples were enjoying 
refreshments between dances, after having escaped from a guest room rented by 
Lieutenant Colonel Harry McAleenan. The colonel, she asserted, had beaten, bitten, 
and refused to pay her for sex. American MPs, meanwhile, were already familiar 
with McAleenan. He had caused trouble at the Victory House the previous evening 
by drunkenly berating enlisted American military policemen in front of Chinese 
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guests and demanding to know where he could find a brothel. To make matter 
worse, just thirty minutes after the biting incident, another screaming Chinese 
woman interrupted the dancers. She, too, had suffered a beating at the hands of an 
American Army officer over a prostitution dispute.103  
Meanwhile, Mayor He Yaozu reinforced the FAB director’s dissembling Victory 
House speech in a May 27 Da Gong Bao editorial. Buttressing many of the points He 
Haoruo had made the previous afternoon, the mayor stressed that Chinese-
American cooperation was “especially” gratifying in Chongqing. He blamed the 
“gullible public” for causing mischief. Enemy agents, he asserted, were probably 
behind the accusations against American servicemen and the grumbling about Jeep 
girls. Some of what he wrote was honest: not all women who rode in Jeeps were 
prostitutes. Many worked alongside American servicemen or for relief organizations 
like the WASC’s Friends of the Allied Soldiers. But other statements did little to 
shore up the Nationalist government’s waning credibility, such as his claim that “the 
Americans, by giving our girls a lift in their Jeeps, are simply helping the girls—a 
chivalrous act that merits emulation.” Defending the right of Chinese women to 
fraternize with American personnel by appealing to China’s “democracy and 
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liberty,” as the Guomindang employed rigid censorship and Dai Li’s Juntong to crush 
dissent, strained credulity.104  
Privately, the mayor had more nuanced views. On May 29, he wrote to Bao 
Huaguo, director of the Chongqing Social Affairs Bureau. Quoting a May 22 report 
that highlighted the insincerity of his editorial in the Da Gong Bao, Mayor He stated 
that because American servicemen lacked “proper entertainment facilities” they 
caused almost constant trouble, especially on Minzu Road, where their favorite 
restaurants were located. If an “Allied Fellowship Society” were set up with food, 
drinks, a teahouse, and dance hall for American soldiers—all under careful 
supervision—it would improve GI morale and restore order on Chongqing’s 
streets.105 Bao Huaguo was skeptical. He recognized that something had to be done 
to halt conflicts between GIs and the people of Chongqing but feared that a dance 
hall with Chinese taxi dancers would raise a whole new set of questions.106 But 
regardless of their views, Chinese officials made keeping Wedemeyer and his men 
satisfied their top priority.  
As officials from the city government debated the merits of establishing new 
entertainment facilities for American personnel, Chiang Kai-shek finalized the 
framework for rebuilding relations with American troops in Chongqing. His National 
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Military Council sent orders to Mayor He on May 27 that quoted P.B. Smitty, the 
American MP attacked by a crowd in Chongqing on May 11 while carrying out a joint 
patrol with the local police. Smitty had criticized the Chinese both for attacking him 
and for the constant price gouging he and other American servicemen had to deal 
with in Chongqing. The National Military Council vowed to stamp out the causes of 
each grievance.107 English-speaking Foreign Affairs Police, rather than ordinary 
gendarmes, would hereafter accompany American MPs on crowd control duty.108 
Starting June 15, both the Chongqing Garrison Headquarters and the Gendarmerie 
would begin joint patrols to ensure that all shops posted prices in Arabic numerals. 
Businesses now had to charge Chinese and American customers the same rates. 
Violators of either measure would have their businesses shut down immediately.109 
Press censorship as well, Chiang told Mayor He, had to remain rigid, because 
“regardless of whether or not [accusations regarding Jeep girls] were the result of 
instigation by traitors, they had a negative influence of the feelings of American 
military personnel.” If Chinese women were riding in Jeeps or being mistreated by 
American troops, Chiang wrote, “Chinese authorities had to report this straightaway 
to U.S. Headquarters so the Americans could investigate and mete out 
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punishment.”110 As Ch’i Hsi-sheng has shown, Chiang had no choice but to go along 
with U.S. wishes: the alliance with Washington was too important to jeopardize.111 
But his servile response to the Jeep girl crisis did little to bolster his nationalist 
credentials.  
Chiang also took responsibility for reversing the U.S. Army’s declining prestige 
in the eyes of his troops. In his May 27 orders to all units under his command in the 
Chinese Army, Chiang urged his men to “spare no effort in giving their cooperation 
to our allied friends.” He outlined a long list of positive American habits and 
characteristics, which he urged all Chinese officers and men to emulate, including 
“respect for women” and discipline.112 These orders also served as the introduction 
for the National Military Council’s lengthy June publication entitled How to Guide 
Our Soldiers to Get Along With Allied Troops [如何指導官兵與盟軍相處]. Preparation 
for this belated counterpart to the U.S. Army’s Pocket Guide to China had begun 
earlier in the spring as the Jeep girl crisis heated up and clashes between GIs and 
Chinese soldiers became more frequent in western Yunnan. It assured Chinese 
servicemen that “Americans hold up women at an unimaginable level.” Interestingly, 
How to Guide Our Soldiers traced this phenomenon to the American colonial era, 
when women earned their place on a pedestal by fighting alongside men against the 
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Indians.113 Regardless, this image of well-disciplined Americans placing women on a 
pedestal bore little resemblance to what countless Chinese had observed in 
Chongqing and elsewhere around the country. Average views of American soldiers 
were so at odds with the National Military Council’s publication that few Chinese 
officers could have taken it seriously. Yet Chiang most likely intended it as more 
than simply a gesture to appease the U.S. Army. In contrast to Stilwell, Wedemeyer 
impressed Chiang. The Generalissimo agreed with Wedemeyer’s criticisms of the 
Chinese military and backed his reform plans. In early February, in fact, Chiang told 
his highest commanders that they numerous things to learn from American officers, 
whom he recognized as far superior to his own officers.114 As Ch’i Hsi-sheng has 
shown, from Chiang’s perspective U.S.-Chinese military cooperation had reached 
unprecedented heights in mid-1945.115 But relations on the ground between 
American servicemen and ordinary Chinese, including soldiers, had fallen to new 
lows at the same time.  
Wedemeyer also appealed directly to Chinese audiences. He addressed the Jeep 
girl crisis when delivering the keynote address at a graduation ceremony for 
Chinese interpreting officers in Chongqing on May 26.116 At a press conference that 
same week, he told Chinese journalists that young women in England and France 
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also rode in Jeeps with American servicemen. In both countries, men and boys had 
thrown rocks at GIs and their local girlfriends, just like they did in Chongqing. 
Americans were the “best paid soldiers in the world,” he reminded the reporters, so 
they naturally enjoyed spending money at liberty and attracted plenty of female 
attention.117 Wedemeyer also argued that young women around the world often 
found foreigners attractive. Many fights had broken out in Montgomery, Alabama 
between GIs and British troops undergoing training there, he noted, thanks to local 
female preference for the latter.118 But the general studiously avoided mentioning 
American discipline problems. These, too, were an international phenomenon, with 
Americans troops in France also inciting widespread panic about rape thanks to 
their whoring, drinking, reckless driving, and frequent attacks on civilians.119 
Although he downplayed the issue in front of Chinese audiences, Wedemeyer 
still attempted to tackle the discipline problems among American personnel. 
Starting May 15, he imposed an 11:00 p.m. curfew from Monday through Friday, 
allowing an extra hour for Saturdays and special occasions.120 He also demanded 
immediate investigation of the incidents reported to him by Army 
Counterintelligence and the FAB. No matter whether such reports were “truth or 
fiction,” he wrote, “they [were] detrimental to the mission of United States forces” in 
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China and an obstacle to his efforts to convince Chiang to crack down on the 
press.121 Finally, he ordered his subordinate commanders to read aloud and discuss 
his May 16 letter with their men and to report back to him on actions they had taken 
to halt violations. 
By mid-June, all of Wedemeyer’s commanders had reported back on their 
progress. Colonel Richard Heppner of the OSS told Wedemeyer that his men around 
China had read and discussed the letter. He assured the theater commander that 
“severe disciplinary action will be taken against offenders.”122 At the 95th Station 
Hospital near Kunming, where two intoxicated GIs had beaten an elderly Chinese 
woman to death in front of a large crowd on April 23, the curfew and a ban on 
pleasure driving had reduced alcoholism, VD, and car accidents.123 Colonel Clarence 
Talbot of the 14th Air Force Service Command promised that immediate 
commanders would be relieved of duty whenever violations were not adequately 
punished.124 In Kunming, Brigadier General Haydon Boatner set up language classes 
for the men of the Chinese Combat Command (CCC) and established a mandatory 
orientation program on Chinese customs and history. Athletics and recreation, he 
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wrote, would also be expanded.125 The SOS also expanded recreational facilities in 
larger cities like Kunming and Guiyang. SOS approaches to prostitution differed by 
city: in Kunming it inaugurated an educational program to supplement existing 
enforcement methods while the SOS commander in Guiyang urged the mayor to 
eliminate all brothels that catered to American personnel.126  
In all, Chinese and American responses to the Jeep girl crisis revealed the 
conspicuous inequality between the two allies and provided fodder for Chiang’s 
domestic critics. In addressing the crisis, Wedemeyer declined to take Chiang into 
his confidence and instead pushed the Generalissimo toward measures that 
undermined his own position in China. By branding all Chinese who took offense at 
American misconduct as ignorant or treacherous, the Nationalists alienated large 
swathes of the Chinese populace, including many of their own soldiers and police. 
Tightening control over the press may have halted publication of unsubstantiated 
sex crime rumors, but it also weakened trust in the government. Printing outright 
lies about the harmonious state of Chinese-American relations in Chongqing did not 
alter reality. The Nationalists’ heavy-handed approach to the anti-American crowds 
in Chongqing also added to the growing litany of grievances against their regime. 
For all his faults, Chiang remained a die-hard nationalist, but his actions cast doubt 
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on this measure, too. In trusting Wedemeyer to weed out misconduct, Chiang 
gambled on the American general’s ability to produce quick and decisive results.  
Troubles Continue 
 The U.S. Army’s efforts to resolve the crisis by tightening discipline and 
expanding recreation and education met with numerous setbacks. Although the 
Stilwell Road from Assam to Kunming had opened in February and tonnages 
delivered over the Hump peaked in June, non-military goods remained in short 
supply. On June 7, Haydon Boater reported that little could be done to expand 
athletics and recreation, which he and more senior Army commanders amusingly 
assumed could be substitutes for sex. His plans for an education program also 
fizzled. The special service library, Boatner wrote, had only one book on China.127 
And lectures on Chinese history and culture did little to address American 
grievances about the difficulties of serving in China. Finding the right balance on 
discipline proved elusive as well. The China Theater lacked sufficient MPs. Military 
police in Yunnan, meanwhile, aroused widespread resentment among enlisted men 
due to their alleged brutality.128 Slowness in reporting derelictions also continued 
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over the summer, as did extensive troop movements, allowing violators to continue 
slipping through the cracks.129   
 Orders from Washington added yet another layer of difficulty, putting 
American commanders in the China Theater in dance between placating troops and 
locals. The War Department warned that lengthy court martial sentences reflected 
unfavorably on the military.130 The SOS, which also had authority over CCC and 
Chinese Training Center disciplinary matters, faced pressure to avoid courts martial 
whenever possible.131 In a May 2 memo, Major General Gilbert X. Cheves, SOS 
commander in China, prodded his commanders to go easier on the men. “Resorts to 
courts martial to enforce discipline,” he told his COs, “evidences a lack of leadership 
in the unit commander.”132 But even if the SOS had been willing to try more cases, 
the shortage of competent court reporters in the China Theater was so great that 
SOS had to discontinue general courts martial altogether in July.133 Meanwhile, 
when it came to prostitution, the War Department demanded suppression using all 
means available, which precluded going along with Chinese suggestions to set up 
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supervised red light districts. Perhaps the Chinese had a point. From 1916 to 1917, 
General John J. Pershing had cooperated with Chinese merchants to set up 
supervised red light districts in northern Mexico, which the general credited for 
reducing VD among his troops, maintaining their morale, and keeping Mexican 
towns free from trouble over sexual relations.134 But Wedemeyer chose not to 
adhere to U.S. War Department directives that foreclosed this option.  
 More importantly, American commanders were powerless in addressing the 
economic problems that fueled the sex trade. Inflation continued to rise over the 
summer.135 Thousands of unemployed ethnic Chinese truck drivers from Burma and 
Malaya remained stranded in Kunming, and many of these men spoke English, 
making it easier for them to do business with GIs.136 The Chinese soldiers and hostel 
employees who worked with American servicemen could also supplement their 
ever-shrinking incomes by pimping. When Chinese-speaking GI Sidney Rittenberg 
first arrived in Kunming in mid-1945, a Chinese officer happily offered him and his 
comrades all the women they wanted.137 And China was no different from other 
war-torn countries where women used their bodies as bargaining chips with GIs to 
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obtain the money and commodities they lacked. In the hardest-hit areas, like 
western Yunnan, sex could still be found in exchange for a few cigarettes.138  
 American misconduct also continued into the summer. Less serious 
disciplinary violations like catcalling and harassing female hostel visitors were still a 
problem in Kunming.139 More worrying was the SOS Staff Judge Advocate’s report of 
an increase in violent crime in June and July.140 Most crimes were assaults and 
shootings involving GIs and Chinese men, but a few American personnel attacked 
Chinese women. The new curfew and Wedemeyer’s May 16 warning failed to stop 
Private Omer White from assaulting a Chinese couple with a wine bottle in Kunming 
on May 17, for which he earned just one night in the stockade.141 A June 30 court 
martial took a much harsher stance against SSG James Erickson and PFC Howard 
Devlin, giving both men life sentences for a June 15 rape they committed in Luoping, 
near the Yunnan-Guangxi border. Down the road in Baise, a strategic Guangxi 
military town, more than 400 Chinese witnessed Raymond Belitz, an intoxicated 
staff sergeant, abusing a Chinese professor and his wife. The crowd also saw Belitz 
go after the professor with a knife and knock his wife out of a Jeep. Luckily, two 
Army CID agents, who were in Baise investigating other allegations against 
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American personnel, subdued him before he stabbed anyone. Ironically, the 
professor was in Baise giving lectures to help rebuild GI-Chinese relations.142 The 
town had been on edge ever since a two-night spate of violence that began on June 
12, when GIs allegedly pushed a prostitute into the river. It ended after 3:00 a.m. on 
the fourteenth when several American servicemen carried out a drive-by shooting 
in Baise’s red light district that left a coolie with two bullets in his neck.143 
Chiang, like Wedemeyer, came up short in keeping his end of the deal when it 
came to misconduct and discipline. Angry crowds targeting American soldiers and 
Jeep girls sometimes formed before gendarmes and foreign affairs police could stop 
them. When Gan Guoyun and his friends noticed a GI and a Chinese women exiting a 
Jeep near Chongqing’s Sichuan Hotel (四川饭店) on June 26, they attacked them. 
American MPs at the hotel came outside quickly, but not before the crowd had 
knocked the woman, Wang Huiru, unconscious.144 Another night, when a prostitute 
flirting with a group of soldiers tried to argue with some angry Chinese men who 
were insulting her, several Chongqing policemen got beat up trying to disperse the 
crowd.145  
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Chinese and American authorities also continued to reach different conclusions 
when investigating alleged sex crimes. On May 24, He Haoruo demanded that 
Wedemeyer punish several GIs for kidnapping three Chinese women on May 15. He 
provided a license plate number for the GIs’ Jeep and told Wedemeyer that Chinese 
gendarmes had rescued the women in Shiqiaopu, a town near Chongqing, after 
hearing them cry for help.146 But an investigation by American MPs and Chongqing 
Foreign Affairs police told a different story. When interviewed on May 26, the three 
women claimed they had been shopping near their homes when the GIs forced them 
into their vehicle. Military police tracked the vehicle to PFC Dante Todoverto of the 
1066th Quartermaster Truck Company and questioned him and the two other GIs he 
was with on the night in question. The men claimed that a Chinese pimp had offered 
them prostitutes for CN$3,000 apiece while they were at the Victory House. The 
following evening Todoverto identified the pimp, Wen Xiangru, and the MPs and 
Chinese police took him into custody. Wen admitted to approaching the three men 
and procuring the prostitutes.147  
After Chinese foreign affairs police questioned the three women a second time, 
they admitted to having sex for money. They claimed rape on May 15 after one of 
the women, Luo Guangru, attracted the attention of a few gendarmes when arguing 
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with a GI, who was trying to pay CN$2,000 instead of the agreed-upon CN$3,000.148 
The Chongqing Police responded to the Jeep girl crisis with a zero-tolerance policy 
toward prostitution, so all three women could have been arrested for solicitation. 
Instead, the gendarmes drew their guns on the three GIs and told them to leave. To 
the gendarmes, the three women appeared to be “respectable” because they were 
married to gainfully employed men. Luo’s husband, in fact, worked as a detective for 
the Chongqing Police Bureau.149 But her husband, like the other two men, worked 
for a salary that inflation had rendered almost worthless. Economic distress had 
compelled the women to enter the sex trade. In the end, Police Chief Tang Yi felt 
embarrassed over the whole thing and recommended punishing the gendarmes in 
order to “correct their morals,” a move that couldn’t have possibly gone down well 
with the men in the ranks.150 
All these issues—shortages, pressures from soldiers and Washington, the 
Chinese economy, misconduct, and disagreement over alleged crimes—had been 
problems for some time, but now a new complication appeared. Chinese soldiers 
began taking matters into their own hands. Press censorship and propaganda had 
failed to convince these troops of the merits of interracial relationships or the 
chivalrous attitudes of American servicemen.  
                                                        
148 CQA 0061.0001.00010, pp. 46 趙唐氏自白書 [Zhao Tangshi Affidavit], undated.  
149 Report made by Mr. He Chi Ming [何建明], Member of the Foreign Affairs Department, 30 May 
1945, RG 493, China Theater/Special Staff/Adjutant General Section, Formerly Classified 
Correspondence 1942-1946, Box 314, Morals and Conduct from 16 May to 30 June, 1945, NARA.  
150 CQA 0061.0001.00010, pp. 50–52 唐毅呈賀耀祖電 [Tang Yi to He Yaozu], 25 July 1945.  




 The SOS had not reported a single Chinese attack on GIs in April, but by July, 
American servicemen found themselves the victims in the majority of 
confrontations between Chinese and American troops.151 On May 16, four 
unidentified Chinese soldiers killed Sergeant Joseph Diltz near Luliang Airbase in 
Yunnan. Diltz, who had angered Chinese officers by renting rooms for two 
prostitutes in a building meant to house Chinese Air Force personnel, had long 
flaunted his associations with Chinese women.152 Further west in Baoshan, men 
from the Chinese regiment responsible for guarding the nearby airbase opened fire 
on GIs in two separate incidents. They shot at Lieutenant Gunnar Sunderstorm on 
June 13 because he had two Chinese nurses in his Jeep and ignored orders to stop 
his vehicle. Regulations now prohibited Chinese women from riding in Jeeps, but 
Sunderstorm was unaware of the new rule. A few GIs came to his aid, and one hit a 
Chinese guard in the face with his rifle butt after the Chinese threatened him with a 
bayonet. Minutes later, an entire Chinese platoon had surrounded the American 
troops. They only dispersed after a Chinese colonel named Fang Cheng ordered 
them to stand down.153 On July 4, Fang Cheng’s men heard rumors that black GIs had 
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kidnapped two Chinese women in Baoshan. When they found two black soldiers in a 
weapons carrier with two prostitutes and a Chinese pimp, they began marching the 
GIs away at gunpoint. When a few American officers happened upon the scene in 
their Jeep, the Chinese opened fire and pinned them down. Reinforcements from 
both sides soon arrived, leading to more shooting, and the Americans eventually 
fled, leaving their vehicles behind. This time, Fang insisted the Americans had 
kidnapped and raped the women, but CID resolutely disagreed.154  
The mere idea of GIs talking with Chinese women was now too much for some 
Chinese soldiers to take. On July 8, men from the 12th Chinese Motorized 
Engineering Regiment entered the International Coffee House near Chongqing and 
saw a group of American enlisted men sitting together with two Chinese women. A 
Chinese officer, whom the Americans believed to be a major, approached their table 
and began cursing at the women. When the GIs talked back to the major, the other 
Chinese soldiers advanced, smashing the wine bottles on their table but allowing the 
women to flee. When the GIs tried to leave, the Chinese troops stopped them with 
rifles and a machine gun, forcing them to stand against the wall. The Americans 
asked for assistance from the three other Chinese officers who were present, but 
they ignored them and looked amused at the scene. Finally, an English-speaking 
Chinese major got up from his chair and shouted, “ I don’t want American soldiers to 
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go with Chinese girls!”155 They eventually let the GIs leave, but American 
commanders now faced “an ever increasing number of incidents involving 
intimidation of US personnel at the point of a gun by Chinese soldiers and 
officers.”156 Chinese and American authorities failed to resolve the crisis over sexual 
relations before the war ended, ensuring that the problem would persist into the 
postwar period, only without a Japanese enemy to hold the wary alliance together.  
Conclusion 
 Friction over sexual relations may not have influenced the outcome of the 
Chinese-American struggle against Japan but it alienated GIs from the Chinese and 
vice-versa more than any other factor. American misconduct played a crucial role in 
precipitating the 1945 Jeep girl crisis, yet it would be wrong to pin all the blame on 
the shoulders of unruly American troops. After all, they came from a society and 
military establishment that viewed Chinese as inferiors and were thrust into an 
alien world where poverty and disorder seemingly confirmed their sense of 
superiority. Immunity from Chinese law, easygoing MPs, and commanding officers 
who made discipline a low priority in order to shore up morale all combined to 
facilitate poor behavior. At the same time, the language barrier, MP personnel 
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shortages, and communications problems helped GIs escape punishment. But 
prostitution serving military personnel flourished not as a result of American 
misconduct but rather as a consequence of the vast disparity between Chinese and 
American wealth and power.  
 Prostitution serving GIs also forced Chinese men to recognize American 
power and Chinese weakness. The extent to which many Chinese men found 
prostitution humiliating is illustrated by the interpreting officer Huang Shang’s 
1946 recollection of his experience working alongside the Americans in Baoshan. 
Huang’s memoir, Guanyu Meiguo bing [On American Soldiers], offered a fair-minded 
and often laudatory portrayal of the Americans he interacted with, but seeing GIs 
together with Chinese prostitutes still disturbed him. “It left a deep impression on 
me,” he wrote, seeing a GI with his arms wrapped around a girl “who couldn’t have 
been more than sixteen or seventeen, too young to wear makeup but dressed in 
western clothes, looking so pitiful and skinny next to her foreign boyfriend.” “To 
think,” he lamented, “that China had to rely on these women to ‘promote 
harmonious diplomatic relations.’”157 Both Chinese and American authorities had 
feared that sexual interaction would cause friction, but the structures they 
established to promote cordial relations and provide “wholesome” alternatives to 
pubs and brothels—WASC banquets, Society of the Friends of the Allied Forces 
activities, joint sporting events, and the U.S. Army’s recreation programs—did little 
to stem demand for the sex trade and nothing to address the ever-expanding supply 
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of female sex workers. Friction over sexual relations between American servicemen 
and locals occurred wherever American troops deployed during World War II, but in 
no other allied country were power relations distorted to the degree they were 
between GIs and the Chinese.  
 Distorted power relations also played a role in fueling the panic over rape 
that swept China during the spring of 1945. In her study of American soldiers in 
wartime France, where a similar panic occurred in 1944, Mary Louse Roberts 
showed how rape rumors proliferated in the Norman countryside due to fear 
combining with a lack of reliable information.158 In China, too, the gendarmes 
reporting rape accusations often had to wait months to hear anything from 
American authorities. In the meantime they spent much of their time protecting GIs, 
who were often intoxicated, even as their own wives sometimes moonlighted as 
prostitutes simply to make ends meet. Press censorship and the Guomindang’s 
campaign to portray GIs as well-disciplined friends of China who treated women 
with respect contrasted so sharply with prevalent rumors and actual experience 
that ordinary Chinese could not help but feel that they were being deceived.  
 The ways in Chinese and American authorities tried to resolve the Jeep girl 
crisis in 1945 also underscored the unequal nature of the alliance. In Britain and 
Australia Americans commanders cooperated with local authorities in good faith to 
deal with friction over sexual relations.159 But in China, Wedemeyer refused to take 
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Chiang into his confidence and resorted to strong-arming the Generalissimo into 
cracking down on his own people. Chiang used the same attitude in dealing with his 
subordinates, leaving American misconduct largely unaddressed while prioritizing 
the protection of American servicemen above the safety of Chinese civilians. His 
press campaign and propaganda efforts used to sway Chinese soldiers were also 
dishonest in claiming that friction with Americans stemmed largely from cultural 
differences. The boorish, intoxicated behaviors that did so much to fuel panic over 
rape would have led to arrest or violent retaliation on the streets of American cities. 
When Chinese soldiers finally took matters into their own hands in the summer of 
1945, their actions signified a firm rejection of Chongqing’s obsequiousness toward 
the U.S. Army.  
 But the crisis over sexual relations was not the only issue causing friction 
between allies in wartime China. The disparity in wealth and power generated 
numerous other problems that added to the distrust, wariness, and outright hostility 
that characterized Chinese-American relations on the ground in China during the 
last year of the Pacific War.





 V: Military-to-Military Relations 
 
 On July 12, 1945, Brigadier General Haydon Boatner, chief of staff at the 
Chinese Combat Command (CCC), submitted a report on U.S. Army liaison officers’ 
work with Chinese General Sun Liren’s New First Army. Built around the units that 
had retreated to India during the calamitous 1942 Burma Campaign, including Sun’s 
38th Division, the New First Army became the centerpiece of the U.S. military’s 
advisory effort in the China-Burma-India Theater. Senior American and British 
officers, including General Joseph Stilwell, considered Sun the Nationalists’ most 
capable general and his troops China’s best military force.1 Along with the rest of the 
Chinese Army in India, these soldiers had graduated from the U.S. Army’s training 
center at Ramgarh. Working with American liaison officers and equipped with K-
rations, M1 carbines, and U.S. Army uniforms, they had spearheaded the campaign 
to retake northern Burma, fighting their way from the Hukawng Valley to the 
Japanese airfield at Myitkyina. They earned the honor of being the first Chinese 
troops to defeat the Japanese in a large-scale offensive operation. The New First 
Army’s combat record inspired Stilwell’s well-known assessment that “the Chinese 
foot soldier, when properly led, trained and equipped, will give as good an account 
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of himself in battle as any soldier in the world.”2 The way Stilwell told it, the New 
First Army exemplified the special relationship between China and the United States: 
American material and know-how had produced a first-rate Chinese fighting force.  
 Other Chinese military units, despite lacking the resources and combat 
record enjoyed by the New First Army, managed to build cordial ties with their 
American counterparts. Although they often operated in harsh conditions behind 
enemy lines, the Chinese guerillas and American sailors of the Sino-American 
Cooperative Organization (SACO) collaborated effectively and avoided the friction 
over sex, crime, and cultural norms that plagued so many other spheres of Chinese-
American interaction. Unlike most senior U.S. Army officers in China, Commodore 
Milton Miles, SACO’s deputy commander, had no qualms about being subordinate to 
his Chinese counterpart, Nationalist secret intelligence chief Dai Li. The U.S. Army’s 
training program at Ramgarh, meanwhile, earned high marks from both Chinese and 
American commanders. Some of the Chinese Army units that trained in Yunnan 
province, such as Lu Han’s 52nd Army and the 2nd Honorable Division of Du Yuming’s 
5th Group Army, impressed American liaison officers, while others, including China’s 
53rd and 54th armies, reported positive results from American-run training 
programs. When it came to actual fighting, American officers in the Chinese Combat 
Command had nothing but praise for the Chinese troops who repelled Japan’s April 
1945 invasion of western Hunan province. According to liaison officer reports and 
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battlefield diaries, Sino-American relations involving these units were amicable 
because the Chinese believed their American counterparts treated them as equals 
and the Americans concluded that their Chinese counterparts had successfully 
adopted U.S. military doctrine and applied its lessons to the war effort.  
 Yet according to Boater, even though the New First Army had reaped 
enormous advantages as the chief beneficiary of U.S. aid, it failed to reciprocate 
American goodwill. “There is no question,” he wrote, “that the attitude of the New 
First Army is anti-foreign.” Ever since May 1942, Boatner continued, “there has been 
repeated friction between the 38th Division, which is now the nucleus of the New 
First Army, with foreigners.” He alleged that in recent weeks, Chinese soldiers from 
this command had repeatedly assaulted American servicemen and threatened them 
at gunpoint. General Jia Yuhui, the army’s deputy chief of staff, had even ordered his 
men to shoot Colonel Lewis Leavell, the chief American liaison officer with the New 
First Army, following an argument between the two men at Myitkyina Airfield.3 
While the Jeep Girl Crisis had precipitated many fights between Chinese and 
American troops, none of the disputes involving the New First Army had anything to 
do with women. According to Leavell, most disagreements stemmed from the 
refusal of Chinese commanders to follow American liaison officers’ 
recommendations. “I know of no single instance” Leavell wrote in a report that 
General Albert Wedemeyer forwarded to Chiang Kai-shek, “where an American 
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liaison officer has ever been consulted regarding training or combat functioning. 
Their suggestions are ignored.”4  
 General Sun dismissed nearly every accusation made by Leavell and his 
superiors at the Chinese Combat Command. Friction in Burma, he contended, arose 
from the “absolute refusal” of American troops “to take into consideration the 
requests and suggestions, sometimes very appropriate, made by our men.” He 
brushed aside allegations of theft, smuggling, assaults, and shootings as “malicious 
slander.” “We welcome criticism,” Sun told Wedemeyer, “but we cannot help 
wishing they [senior officers in the Chinese Combat Command] had based their 
accusations on a little more adequate foundation of facts.”5 Meanwhile, General Li 
Hong, who replaced Sun as commander of the 38th Division when Sun took 
command of the New First Army in August 1944, denied that his troops harbored 
anti-foreign inclinations. “The friendliness of the men and officers of the 38th 
Division,” he told Major General Robert McClure, commander of the Chinese Combat 
Command, “is known to every American who has worked with this unit no matter 
for how long.”6 Boatner, obviously, thought otherwise.  
 The New First Army possessed assets that should have facilitated better 
relations with American servicemen. No other Chinese Army could match its 
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equipment, training, or provisions. And if Henry Luce could have invented his ideal 
Chinese general, he would have been hard pressed to do better than Sun Liren. The 
first Chinese to graduate from the Virginia Military Institute, where his commanders 
praised him for “shoulder[ing] his responsibilities like a man,” Sun also had a civil 
engineering degree from Purdue. Before beginning he studies in the United States, 
he had graduated from the Boxer Indemnity Scholarship Program-funded Tsinghua 
University and played on the first Chinese team to win an international basketball 
competition.7 As a soldier, Sun rose through the ranks due to personal ability rather 
than political connections.8 He even earned the respect of Joseph Stilwell, who 
regarded most senior Chinese commanders as imbeciles. When President Roosevelt 
relieved him of duty in October 1944, Stilwell never bothered to leave behind 
instructions for his replacement, Albert Wedemeyer, but he did take the time to pen 
a laudatory farewell to Sun: “you have laid the foundation for a new and efficient 
national force, and with this example, China can go on and build up an Army that 
will maker her free and strong.”9  
 Yet as New First Army’s experience demonstrated, friction caused by the 
broader politics of the Americans’ “friendly” occupation of China also affected 
military cooperation. Most American officers regarded it as self-evident and natural 
that Chinese military officers would do whatever the Americans told them to do. 
“Sold on the American way,” was thus the highest honor that an American Army 
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officer could bestow upon a Chinese military unit. Questioning or disregarding 
American recommendations, as the New First Army’s commanding officers had 
done, therefore meant an outright rejection of the Chinese-American special 
relationship. The fall 1944 Stilwell Crisis, where the American general demanded 
unrestricted command over all Chinese armed forces, revealed how this logic 
shaped Sino-American military interaction at the alliance’s highest levels. Tensions 
between American liaison officers and the New First Army’s Chinese commanders 
illustrated how Stilwell was hardly alone in presuming that Americans invariably 
understood the Chinese Army’s needs better than its own commanders did. Of 
course senior Chinese military commanders, Chiang and Sun not least among them, 
recognized that the U.S. military possessed abundant advantages over China’s 
armed forces, but they did not believe their troops should always adopt American 
methods. Nor could they abide being treated as inferiors. 
 By late 1944, as the campaign to drive the Japanese out of northern Burma 
and western Yunnan reached its final stages, the issues that had heighted tensions in 
other realms of Sino-American interaction also exacerbated military-to-military 
discord.  Smuggling and theft skyrocketed as Chinese troops made their way home 
from India and Burma, fueling an increase in violent confrontations between 
Chinese soldiers and American military police. Chinese men in the ranks resented 
being subjected to the U.S. Army’s anti-smuggling regime. Like their commanders, 
they had little patience for being treated as if they were a colonial fighting force 
operating under U.S. command. Mutual distrust and resentment were further 




evident in the way Chinese and American authorities dealt with violent crime 
involving Chinese and American servicemen in Burma and India. In almost every 
incident, Chinese and American investigators absolved their own countrymen of any 
wrongdoing. Back in China, Chinese pilots of the 14th Air Force’s Chinese-American 
Composite Wing grew resentful of their inferior pay and living conditions in 
comparison to their American comrades. And starting in May 1945, the Jeep Girl 
crisis sparked clashes between Chinese and American soldiers in Sichuan, Yunnan, 
and Guangxi. Discipline broke down further as Chinese armies moved around the 
country during the war’s final months, and roving bands of Chinese troops and 
deserters began holding up U.S. trucks at gunpoint. As these incidents snowballed, 
American commanders continued to push for ever-greater authority over Chinese 
forces. Even Japan’s surrender failed to halt the violence. 
The Chinese and American Military Missions  
High-level Sino-U.S. military cooperation—and animosity—began with the 
exchange of military missions. Brigadier General John Magruder arrived in 
Chongqing on October 10, 1941 as head of the American military mission to China 
(AMMISCA), a delegation of forty-three Army officers and NCOs that came to Asia in 
order supervise Lend-Lease aid distribution and advise the Chinese government.10 
On April 13, 1942, China’s military mission to the United States, led by General 
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Xiong Shihui, arrived in Washington D.C. As Chiang’s representative, Xiong sought to 
attain China’s inclusion in the U.S.-U.K. Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Combined 
Munitions Assignment Board, the supreme allied organizations devoted to military 
strategy and war material allocation.11 These two missions’ experiences 
foreshadowed sources of conflict in military-to-military relations and also shaped 
lasting mutual impressions.  
Huang Renlin’s War Area Service Corps (WASC) laid out the red carpet for 
Magruder and his staff, who quickly concluded that the Nationalists had little 
interest in fighting the Japanese. Magruder had become “quite perturbed over the 
lack of any real actions by the Chinese armies” by December 18, according to his 
chief-of-staff, Colonel Edward MacMoreland.12 On January 5, Magruder sent a 
message to Washington stating that Chiang intended to stop fighting and planned to 
stockpile American aid for future use against the Chinese Communists.13 Magruder 
also told U.S. Army Chief of Staff George Marshall that the United States should use 
Lend-Lease aid as a lever to force Chiang to accept American policy and strategy.14 
These opinions soon became articles of faith for the U.S. Army in China, laying the 
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groundwork for seeing Chongqing as an obstacle rather than a partner. “The Chinese 
propaganda in the States is superb, and I fear our people are completely taken by it,” 
MacMoreland remarked in his diary on March 2, “[and] I feel that they [the Chinese] 
are through and want someone else to win the war for them.”15 
The Magruder Mission’s appraisal of China’s commitment to the war effort 
was dead wrong. As Magruder and staff accused the Nationalists of trying to 
blackmail the United States and let others do the fighting, Chiang was practically 
begging to send up to 100,000 Chinese troops to Burma to assist in the colony’s 
defense. The British rebuffed Chiang’s offer until after the fall of Rangoon, the port 
through which the United States delivered China’s Lend-Lease supplies, was 
imminent. Meanwhile, Magruder reached his conclusions without visiting any 
battlefronts and after meeting just a handful of Chinese officials. China scholar Ch’i 
Hsi-sheng argues that Magruder erred simply because he was unreliable and bad at 
his job. Less than a third of his staff had any experience related to China, and many 
of them had been pushed into early retirement before World War II due to poor 
performance. When White House economic advisor Lauchlin Currie visited 
Chongqing in August as Roosevelt’s personal envoy to Chiang Kai-shek, he told 
Chiang that many members of the Magruder mission had come to China hoping to 
make a name for themselves and revive their moribund careers.16 Their 
performance in China supported Currie and Ch’i’s assessments. Magruder sent a 
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number of them home early for unsatisfactory conduct and other problems, 
including drunkenness. Even Chief-of-Staff MacMoreland believed “we did a very 
poor job in picking them [the members of AMMISCA] in the first place.”17 
While the WASC did its utmost to ensure that Magruder and his staff were 
well taken care of in China, General Xiong Shihui’s mission had an entirely different 
experience during their journey to the United States. On several legs of the flight 
route from Chongqing to Miami aboard U.S. Army aircraft, American officers forced 
Xiong and his comrades to give up their seats near the front of the plane and move 
to the back so all the whites could sit together. “The way Americans discriminate 
against the Chinese is despicable,” Xiong wrote in his diary on April 3. On the train 
from Miami to Washington, Xiong’s delegation had to sit in the colored train car. 
“This discrimination was not random,” he noted, “the way Americans look down on 
Chinese is deep seated and must be corrected.”18 In Washington, the War 
Department rebuffed Xiong’s requests to join the Combined Chiefs of Staff and 
Munitions Assignment Board, even refusing to allow him to attend meetings.19  
“China is called an ally but in reality the country is treated as an inferior,” he 
complained to Chiang in May.20 The indignities Xiong suffered in Washington led 
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Chiang to protest to Roosevelt that the most difficult part of allied relations was the 
sense of superiority with which whites treated the Chinese.21   
The contrast between the two military missions could not have been more 
striking. Xiong’s delegation endured racism along the way to Washington and the 
War Department’s indifference after it arrived. “The first order of business at 
military affairs meetings,” Xiong told Chiang on May 23, “should be a 
pronouncement recognizing that China has struggled alone against Japan for five 
years.”22 Xiong never received such acknowledgement, and more importantly, he 
returned home having failed to gain a place for China at the highest levels of allied 
decision-making. His experience convinced Chiang that being an ally of the United 
States would do little in the way of pushing the Americans to abandon their 
traditional feelings of superiority toward the Chinese.23 Magruder’s experience, on 
the other hand, reinforced existing prejudices. His reports convinced Washington 
that China was an unreliable ally.  
Disaster in Burma 
Prospects for effective military cooperation further diminished after the 
disastrous defense of Burma. The Japanese had not planned to invade Burma when 
they struck out on their Southern Advance to seize Hong Kong, the Philippines, 
Malaya, Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies, but the ease with which they sliced 
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through allied defenses convinced them to take Burma as well.24 Tokyo hoped that 
severing the Burma Road would knock China out of the war.25 Serious fighting began 
in February, and Archibald Wavell, British commander for the Far East, rejected 
Chiang’s offer to send his best troops, China’s 5th and 6th Armies, to assist in the 
colony’s defense. Wavell’s decision stemmed from imperial pride, logistical 
concerns, and longstanding anxieties about Chinese territorial ambitions in 
Burma.26 As the British position deteriorated, however, Wavell agreed to accept 
more Chinese troops. Rangoon fell on March 8, and Chiang reluctantly granted 
Stilwell command over the Chinese troops deployed to Burma, three armies (the 5th, 
6th, and 66th) comprising the Chinese Expeditionary Force. Chiang instructed Stilwell 
to keep Chinese forces in northern Burma and concentrate on the defense of 
Mandalay [See figure 5.1].27 The Japanese operated 400 aircraft in Burma to the 
Allies’ thirty-five and enjoyed similar advantages in artillery and naval support, so 
Chiang knew that a Chinese counteroffensive could result in the destruction of his 
best armies. Stilwell, however, without consulting Chiang, ordered two Chinese 
divisions to hurry south and launch a counteroffensive on March 21.28 
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 The military situation quickly turned against the Chinese Expeditionary 
Force. On March 25, Japanese troops encircled Tounggoo and surrounded China’s 
only mobile division, the 5th Army’s 200th. Stilwell refused to order the 200th 
Division to retreat while it still had time, but with Chiang’s approval divisional 
commander Dai Anlan ordered a breakout, providing fodder for Stilwell’s 
subsequent accusations that Chinese commanders had refused to follow his orders. 
Meanwhile, partially as a result of information provided by documents captured at 
Toungoo, which showed that China’s forces had moved too far south of Mandalay, 
the Japanese launched an attack against the Allies’ logistical and command center at 
Lashio, to Mandalay’s northeast, on April 3. Japanese forces took the city on April 29, 
and panic ensued.29 Chiang ordered his armies to regroup further north at 
Myitkyina, but Stilwell abandoned the men under his command on May 5 and 
retreated to India with a party of some eighty people. Sun Liren’s 38th Division of the 
66th Army also escaped to India, reaching the country with minimal losses while 
following a path slightly to the south of Stilwell’s escape route.30  
Other elements of the Chinese Expeditionary Force fared worse. The 200th 
Division made it back to Yunnan but lost nearly 2,000 men during the retreat, 
including General Dai. The 5th Army’s other two divisions, the 96th and 22nd, 
retreated northward to Myitkyina, which fell to the Japanese on May 9. These 
divisions then split up, with Liao Yaoxiang’s troops eventually reaching Assam, India 
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and the 96th Division returning to China. Japanese planes and hostile locals 
decimated their numbers as they made their escape, and disease and hunger also 
ravaged both divisions. In order to survive, these troops resorted to looting and 
pillaging, laying the groundwork for lasting anti-Chinese resentment.31 Meanwhile, 
the 55th Division of the 6th Army was destroyed in battle, and the 6th Army’s other 
two divisions fell to pieces as they made there way back to Yunnan, looting heavily 
in Burma’s Kengtung State.32 Casualties during the retreat were more than twice as 
high as those suffered in battle, and in all, the Chinese Expeditionary Force lost more 
than 30,000 men.33 Stilwell’s risky, unauthorized counteroffensive had gone 
horribly wrong.  
 The failure in Burma amplified tensions between U.S. and Chinese forces. 
Stilwell could not see, as Chiang did, that the defeat resulted from Japan’s 
overwhelming advantages and the fallout of Stilwell’s ill-conceived counter-
offensive. Had Stilwell followed Chiang’s instructions and kept the Chinese 
Expeditionary Force along a defensible line in northern Burma, it would have 
allowed an easier retreat back to Yunnan. Instead, Chiang lost his two best armies, 
and Yunnan province became a frontline region. Japanese control of the airfield at 
Myikyina also forced pilots flying the Hump to follow a dangerous air route over the 
eastern Himalayas. From Chinese perspectives, Stilwell deserved blame for both the 
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failed counter-offensive and for abandoning the Chinese Expeditionary Force 
without first organizing an orderly retreat. Chiang gave Stilwell the command he 
wanted, and Stilwell betrayed his trust. The entire ordeal reinforced Chiang’s 
misgivings about the U.S. military.34 Stilwell, on the other hand, refused to accept 
any responsibility, blaming the failed campaign on Chinese stupidity and 
unwillingness to take the offensive.35 He interpreted Chiang’s caution in Burma 
through the lens of Magruder’s appraisal of China. It meant that the Generalissimo 
was unwilling to fight. Stilwell also responded to the defeat by adopting Magruder’s 
recommendation to use Lend-Lease aid as a lever to twist Chiang’s arm, convinced 
that relentless pressure was the only way to get things done in China.  
The Sino-American Cooperative Organization 
Sino-American Cooperative Organization deputy director Milton Miles took a 
different approach. In contrast to Stilwell, Miles understood that his organization 
could not accomplish its mission in China without mutually respectful relations with 
SACO’s Chinese. Expecting to exercise command over foreign troops in another 
country, Miles believed, was absurd. He supported Dai Li as undisputed SACO 
commander and insisted that all his men exercise tact and patience in their dealings 
with the Chinese.36 Nevertheless, Miles’ emphasis on equality did not guarantee 
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success. According to a study commissioned by the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, 
SACO’s Chinese and American branches issued separate orders, resulting in 
“frequent embarrassment and difficulties” when the men in the ranks found 
themselves working at cross purposes. Guerrilla raids occasionally fell apart as a 
result. Some units also languished with ineffective American instructors. Supply and 
transportation problems, the bane of the China Theater, took their toll as well.37 At 
the same time, many Chinese recruits arrived at the organization’s training camps 
weakened by malnutrition and disease, a problem familiar to American troops at the 
training centers in Yunnan.38 And like China’s interpreters, many Juntong officers in 
SACO were angered by the disparity between their salaries and what the Americans 
earned.39 Americans serving at SACO’s training camps also suffered from morale 
problems, but Miles believed that field contact “with other foreign groups who 
ardently dislike the theater and its occupants,” such as the U.S. Army, played a large 
role in this regard.40 Yet by forbidding behavior that Chinese could interpret as 
unequal treatment and adopting a harsh stance toward any American misconduct, 
Miles’ naval organization was able to avoid many of the problems that plagued the 
U.S. Army in China. 
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 The Sino-American Cooperative Organization was established on April 15, 
1943, as a partnership between Dai Li’s secret police agency, the Bureau of 
Investigation and Statistics (The Juntong), and Miles’ U.S. Naval Group China. SACO 
set up thirteen training camps scattered around the country, each hosting one naval 
unit, where American sailors and marines taught Chinese recruits how to carry out 
sabotage and intelligence operations. Another camp located at Happy Valley 
(Geleshan), eight kilometers west of Chongqing, trained Dai’s secret police force. 
SACO also spied on Japanese shipping, rescued downed aircrews, monitored 
weather, and mapped coastal areas. According to Chinese Nationalist sources, Miles’ 
men trained more than 49,000 Chinese recruits, and the group’s operations killed 
more than 24,000 Japanese troops.41 Miles and his staff selected all of SACO’s 
American members personally, choosing men free from racial prejudice who could 
cooperate tactfully with the Chinese under exasperating circumstances. The 
organization also eschewed Huang Renlin’s approach of housing men in Western-
style enclaves that encouraged them to see Chinese as servants rather than 
comrades-in-arms. Instead, men from SACO lived under the same conditions as the 
Chinese they served with.42 Working together in hostile territory fostered mutual 
respect and cultivated an esprit de corps absent in support organizations like the 
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Army’s Services of Supply. “I am here today because of the Chinese,” SACO veteran 
Robert Hill recalled many years later, “how many times they saved my life, I don’t 
know.”43  
 The Sino-American Cooperative Organization built stronger cross-cultural 
relations than the other military unit where Chinese and Americans served together 
as ostensible equals: the 14th Air Force’s Chinese-American Composite Wing 
(CACW). Set up under Chennault’s command in July 1943, the CACW sought to train 
and equip the Chinese Air Force by integrating Chinese and American pilots and 
ground crews into a single organization. It also served as a combat unit, with 
Chinese and Americans participating in each of the air wing’s missions. Although the 
CACW established a solid record in aerial combat and ground support operations, its 
men never integrated to the degree that SACO’s troops did. They lived separately 
and ate at different canteens. 44 “Besides during pre-mission briefings or during the 
mission itself, I did not have many interactions with the Americans,” recalled Wang 
Songjin, a P-40 pilot.45 Some off-duty interaction occurred, mostly at Liangshan, 
Sichuan, where Chinese and American officers shared a club, but racism, cultural 
differences, and disparities in living conditions still disrupted operations and 
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generated resentment.46 Chinese pilots refused to fly in August 1944 after an 
American officer kicked a Chinese officer. Meanwhile, throughout unit’s existence, 
American ground crewmen complained that their Chinese counterparts performed 
their duties unsatisfactorily. American pilots also argued that the preflight rituals 
performed by Chinese airmen caused unnecessary delays.  At the same time, the 
Chinese government struggled to provide Chinese pilots and ground crews with 
adequate food, clothing, electrical supply, or coal. These shortcomings amplified 
resentments against the better-paid and equipped Americans and compelled 
Chennault to take over logistical support for Chinese airmen and ground crews in 
early 1945.47   
 In SACO, Miles sought out and promoted men who fostered closer 
cooperation with the organization’s Chinese members. Ideal American personnel, he 
believed, would be able “to go out into the front lines and fight with the guerillas and 
to set them an example.” To do so, they had to perform the same tasks as their 
Chinese comrades, only “in a better manner.” “I have definite proof,” Miles wrote in 
September 1943, “that the Chinese will emulate the things we are doing if he thinks 
it is better.”48 Miles, like Stilwell, sought to convince Chinese troops to adhere to U.S. 
military doctrine, but unlike Stilwell he recognized that demonstrating the efficacy 
of American methods, rather than applying unrelenting pressure, offered a better 
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means of achieving his goal. Miles’ promotion recommendations illustrated how 
important effective personal relations were to this endeavor. Based on Miles’ urging, 
Lieutenant Seth Morris, commander of Naval Unit Six in south Fujian, earned a 
promotion for “making personal friends of practically all the Chinese officers in the 
area.”49  Miles wanted another lieutenant put in charge of selecting American 
personnel for duty in China after he established a track record of teaching Chinese 
and Americans to get along with one another.50 He also requested that the Navy 
promote Gunnery Sergeant Way Holland to warrant officer and send him back to 
China to lead guerrilla attacks because Holland “was unusually successful in 
personal relationships with the Chinese with the result that he obtained the 
maximum cooperation and assistance from them.”51 In contrast to these promotions, 
Miles dismissed men from duty if they behaved in ways detrimental to close 
relations between Americans and Chinese, an action that 14th Air Force 
Headquarters pondered but never implemented.52 
 The Sino-American Cooperative Organization also proved more effective 
than the Army in maintaining discipline. Miles took a proactive approach that 
enabled the organization to ward off the friction over sex and unequal treatment 
that plagued GIs’ interactions with the Chinese. In September 1944, six months 
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before the Jeep Girl Crisis exploded, Miles sent out an order addressed to all the men 
in his command. “The public display of the sexual urge or of any affection however 
slight toward any woman in China, be she virtuous or otherwise,” he wrote, “is an 
offense prejudicial to good order and discipline.” He warned that severe disciplinary 
measures would be taken against any violators.53 After the crisis broke out, Miles 
requested authorization for his men to wear SACO shoulder patches so that Chinese 
would identify them as separate from “Army personnel in the field who are 
continuously creating bad impressions among the Chinese.”54 Whereas Chongqing’s 
Foreign Affairs Bureau grew accustomed to passing along police reports about GI 
misconduct to U.S. Army Headquarters, Dai Li commended SACO personnel for 
being law abiding.55 Although Miles never required his men to abstain from sex and 
alcohol altogether—Dai Li, after all, was a heavy drinker and serial philanderer—he 
made sure their behaviors adhered to Chinese cultural norms, which frowned on 
public intoxication and interaction between the sexes.56  
 The contrast in discipline and organizational culture between SACO and the 
U.S. Army was evident in their receptions for the Pat O’Brien Troupe’s United 
Service Organizations (USO) tour in China. Most famous for playing Notre Dame 
football coach Knute Rockne in the 1940 film Knute Rockne, All American, O’Brien, 
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toured the CBI Theater in 1944 accompanied by a troupe that included the actress 
Jinx Falkenberg, guitarist Jimmie Dodd, and several USO dancers. When the troupe 
performed for SACO at Happy Valley in October, Miles and Dai treated them to a 
banquet and opera performance, allowing them to meet locals and eat Chinese food. 
Children from the orphanage SACO funded in Happy Valley presented the troupe 
with gifts, and O’Brien stayed up most of the night talking to Chinese and American 
officers, who had treated the troupe’s female performers with respect, a contrast to 
what occurred at the troupe’s other shows in China.57 
 The troupe’s October 25 performance at Yunnanyi Air Base, however, led to 
the dismissal of Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Wheeler, the base commander. 
Around 1,500 officers and men, mostly from the 27th Troop Carrier Squadron and 
the 14th Air Force’s 25th Fighter Squadron, gathered for the show. Wheeler drank 
heavily while standing at the back of the stage, in full view of the audience. With 
little to fear from their commander, intoxicated officers took up the front rows and a 
nearby rooftop, proceeding to heckle the performers throughout the show. At one 
point, a lieutenant stole O’Brien’s hat. Wheeler himself interrupted the production 
twice, once to cajole O’Brien into allowing an American major to sing a song, and 
second time to press O’Brien—unsuccessfully on this occasion—to end the show by 
bringing a donkey on stage. After the show, MPs arrested one officer for trying to 
enter the female dressing tent while completely naked. According to investigators, 
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the previous USO show at Yunnanyi, featuring the actress Ann Sheridan, had been 
the scene of similar misconduct.58  
  It would be a mistake to dismiss the mess at Yunnanyi as a case of boys 
being boys, with little bearing on Sino-American military ties in China. The contrasts 
between SACO’s camps and the Yunnanyi Air Base went far beyond this isolated 
event. Yunnanyi was a focal point of Sino-American tension. American servicemen 
stationed there killed suspected Chinese thieves with impunity, provoking outrage 
among the area’s civilian population and the base’s Chinese troop contingent. 
American troops at Yunnanyi also played a central role in the black market trading 
that dominated the nearby town’s economy. SACO, on the other hand, maintained 
rigid discipline and nurtured an interest in Chinese culture that discouraged the 
creation of the enclaves of Americanness that the Army and the WASC established. 
This environment resulted in an orderly crowd during the Pat O’Brien Troupe’s 
performance and also played a crucial role and preventing the outbreak of the 
violence and distrust that plagued Yunnanyi.  
  Miles’ leadership allowed SACO to deal with wide-ranging challenges 
without the animosity that characterized much of the U.S. Army’s collaborations 
with Chinese forces. Miles and his staff never attributed problems to Chinese 
inferiority or untrustworthiness, as was common among U.S. Army units in China. 
SACO’s Chinese, for that matter, did not complain about unequal treatment or 
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American racism. When difficulties came up, Miles addressed them diplomatically 
rather than with arm-twisting or threats.59 Problems stemming from SACO’s turf 
wars with other agencies, particularly the Office of Strategic Services, as well as the 
Army’s discomfort with U.S. Naval Group China’s partnership with Dai, whom many 
American diplomats and Army officers considered a nefarious figure on par with 
Heinrich Himmler, did far more to undermine the organization’s operations than did 
Sino-American friction among its members.60  
The Ramgarh and Yunnan Training Programs 
 Many of the American-trained and advised Chinese Army units also managed 
to cooperate effectively with their Allied counterparts. Despite his sensitivity 
toward unequal treatment, Chiang himself remarked in his diary in November 1943 
that Chinese officers lagged far behind the Americans when it came to professional 
knowledge, discipline, and physical strength. He and other senior commanders were 
eager to allow American advisors to train and equip Chinese troops. During the 
1930s, the Nationalists were pleased with military advisory programs run by the 
Germans and Soviets. According to Ch’i Hsi-sheng’s analysis, they expected the U.S. 
military to achieve even better results. Stilwell, whose real strengths lay in training 
troops rather than commanding them on the battlefield, oversaw the Army’s 
training program at Ramgarh, which began operating in 1942 after the arrival of Sun 
                                                        
59 Milton Miles to Dai Li, 1 December 1943; RG 38, Naval Group China Papers, Box 31, U.S. Naval Unit 
9, Folder 1, NARA. 
60 Maochun Yu, The Dragon’s War: Allied Operations and the Fate of China (Annapolis: Naval Institute 
Press, 2006), 104.  




Liren and Liao Yaoxiang’s divisions from Burma. Some five divisions passed through 
Ramgarh’s gates before launching the offensive to retake Burma, and the training 
program won universal praise from China’s senior military commanders, even 
managing to rebuild some of the trust that Stilwell had lost after the disaster in 
Burma during 1942.61   
Ramgarh’s operations, however, did not always run so smoothly from the 
perspectives of the men in the ranks. In addition to problems regarding food, 
uniforms, and occasional Sino-American violence, Ramgarh suffered from an 
alarming desertion rate. More than 100 Chinese soldiers went AWOL each month in 
1944, even though Chinese authorities attempted to stanch the flow by assembling 
their men together and forcing them to watch deserters be executed.  Most 
successful deserters fled to Calcutta, where a boomtown economy and a Chinese 
Consulate General willing to provide Overseas Chinese Registration Cards awaited 
them. The problem became so severe that Minister of War He Yingqin asked Stilwell 
in September to secretly arrest “these deserters in order to secure the discipline of 
our Army.”62 Stilwell balked at He’s unorthodox request, which went against 
everything the Chinese government had done over the past two years to press the 
colonial authorities in Delhi to grant Chongqing exclusive jurisdiction over criminal 
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matters involving Chinese servicemen in India.63 American servicemen acting 
without authorization, and with unclear motivations, however, nevertheless 
assisted British police in rounding up deserters in Calcutta. This action gave mid-
level Chinese officers in Ramgarh the impression that Americans were anti-Chinese, 
particularly when American MPs mistakenly arrested overseas Chinese civilians 
residing in India.64 Locally, tensions between Chinese soldiers and Indian civilians 
paralleled the situation in China, with disputes over price gouging, sex, and cultural 
differences beginning shortly after the first troops arrived.65 To deal with the price 
gouging issue, Chinese authorizes urged Stilwell, who retained command over the 
entire training program, to allow them to open a cooperative store that could 
function like an American post exchange (PX). Stilwell turned down their request 
without further comment, compelling Chinese troops to do their shopping at local 
bazaars.66   
American racism was also prevalent at Ramgarh. The Termite Hill Gazette, a 
weekly U.S. Army unit newsletter published in Ramgarh that bore the official CBI 
Theater seal, referred to the Chinese as chinks. “There seems to be a little petty 
jealousness between the two services [ordnance and tank] as to the perfection of the 
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ability to teach chinks to drive,” read one section under the headline “Chinese 
Comments and News,” published in October 1944.67 In a section on Ramgarh 
published during the previous week, the author noted with obvious disappointment, 
“it had been thought that when Andrews Fibisch and Lavell left that all those 
interested in the Chinese were departed.” Recently, however, another officer 
surnamed Hawkins had arrived to coordinate infantry training with Chinese troops: 
“Now according to his own statements as to the willingness and interest of the 
chinks…he is called CHINK HAWKINS.”68 In SACO, Milton Miles had dismissed a 
competent lieutenant commander due to statements he made in public that Miles 
found “detrimental to close relations between Americans and Chinese.”69 Yet at 
Ramgarh, empathizing with the Chinese could make an American officer suspect in 
the eyes of his fellow GIs. American Commanders at Ramgarh were either oblivious 
or indifferent to allowing racist language to be used in newsletters that any Chinese 
interpreter or soldier with English proficiency could have understood. Many GIs 
simply took it for granted that Chinese were inferiors, even if trained and equipped 
by U.S. forces. Colonel Arcadi Gluckman, a former member of the Magruder Mission 
now serving in India, agreed that Liao Yaoxiang and Sun Liren’s Ramgarh-trained 
forces were China’s best troops, but his respect for them only went so far. He 
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described these troops as “loyal hardy, docile, fairly intelligent for a low class Asiatic 
and not lacking in courage.”70 
In Yunnan, unlike in Ramgarh, training efforts fell short, and positive reports 
reflected what Chinese and American commanders wanted to hear.  Chinese 
commanders were reluctant to send their best troops for training in Yunnan, fearing 
that they might lose control of them, so many recruits arrived in wretched shape. 
Training thus proceeded at a maddeningly slow pace. Chinese troops resented 
seeing GIs living in WASC hostels while they slept in drafty tents, and commanders 
seethed over what they perceived as American scheming to take command over 
Chinese troops by using Lend-Lease as leverage.71  American liaison officers with 
China’s 52nd Army and 2nd Honorable Division lauded these units for being “sold on 
the American method,” while the commanders of China’s 52nd and 53rd Armies 
praised their liaison officers for being “warm-hearted and conscientious in their 
work.”72 These reports may have been sincere—critical reports generally conveyed 
the opposite message—but it is also possible that simply wanted to please their 
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respective commanders, who wanted to hear about Americanized Chinese troops 
and American officers who treated Chinese soldiers with respect.   
Burma, Ichigo, and the Stilwell Crisis 
 One of the reasons Chiang endorsed the Ramgarh training program was his 
desire to launch another offensive in Burma. Despite the first campaign’s ruinous 
consequences, by August 1942, both Chiang and Stilwell wanted to send China’s 
armies into the Burmese jungle once more. Chiang believed another offensive, if 
carried out correctly, would strengthen his ties with Washington and reopen the 
overland supply route from Rangoon to Kunming.73 For Stilwell, another offensive 
offered a second chance to command troops in the field and to avenge his earlier 
defeat. The Generalissimo and his American chief-of-staff, however, derived 
conflicting lessons from the rout suffered in 1942. Stilwell concluded that he needed 
more troops and greater command authority over the Chinese military. Chiang, on 
the other hand, resolved to stand firm against Allied demands that would place his 
armies at unnecessary risk. He did not want to grant Stilwell command over his 
forces again, nor was he willing to participate in the campaign without watertight 
guarantees of air and naval support from the Americans and the British. Unless 
China’s allies deployed sufficient manpower to seize Rangoon, the Japanese would 
be able to resupply and reinforce their troops in Burma.74  
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 Chiang attempted to adhere to these lessons as the Allies began preparing to 
recover north Burma and his personal relations with Stilwell continued to 
deteriorate. He approved a joint U.S.-U.K. proposal laid out at the May 1943 Trident 
Conference for an offensive in Burma on the condition that it would meet his 
minimum needs: “if this meeting can’t provide guarantees on 500 airplanes for the 
China Theater and guarantee American land, naval, and air involvement in taking 
Rangoon, then it will just be empty talk,” he told Foreign Minister Song Ziwen, “the 
Chinese military and people will lose faith in the Americans.”75 The Americans 
agreed to these conditions, and Chiang went forward with preparations. “Doing 
everything I can to help the U.S. and Britain recover Burma is the only strategy [for 
China] to follow,” Chiang wrote in his diary on June 28.76 Over the summer, Chiang’s 
ties with Stilwell worsened as the general schemed to take control over all Chinese 
armed forces and treated Chiang and his key lieutenants with derision. Their 
relationship grew so strained that Chiang made an official request for Stilwell’s 
recall on October 15, only to change his mind a few days later on the advice of his 
wife and sister-in-law, Song Ailing, the wife of Kong Xiangxi.77  
When Chiang attended the Cairo Conference in late November with Churchill 
and Roosevelt, he threw his weight behind a proposal for the re-invasion of Burma 
codenamed “Tarzan.” According to this plan, Chinese forces based in Ledo would 
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invade the Hukawng Valley and fight their way toward Myikyina and Bhamo before 
eventually linking up with the Yunnan Force (also known as the Chinese 
Expeditionary Force), which would cross the Salween River and dislodge the 
Japanese from western Yunnan. Meanwhile, seven divisions from British General 
William Slim’s 14th Army Group would attack Burma from Chittagong and Imphal, 
while U.S. and British long-range penetration forces under Frank Merrill and Orde 
Wingate would assist the Chinese troops making their way from Ledo. Roosevelt 
promised Chiang that Tarzan would include large-scale naval operations in the Bay 
of Bengal in order to sever Japanese communication lines and guarantee air 
superiority.78  
Yet Roosevelt backed away from his promise after discussing strategy with 
Stalin and Churchill a few days later at the Eureka Conference in Teheran. Stalin 
demanded that the Allies focus on the invasion of France, and in late December all 
British landing craft were sent back to Europe for use in Operation Overlord. The 
Chinese government protested against this reversal to, no avail. In late December, 
Chinese forces near Ledo began making contact with the Japanese, and Chiang 
agreed to continue with the operation as a means to encourage direct U.S. ground 
force participation in China.79 The second Burma campaign thus went forward 
without the naval support Chiang had deemed essential. Chiang even granted 
Stilwell command over Chinese troops in India.80 After making their way through 
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the Hukawng Valley, Chinese and American forces suffered enormous losses during 
the three-month siege of Myitkyina. In April, Roosevelt strong-armed Chiang into 
unleashing the Yunnan Force against Japanese troops by threatening to cut off all 
Lend-Lease aid if Chiang refused. The Generalissimo had warned the Americans in 
January that concentrating Allied efforts in Europe would invite an all-out Japanese 
offensive against China, and by committing the Yunnan Force to the Salween 
Campaign in western Yunnan and northern Burma, Chongqing deployed its best 
remaining forces to a front of little strategic value to China.81  
In early April, Chiang’s warning came true when Japan’s Operation Ichigo 
began in Henan province. Japan mobilized a half million troops and 200 bombers 
while preparing enough aviation fuel for an eight-month campaign and enough 
ammunition to last for two years. Within a month, the Japanese took Henan and 
destroyed the Chinese forces along the Peking-Hankou Railway. They attacked 
Hunan province next, and Changsha, the provincial capital, fell on June 18. American 
commanders, including Chennault, were outraged by the Nationalists’ bungled 
defensive operations in Henan and Hunan, including Chiang’s refusal to send 
supplies to General Xue Yue’s forces at Changsha due his fears that Xue was disloyal. 
Chiang once again refused to help Xue’s troops as they regrouped to defend the city 
of Hengyang, 100 miles south of Changsha. The 14th Air Force operated an important 
airbase at Hengyang, and Chennault begged Stilwell to approve the diversion of 
1,000 tons of Lend-Lease supplies to aid Xue. Stilwell, whose relations with 
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Chennault were little better than those with Chiang, replied with the message: “Let 
them stew.” Hengyang fell on August 8, and Japanese forces moved into Guangxi 
province. In early September, Stilwell continued to withhold fuel from the 14th Air 
Force, and refused Chiang’s request to stage a diversionary attack on Bhamo, in 
northern Burma, in order to relieve pressure on the Yunnan Force, which had 
encountered tough resistance at Longling, near the Yunnan-Burma border. Although 
the situation in Burma had improved after the British defeated the Japanese thrust 
into Imphal, India, Allied strategy in the Far East still lay in ruins.82 
 Sino-American tensions finally boiled over into the alliance’s worst crisis on 
September 19, when Stilwell interrupted a meeting at Chiang’s Huangshan 
mountain retreat outside Chongqing to present the Generalissimo with a message 
from President Roosevelt. U.S. Army Chief of Staff George Marshall, a personal friend 
of Stilwell’s, had urged the president to settle the crisis in China by continuing to 
push for Stilwell’s appointment as commander of all Chinese armed forces.83 
Roosevelt’s message, drafted on September 16, demanded that Chiang at once place 
Stilwell “in unrestricted command of all your forces.”84 “At very long last,” Stilwell 
wrote in his diary, “ FDR has finally spoken plain words, and plenty of them, with a 
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firecracker in every sentence.”85 Stilwell showed the note to Patrick Hurley, 
Roosevelt’s envoy in Chongqing, who urged him not to deliver the message to 
Chiang directly, warning that doing so could permanently damage U.S.-China 
relations. Yet Stilwell insisted on passing the note to Chiang himself. Chiang read the 
letter without emotion and ended the meeting. But he burst into tears once alone in 
the room with his brother-in-law Song Ziwen, seething that Stilwell must lay behind 
Roosevelt’s message.86 Chiang wrote in his diary that night that his encounter with 
Stilwell earlier in the day had been “the most severe humiliation I have ever had in 
my life.”87 On October 9, Chiang told Roosevelt that he wanted Stilwell recalled 
immediately.88 
 The Chiang-Stilwell clash represented at the highest level the intractable 
tensions that permeated the U.S. military’s mission in China. Magruder and his staff 
had laid its foundation by concluding in late 1941 that the Nationalists had no desire 
to fight and would not contribute to the war effort unless the Americans coerced 
them. Under Stilwell, these convictions undergirded the U.S. Army’s actions in the 
CBI Theater. Milton Miles and SACO proved to be the exception, suggesting what 
might have been if the U.S. Army had taken a different approach. But because so 
many Americans across all ranks accepted Chinese inferiority as a given, that option 
was never a possibility.   
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Operations in Burma and China, 1944–1945 
On March 30, more than five months before Stilwell’s showdown with Chiang, 
General Liao Yaoxiang cabled Chongqing from northwest Burma. For the first time, 
Chinese and American combat troops had fought shoulder-to-shoulder against the 
Japanese. The U.S. Army’s 5307th Composite Unit, better known as Merrill’s 
Marauders, joined Liao and Sun Liren’s forces in attempting to encircle and destroy 
Lieutenant General Shinichi Tanaka’s 18th Division near the town of Maingkwan in 
Burma’s Hukawng Valley. In American popular memory, Brigadier General Frank 
Merrill’s Marauders, the U.S. Army’s long-range penetration force, have been 
immortalized as heroes second only to Stilwell in the CBI Theater, but Liao found 
them underwhelming.89 “This unit of veteran American troops is a strong force but 
lacks backbone,” Liao reported to Chongqing. According to Liao, Merrill’s men were 
undisciplined. They had retreated without orders while Chinese units were engaged 
in combat, abandoning bodies and equipment as they withdrew, and leaving the 
Chinese to deal with the mess they left behind. Chinese forces drove Tanaka’s troops 
out of Walawbum, ten miles south of Maingkwan, but the operation was only a 
partial success because the 18th Division survived to fight another day. For Liao, the 
U.S. military lost much of its luster during the fight for Walawbum, while Chinese 
forces proved their mettle. “In this battle, in comparison to Japanese and American 
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forces, the results prove that our Revolutionary Army has recovered its self-
confidence,” he told Chiang.90  
Liao’s assessment was no doubt self-serving, but it reflected a newfound 
confidence among the Chinese officers and men who had trained in India and 
participated in the Burma Campaign. As they gained combat experience, these 
troops became less inclined to accept their subordinate role. Of course as the 
glowing reports on China’s 52nd Army and 2nd Honorable Division demonstrated, 
Chinese soldiers’ ability to adopt American ways was the sine qua non of successful 
Sino-American cooperation from the U.S. Army’s perspective. So when the New First 
Army rejected American liaison officers’ suggestions in late 1944 and early 1945, 
the U.S. Army’s Chinese Combat Command attributed it to an “anti-foreign” 
attitude.91 Even though these same liaison officers admitted that Ramgarh-trained 
troops were China’s best military force, they were angered by the New First Army’s 
willingness to disregard American advice. This raises the question of whether the 
U.S. Army’s Chinese Combat Command was more concerned about Chinese military 
effectiveness or Chinese deference to American mentoring.  
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Crime and misconduct during the Burma Campaign intensified these disputes 
over the nature of relations between American liaison officers and the Chinese 
forces they served with. American and British commanders in Burma believed that 
the New First Army was behaving recklessly in Burma. U.S. Headquarters at Ledo 
received numerous reports in February 1945 about Chinese crimes against civilians 
in Burma, including robberies, theft, sexual assault, and running people out of their 
homes.92 In India, men from China’s New First Army had already established a 
reputation for violence against civilians. “Indians are scared to death of the Chinese, 
who knowing the same become arrogant,” reported Haydon Boatner in October 
1944. Only the presence American liaison officers could keep them out of trouble, he 
believed.93 The irony of how closely these allegations paralleled American 
misconduct in China seems to have eluded men like Boatner. Taken as a whole, 
these actions bespoke Chinese cultural arrogance, or even racism. Meanwhile, as 
British colonial authorities reestablished control in Burma, they discovered similar 
problems. “It has been reported here that many deserters from the Chinese forces 
have established themselves in North Burma thereby displacing villagers who are 
being forced to live out in the fields,” reported the Burmese Civil Affairs Staff.94 
Crime along the Yunnan-Burma border was even worse, as robberies occurred 
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almost daily in the summer of 1945, and armed Chinese troops took over entire 
villages.95  The colonial government even wanted the U.S. Army to assist British civil 
affairs officers in rounding up Chinese deserters.96  
As was the case in almost all violent incidents involving Chinese and 
Americans, investigating authorities continued to reach opposing conclusions. For 
example, Sun Liren personally demanded murder charges against a sixteen year-old 
Kachin serving in the U.S. Ranger Guard who killed a decorated New First Army 
sergeant and vice platoon leader.97  Yet American investigators concluded that the 
killing was justified because the Chinese sergeant had entered a restricted area and 
threatened the Kachin guard.98 U.S. authorities also absolved an American MP of any 
guilt after shooting two Chinese kitchen staff at the 14th Evacuation Hospital near 
Ledo, blaming the incident on the absence of Chinese MPs.99 The presence of 
Chinese MPs, however, provided no surefire guarantee against violent disputes.  
At Ledo Airfield in May 1945, Lieutenant Colonel S.Y. Kao, commander of the 
local Chinese MP battalion, witnessed two American MPs, both privates first class, 
dragging two Chinese majors out of the passenger terminal, kicking and punching 
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them along the way. The two men had been stranded at Ledo for three days, having 
been twice refused seats on the grounds that they possessed invalid travel 
authorization. Kao saw the scene as an “open insult of Chinese officers,” and spoke 
to the American MPs through his interpreter, asking them not to handle the two 
officers in such a way, and offering to settle the affair peacefully. “I don’t care who 
this damn colonel is,” one of the Americans replied, before forcing the two majors 
into a Jeep and driving them away. An armed standoff ensued, as some twenty-five 
of Kao’s men lined up outside with their weapons. An American officer who knew 
Kao personally talked him into leaving with his men, but Kao still insisted later that 
the American MPs be “thrashed publically for having mistreated the Chinese 
officers.”100 American investigators, however, recommended no criminal charges 
against the two enlisted MPs “as they were fulfilling an order by a superior officer in 
the performance of duty.” 101 Such incidents poisoned ties from the perspective of 
Chinese and American men of all ranks.  
Disputes over smuggling and black market dealing also intensified over the 
final year of the war. These had been flashpoints in interactions between GIs and 
Chinese civilians, so it is hardly surprising that the issue became so divisive as 
China’s Ramgarh-trained forces returned to Yunnan province. In the weeks leading 
up to January 21, 1945, when the New First Army linked up with Yunnan Force near 
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Wanding, China, smuggling intensified as Chinese soldiers prepared to drive their 
trucks over the Ledo Road back to Kunming. According to Chinese government 
regulations, anyone caught smuggling while using military transportation faced a 
five to ten-year prison sentence.102 In practice, however, Chinese authorities were 
more lenient, so the U.S. Army took the lead in implementing anti-smuggling 
measures. On January 11, 1945, U.S. authorities placed the Margherita and Ledo 
bazaars in Assam off limits to Chinese troops.103  
The ban outraged Chinese troops, and Chinese military policemen refused to 
enforce it. American MPs began patrolling the bazaar areas, pulling over Chinese 
troops suspected of loading up goods in military vehicles. During one such stop on 
the evening of February 28, Chinese personnel in a 6x6 truck refused to stop and 
even attempted to run the U.S. military police Jeep off the road. Another Jeep tried to 
block a two-lane wooden bridge, but the truck kept going, forcing an American 
sergeant to jump over the embankment to avoid being run over. The chase 
continued for another four or five miles, with American military police opening fire 
twice. Two Chinese, a driver and a passenger, both privates, were wounded. That 
same evening, American MPs stopped another two military trucks driven by Chinese 
soldiers at the Margherita bazaar, and in all, the three trucks carried hundreds of 
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cartos of cigarettes, as well as textiles, batteries, soap, cooking oil, and thread.104  
These were all daily necessities that any GI was free to purchase from the local PX or 
the bazaars. Chinese soldiers continued to protest the ban by making this point. 
General Li Hong, commander of the 38th Division, which was now undergoing 
training in Myitkyina, also supported his men, stating that the ban was causing 
tremendous inconvenience for his forces because the officers he sent back to India 
to purchase supplies had been unable carry out their orders.105  
Violent resistance against American MPs attempting to enforce anti-
smuggling regulations became more common over the next few months. Initially, 
American MPs recommended tighter control over convoys leaving from India. 
“Inasmuch as the Chinese were allowed to load the vehicles the day before 
departure they had ample opportunity to secret items of non-military nature 
without detection. This practice invites attempts at smuggling,” wrote one MP after 
a standoff at a Ledo Road traffic station in early April. “It is recommended that any 
convoy to be operated by Chinese be loaded by Americans. The Chinese 
organization furnishing the vehicles and drivers should not be allowed near the 
loaded vehicle until a short time prior to the hour of departure,” he 
recommended.106 In Baoshan, the first major military town in Yunnan along the road 
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from Burma, American commanders reported frequent brawls between GIs and 
Chinese drivers. Officers on Chinese convoys refused to cooperate with American 
MPs. “All of the trouble arises from personnel going from India to China,” reported 
SOS Headquarters.107 On May 14, a Chinese officer threatened to kill “all of the 
Americans if they touched another vehicle” during an inspection of a New First 
Army convoy near Baoshan. As a result, Wedemeyer protested to Chiang but agreed 
to halt searches of Chinese-controlled vehicles and personnel returning from 
India.108 Wedemeyer’s decision halted violence over smuggling, but robberies and 
banditry continued to plague the Ledo Road for the remainder of the war.109 
 Japan surrendered shortly after American-trained Chinese units began 
offensive operations in China, and although efforts to repel Japan’s invasion of west 
Hunan won the approval of American liaison officers, numerous problems still 
emerged. On May 3, Chinese armies began their counterattack at Wuyang, seventy 
miles southeast of Zhijiang, the main target of the Japanese attack. Supported by 14th 
Air Force bombardments and airdrops of food and ammunition, they “fought with 
great courage and not inconsiderable skill,” according to their American liaison 
officers. The first test of Sino-American cooperation on the main China battlefront 
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proved successful.110  China’s 94th New 6th and 18th Armies continually outflanked 
the Japanese and forced them to retreat.111 Other Japanese forces began evacuating 
from Guilin, Liuzhou, Nanning, and other areas in south China as the situation in 
Okinawa deteriorated, and Chinese troops began moving forward into the vacuum 
left by the repeating Japanese.112 
As Chinese troops moved into formerly Japanese-occupied territories in 
southern China, much of the cooperative spirit of the Zhijiang Campaign broke down. 
Filling the vacuum left by retreating Japanese troops required large-scale airlifts and 
truck convoys over primitive roads. American pilots flew much of the New 1st Army, 
including the entire 38th Division, from Myikyina to Yunnan and then onto Baise and 
Nanning, in Guangxi province. Colonel Lewis Leavell, the chief American liaison 
officer, experienced “continuous intimidations, threats, and delays” as he attempted 
to coordinate the loading of aircraft, including having a bayonet thrust against his 
stomach by a Chinese sentry. On another occasion, he and Chinese colonel had a 
heated argument over the use of transport aircraft that ended in a fistfight. After he 
arrived in Kunming, Leavell discovered “disgraceful…misuse and abuse of New 1st 
Army vehicles.” These trucks were provided to the Chinese via the Lend-Lease 
program, so Leavell and other liaison officers were particularly disgusted to find 
them wrecked, being driven by civilians, or used to transport the families and 
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furniture of senior officers.113 Trouble continued at Baise, where soldiers from the 
New 1st Army, angered about how pilots had treated them during the flight from 
Yunnan, forced the American crew off the plane at gunpoint on July 5.114 Just the 
previous week, New 1st Army troops crossing a river near outside Baise had fired at 
U.S. troops after an argument over loading their trucks on the ferry.115 All these 
disputes occurred at a time when Chinese-American tensions were already 
heightened at Baise due to the Jeep Girl Crisis.  
The movement of the New 1st Army into China was also accompanied by 
robberies, assaults, and holdups—committed by Chinese against American 
servicemen. Transport bottlenecks, like ferry crossings and bridges over the 
Salween River in western Yunnan were the most frequent sites of such incidents. 
Fights and robberies had occurred before, and bandits and robbed several convoys 
in Yunnan during 1943 and 1944, but these holdups were new. Major General 
Robert McClure of the Chinese Combat Command warned Wedemeyer on August 3 
that “an ever increasing number of incidents involving intimidation of U.S. personnel 
at the point of a gun by Chinese soldiers and officers” had strained relations even 
further.116 Most of these troops simply demanded rides, but others robbed 
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individual vehicles and entire convoys.117 Break-ins also increased at U.S. military 
bases and warehouses, becoming daily occurrences after Japan’s surrender.118 
Widespread looting in formerly Japanese-held territories as well as cities like 
Kunming also took place immediately after Japan’s surrender.119 Instead of 
welcoming victory, Nationalist China descended into a free-for-all as Chinese 
soldiers snatched up whatever they could and GIs demanded to go home.   
Chinese soldiers’ behavior stemmed from opportunism, desperation and the 
same confidence that had first emerged in Burma. Most soldiers smuggled because 
being out of the country allowed them to buy or otherwise acquire high-value goods 
that could augment their meager salaries.  In India, Chinese soldiers were paid 
partially in rupees, so they were better off than their compatriots back in China. 
After the Ledo Road opened, they purchased anything that could be sold at a profit 
upon returning home, where the Japanese blockade had led to shortages in 
practically everything. These soldiers were also outfitted with valuable U.S. military 
goods, such as canned meat, blankets and uniforms—items that would fetch a high 
price in China. American officers assumed Chinese troops sought to hoard these 
goods in preparation for fighting the Communists, but in reality, according to 
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interpreting officer Huang Shang, they were just trying to make money.120 The 
desire to make money also motivated black marketers and thieves—often China-
based troops who were paid in nearly worthless Chinese currency, if at all. 
Depredations in Burma, meanwhile, resulted from the desire to grab up whatever 
spoils were in reach, augmented by feelings of superiority over the locals. And 
finally, Chinese soldiers became more willing to rob, attack, or intimidate GIs at 
gunpoint because their experience fighting in Burma had given them confidence to 
challenge American authority, just as their commanding officers did.  
Conclusion 
 The U.S. Army’s Pocket Guide to China warned GIs that unless they treated 
their Chinese comrades as equals, they would “be playing right into the hands of 
Hitler and the Japs.” The Japanese, the Pocket Guide continued, “will harp on the 
color question first, last, and all the time. She will tell the Chinese what she has been 
telling them ever since Pearl Harbor—that Americans look down on nonwhites 
peoples and that the Chinese can never hope to be treated on equal terms of equality 
by America.”121 Clearly, higher-ups in the U.S. Army understood how sensitive 
Chinese were about unequal treatment and bigotry. So what made the U.S. Army fail 
so fully in putting this knowledge into practice? Why did Stilwell and other senior 
American officers treat China’s leader and military commanders as if they were 
                                                        
120 Huang Shang 黃裳, Guanyu Meiguo bing 關於美國兵 [On American Soldiers] (Shanghai: Shanghai 
chu ban gongsi, 1947), 92–94, 117–120.  
121 Special Service Division, Army Service Forces, United States Army. Pocket Guide to China 
(Washington D.C.: War and Navy Department, 1942), 2.  




colonial underlings? How could it be that even after Stilwell’s recall, American 
liaison officers never questioned their conviction in always knowing the Chinese 
Army’s needs better than China’s military officers did themselves?  
 As in other realms of wartime Sino-American interaction, military-to-military 
relations suffered when prewar perceptions met with the hardscrabble realities of 
life in China. In carrying out its chief mission in China—increasing the combat 
effectiveness of the Chinese Army and defeating the Japanese—American 
servicemen were convinced that the Chinese military’s salvation lay in heeding the 
advice of its American mentors. Indeed, only by adopting the “American way” could 
Chinese officers and men earn the respect of their American counterparts. American 
troops internalized this pernicious and unexamined preconception before they 
arrived in China, where the country’s poverty and the poor condition of its armed 
forces reaffirmed it. In their eyes, a people long regarded as racial inferiors could 
not possibly be equals, especially since the country lagged so far behind the United 
States in so many striking ways. Interactions with Chinese soldiers, in particular, re-
enforced American assumptions. As Chiang himself admitted, China’s malnourished, 
poorly trained, disease-ridden soldiers were no match for their American 
counterparts.   
 Yet from Chinese soldiers’ perspectives, American servicemen did not 
deserve unquestioned deference. At the command level, Stilwell had botched the 
defense of Burma, and victory in the second Burma Campaign came at an enormous 
cost for China and its military. All the while, Chinese troops—not Americans—did 




nearly all the fighting, and the few American ground troops who participated in the 
advance toward Myitkyina did not demonstrate superior bravery or competence in 
comparison to their Chinese comrades. At the level of day-to-day interactions 
among the men in the ranks, attempts by American military police to suppress 
Chinese soldiers’ smuggling and theft provoked a violent response rooted in 
righteous indignation. As Chinese servicemen saw it, GIs did just as much smuggling 
and stealing as Chinese troops, if not more. Yet these Americans also enjoyed high 
salaries, ample supplies, and more comfortable living conditions. On top of 
everything, Chinese military police and customs officials would have never tried to 
halt American troops’ theft and smuggling. From Chiang and his generals and on 
down to the enlisted men of the New First Army, the Chinese military establishment 
saw ample evidence, time and again, that their allies treated them like America’s 
colonial army.  
 Milton Miles and SACO offered an alternative approach. American soldiers’ 
behavior in Australia and Britain, as well as Chinese troops’ misconduct in Burma 
and India, demonstrated that the presence of foreign troops will almost inevitably 
lead to tensions and misconduct. So while Miles’ emphasis on equality and good 
conduct was not an ipso facto guarantee of better relations, it nevertheless offered 
far more promise in managing the ineluctable challenges inherent in on-the-ground 
alliance building. Had Magruder, Chennault, Stilwell, or even Wedemeyer operated 
more like Miles, many of the Chinese grievances about mistreatment at the hands of 
American servicemen could have been avoided. Magruder could have put together a 




competent team and carried out a more accurate assessment of China’s military 
needs. The 14th Air Force, Services of Supply, and other units could have done far 
more to minimize misconduct, and Stilwell might have been the chief-of-staff and 
military advisor that Chiang always wanted, rather than the foolhardy schemer 
eager to turn China’s military into his personal fiefdom. Most importantly, Miles’ 
approach would have mitigated the pervasive distrust that plagued all levels of Sino-
American military interaction. In the end, however, SACO’s association with Dai Li 
and Miles’ contentious relationship with John Paton Davies, one of the wartime 
American “China Hand” diplomats who fell victim to McCarthyism, doomed the 
organization and its deputy director to infamy in historical memory in both China 
and the United States.122  
 Finally, distrust and tension in military-to-military relations differed in one 
crucial regard compared to other areas of Sino-American interaction: Chinese 
soldiers could fight back. Interpreters, civilians, or hostel workers had little recourse 
when involved in incidents with American servicemen. But soldiers carried firearms. 
The robberies, hold ups, and armed confrontations that occurred frequently during 
the war’s final months added an element of danger not seen since the bandit attacks 
on American convoys in Yunnan in early 1944. During the final months of war in 
Europe, GIs on leave in Britain stayed at local homes and visited pubs with British 
soldiers. Drunkenness and fights still occurred, especially in London, but when 
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Germany surrendered soldiers from both countries celebrated together as allies 
who recognized one another’s contributions to the joint war effort.123 In China, on 
the other hand, the atmosphere resembled a military occupation zone.
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 Soon after Japan’s surrender, Staff Sergeant Earl Revell, a former teacher 
from Madison, South Dakota who had served almost a year in Kunming and Zhijiang 
with the 653rd Engineer Topographic Battalion, composed a poem called “Panorama 
of China.” He wrote: 
If I were an artist with nothing to do, 
I’d paint a picture, a composite view, 
Of historic old China, in which I’d show, 
Visions of contrast, the high and the low, 
There’d be towering mountains, a deep green lea, 
Filthy brats yelling “Ding how” at me. 
High plumed horses, and colorful carts, 
Two-toned dresses on hustling tarts. 
I’d show Chinese coolies, seemingly merry, 
Dejected old women, with too much to carry. 
A dignified old gout with a Fu-Man-Chu beard. 
Bare bottomed children with both ends smeared. 
Temples and tombs and mud houses too, 
Hostels and mountains and marvelous views, 
Houses made of wood, bricks and of mud, 
People covered with scabs, scurvy and crud, 
Poverty and want, men craving for food, 
Picking through garbage, practically nude. 
Stately temples, with horrible smells. 
Stone fronted tombs, a place for the dead, 
Noisy civilians clamoring for bread. 
Grass fringed paddies, swept by the breeze, 
Peasants wading in mud up to their knees. 
 
Ancient idols with legends replete, 
A sensual lass with scars on her f[ee]t 
Creeping roadways, with a spangled theme, 
Alleys that wind like a dope fiends’ dream. 
Rice fields set on the side of a hill, 




A single latrine with privacy nil. 
Two by four shops with shelving bare, 
Gesturing merchants filling the air. 
Narrow gauge sidewalks, more like a shelf, 
Butt-puffing youngster, scratching himself,  
Lumbering carts, hugging the road, 
Non-descript trucks frequently towed,  
Diminutive donkeys loaded for bear, 
Coolie drawn taxis, soaking a fare. 
Determined pedestrians, courting disaster, 
Walking in gutters where movements are faster, 
Chinese drivers all accident bound,  
Weaving and twisting to cover the ground. 
Home made brooms, reed tied to sticks,  
Used on the streets to clean off the bricks. 
Rickshaws and pushcarts, blocking your path, 
Street corner “SLOPIES” needing a bath. 
Soldiers galore with manners quite mild, 
Profile woman, all heavy with child. 
 
Arrogant wretches, picking up snipes, 
Miniature apartments of various types. 
An ugly maiden, a smile on her face, 
Breath smelling of onion, fouling the place, 
A listless housewife, with bound up feet, 
Washing and cooking right out in the street. 
The family wash, a tattle-tale gray, 
Hangs from a cord, blocking the way. 
Families dining from one common bowl, 
Next to a fish store, a horrible hole. 
Chinese Zoot-suiters, flashingly dressed, 
Barefooted beggars looking depressed.  
 
Mud smeared children, clustering about, 
Filling their jugs from a community spout. 
A dutiful mother, with a look of despair, 
Picking the lice from her small child’s hair, 
Capable craftsmen, skilled in their art, 
Decrepit old shacks, falling apart. 
Intricate needlework, out on display, 
Surrounded by rot, filth and decay, 
Elegant baskets, weaved out by hand, 
Odorous shops where leather is tanned. 




An alley-way ship—a black market store, 
Crawling with vermin, no screen on the door. 
 
I’ve neglected the war scars, visible yet, 
But those are the things we want to forget, 
I’m glad I came, but darned anxious to go, 
Give it back to the “Chinks,” I’M READY TO BLOW!1 
 
In his long poem, Revell laid out a scathing critique of the Chinese. Initially, he had 
preferred China to India, describing the country to his wife Leona as poor but full of 
clean, smiling, and hardworking people.2 This early impression, with its echoes of 
Henry Luce and Pearl Buck, faded quickly. Revell became indignant when he 
realized that China bore little resemblance to what he had seen in Hollywood 
movies or the pages of Life magazine.  “Panorama of China” provided catharsis for 
Revell, who had told Leona in February about his desire to write a book about “real 
life” in China.3  
 From Revell’s perspective, the reality of life in China was an all-out assault on 
the senses. The Chinese people, as he described them, were primitive, malodorous, 
disease-ridden, filthy and ugly. The civilians GIs regularly interacted with—
rickshaw pullers, prostitutes, and beggars—sought to cheat them, foul the air they 
breathed, or collect the snipes (cigarette butts) they threw away. Flashy zoot-
suiters, China’s wealthy youth, shirked their duty to defend their country, while in 
the United States everyone served. Being mild-mannered, Chinese soldiers did not 
compare favorably to their manly American or Japanese counterparts. The few 
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positive facets Revell listed, such as the country’s majestic views and capable 
craftsmen, paled in comparison to the litany of negatives. Nearly everything about 
China and its people disgusted or frustrated him. Each interaction he had with a 
local reinforced his feelings of superiority over them. Arrogance, as Reinhold 
Niebuhr wrote, “is the inevitable consequence of the relation of power to 
weakness.”4 It would have been impossible for Revell to see Chinese as equals, or 
even as allies. They were merely “slopes” and “chinks”: obstacles rather than 
partners in the war effort.  
The majority of American troops who served in China shared Revell’s dim 
assessment. Revell claimed that ninety-nine percent of his fellow GIs hated being 
there, and while his figure might not have been exact, it was not far off.5 Many, like 
Revell, enjoyed China when they first arrived. Poverty in India exceeded what GIs 
encountered in Kunming or Chongqing. Ancient-looking temples dotted Yunnan’s 
picturesque countryside, offering a panorama that resembled the more flattering 
representations of China in American popular culture. Local culture had its 
attractions too.  For an Iowan farm boy, or even a college kid from Queens, Peking 
Opera and Chinese banquets were an exciting novelty, albeit one that wore off 
quickly. Daily life in China from the American perspective also meant living with a 
miasma of urine and human feces, maddening inefficiency, lousy hostel food, and 
public behavior that annoyed them, such as spitting and the disregard for traffic 
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laws. Making matters worse, many locals seemed out to harm or take advantage of 
them. Theft reached epidemic levels. Bandits robbed American truck convoys. 
Ordinary people attacked GIs for being in public with Chinese women, many of 
whom were prostitutes provided by local pimps. And the Chinese soldiers who GIs 
trained and equipped rewarded American generosity with hold ups and pilfering. 
Interacting with the Chinese, both soldiers and civilians, thus reinforced American 
servicemen’s feelings of superiority and made it easy to fall back on racist 
presumptions as a way to explain Chinese behavior. The Japanese might have been 
the enemy, but for most GIs in China, the only adversaries they had to deal with 
were Chinese.   
The collective American contempt for China revealed the failure of Huang 
Renlin’s interpreter and hostel programs. Huang believed these alliance-building 
initiatives would convince GIs to look beyond China’s poverty and backwardness. 
The interpreter program, in particular, would show American servicemen that 
Chinese deserved to be treated as equals. Yet on both counts, Huang’s programs fell 
short. The average GI saw interpreters and hostel workers as servants rather than 
comrades, while American commanders understood shortcomings in these 
programs as evidence of Chinese perfidy and incompetence. These failures occurred 
in spite of Chinese investment in money and manpower that was far more 
substantial, in relative terms, than anything the United States provided to China. 
Chongqing drafted students from the country’s best universities to serve as 
interpreters, while feeding, housing, and providing other facilities for American 




servicemen became the second-largest item on China’s national budget by early 
1945. U.S. Lend-Lease aid to China, in contrast, amounted to only 3.2 percent of 
America’s total Lend-Lease aid to foreign countries.6 But because Huang’s initiatives 
failed to meet American standards, U.S. military officers and diplomats never 
recognized how much effort China devoted to these programs, even if it lacked the 
money and administrative capacity to carry them out satisfactorily.  
The hostel and interpreter programs derived from an empathetic 
understanding of how China would look from the American perspective, while much 
of the U.S. military’s failures in China resulted from a remarkable lack of empathy on 
the part of American servicemen. Huang Renlin, He Haoruo, and other senior figures 
behind these programs had spent many years in the United States. They knew that 
daily life in China would frustrate and repulse American troops, so they tried to 
insulate them with western-style living conditions and soldierly, English-speaking 
cultural intermediaries. U.S. Army planners, for their part, understood that any 
American conduct that Chinese soldiers or civilians might interpret as being racist, 
or even arrogant, would play into the hands of Japanese propagandists.  Yet the 
American theater commander attempted to gain unrestricted command over 
China’s military. Other officers forced the commanding general of China’s military 
mission to the United States to give up his airplane seats to make room for white GIs 
and to ride in a colored train car. The Theater Judge Advocate imposed light 
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sentences for violent crimes against civilians, while GIs ordered interpreters to 
carry out manual labor, and sentries shot suspected thieves. With few exceptions, 
such as Milton Miles and SACO, the Americans who served in China did not 
appreciate how their actions looked from the Chinese point of view.  
 From Chinese perspectives, these American shortcomings made the alliance 
more like an occupation. Interpreters seethed at mistreatment, while War Area 
Service Corps staff resented being accused of corruption and dishonesty after 
having channeled so much of the country’s limited resources to ensure that 
American privates could live better than Chinese generals. Soldiers grew weary of 
Americans telling them what to do, while civilians faced numerous dangers. Living 
near a hostel or U.S. military installation increased one’s risk of being harassed, 
assaulted, raped, hit by speeding Jeep or a stray bullet, or even shot to death as a 
suspected thief. Policemen lacked the power to intervene when Americans 
committed crimes yet they also had orders to protect rambunctious GIs blowing off 
steam and seeking out sex while at liberty. Senior officials also had to put the U.S. 
Army’s interests ahead of the people they governed. Long Yun watched commodity 
prices skyrocket and meat supplies dwindle so the WASC could feed GIs in Yunnan. 
Mayor He Yaozu extolled the U.S. Army’s good conduct as the people of Chongqing 
lived in fear of rape and assault. Granting the U.S. Army exclusive jurisdiction over 
American servicemen was a hard pill for some Nationalist officials to swallow, but 
the real problem was the U.S. Army’s failure to maintain discipline and enforce the 




Articles of War. As a result, Chinese from all walks of life were as eager to see the 
Americans go home as Earl Revell and his fellow GIs were to leave.  
 Yet neither Chiang Kai-shek nor the Truman Administration was prepared to 
give China “back to the Chinks” just yet. The August 11, 1945 surrender order 
stipulated that all Japanese troops in China (excluding Manchuria) were to 
surrender to the Chinese Nationalists.7 Yet Chiang’s forces were concentrated in 
southwest China, more than 1,000 miles away from Japanese-occupied coastal cities 
like Shanghai and Tianjin. Both Chiang and Wedemeyer feared that Mao Zedong’s 
Communists would fill the void left by surrendering Japanese troops unless the 
United States intervened. So On August 12, the U.S. Secretary of War approved plans 
for the III Marine Amphibious Corps to land near Tianjin. The marines would take 
control of key port cities and railway junctions to facilitate the disarming of 
Japanese troops and await the arrival of Chiang’s armies, who would be ferried in 
from southwest China aboard U.S. naval vessels and U.S. Army Air Transport 
Command cargo planes. As marines from III Corps prepared to leave Guam and 
Okinawa, General He Yingqin, commander of the Nationalist armies, ordered the 
Japanese to defend themselves against the Communists and await the arrival of 
Nationalists forces. On September 26, the first marines landed in Dagu Bar and 
boarded trains for Tianjin, fifty kilometers inland.8  
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 Within weeks, more than 53,000 marines had landed in northern China, 
occupying Tianjin and nearby Beijing (then known as Beiping), Qingdao on the 
Shandong Peninsula, and the key Yellow Sea port of Qinhuangdao, located 300 
kilometers east of Beijing, where coal from the Kailan mines was shipped to 
Shanghai.9 As the men of III Corps, veterans of the bloodbaths at Peleliu and 
Okinawa, arrived in China, thousands of Chinese lined the streets to welcome them. 
Yet in a matter of days, every source of wartime Sino-American friction returned 
with a vengeance. Fraught encounters revolving around issues of money, crime, 
cultural norms, and sex fueled animosity between marines and the locals. Only now, 
there was no Japanese enemy to hold the alliance together.  
 From the moment marines debarked, their wealth made them targets. “I 
thought I knew what poor was until I went to China,” recalled George Fox of the III 
Corps’ 1st Marine Division, “they would fight to get into the garbage cans.”10 Tianjin 
authorities uncovered widespread collusion between prostitutes and rickshaw 
pullers “to cheat American troops,” with fresh arrivals the preferred quarry.11 
Attempts to regulate rickshaw fares and halt price gouging had no effect.12 Marines 
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10 George Fox Collection, AFC/2001/001/32107, Veterans History Project, Library of Congress, 
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found more trouble with civilian laborers, who stole U.S. government property in 
order to obtain scarce daily necessities and supplement salaries that inflation 
rendered worthless.13 As inflation increased in Beijing during 1946, car theft soared. 
Thirty-three Marine Corps Jeeps going missing between May and December.14 
Another thirty-five U.S. Army vehicles disappeared during shipment to Beijing over 
the same period.15 By early 1947, break-ins occurred daily at warehouses and other 
U.S. military facilities. American troops blamed the theft epidemic on the 
indifference of Chinese police, and they responded by searching private residences 
and businesses while also shooting suspects on the spot. Nearly all victims were 
unarmed, and many were only children.16 
 Suspected thieves were not the only Chinese who experienced violence at the 
hands of American servicemen. Marines began looting in Tianjin just days after they 
first arrived. They also assaulted rickshaw pullers and shopkeepers who tried to 
overcharge them, and beat up Chinese police who happened to intervene.17  On 
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13 BMA, J181-025-01862, J181-027-02550, and J181-027-00543, various theft cases and incident 
report.  
14 BMA, J181-010-00303, p. 47, First Military Police Company, Headquarters Battalion, First Marine 
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15 BMA, J181-010-00303, p. 16–18, Office of the Provost Marshal, Marine Headquarters, Peiping Area, 
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16 TMA, J0219-1-006561, p. 43 李漢元令消費合作社電 [Li Hanyuan to Consumers’ Cooperative], 17 
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17 See, for example, BMA, J181-010-00299, p. 19–22, 內七分局局長金賀呈警察局局長張陳焯電 
[Interior Seventh Precinct Commander Jin He to Beijing Police Chief Chen Zhao], 5 February 1946. Jin 
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November 27, Tianjin police reported the first attempted rape involving a marine.18 
In Shanghai, American misconduct attracted nationwide attention after a sailor 
named Edward Roderick beat to death a rickshaw puller named Zang Da Erzi in 
September 1946.19 Zang’s death was no anomaly. In just three months over the 
winter of 1945 to 1946, Shanghai police reported sixty-seven violent incidents 
involving American servicemen.20 At the end of 1946 in Tianjin, police were still 
investigating forty unsolved crimes, mostly assaults and robberies, committed by 
marines over the past year.21 Most marines and GIs escaped punishment unless 
American MPs caught them in the act, as American investigators continued to 
distrust Chinese testimony and police reports. Misconduct among American MPs 
also proved to be a problem, and they committed crimes ranging from public 
intoxication to murder. Corporal Frank Aldrich of the 701st Military Police Battalion 
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was sentenced to life in prison for drowning two Chinese civilians, whom he pushed 
off a bridge in Nanjing after a heavy drinking session with his fellow MPs.22  
Clashing cultural norms, negligence, and reckless driving also led to 
resentment, injury, and death. In Qingdao, around fifty dancing clubs and more than 
400 cafes and restaurants catering to marines opened by early 1946.23 Prostitutes 
plied their trade at many of these businesses, leading to complex dynamics of public 
male-female interaction, such as this scene of a marine and a local woman in Figure 
6.1 [See Below], that were perhaps consensual, perhaps coerced or paid for, but 
alien to Chinese culture. Practical jokes, such as throwing fire crackers at 
pedestrians from Jeeps and hotel windows, led to complaints wherever American 
servicemen were deployed.24 People feared that Americans were shooting at them, 
not an unreasonable conclusion considering that marines and GIs shot at birds and 
power line insulators from moving vehicles and also went hunting in city parks.25 
Stray bullets sometimes wounded or killed, but vehicle accidents remained the chief 
cause of injury and death. The Tianjin Police Bureau recorded 114 such accidents 
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caused by American servicemen during 1946.26 Between October 1945 and January 
1946, police in Beijing found American servicemen at least partially at fault for 
eighty-three accidents, the majority causing injuries or deaths.27 According to an 
investigation by a reporter at the Minzhu bao [民主報] newspaper, American Jeeps 
and trucks killed more than 1,000 people in China between Japan’s surrender and 
July 1946.28  
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Figure 6.1: A U.S. marine with a local woman outside a bar in Qingdao.29 
 
 American involvement in China’s black markets also heightened tensions. 
Marines pilfered U.S. government property and sold it to Chinese civilians just as GIs 
had done during the war. When Chinese police or American MPs attempted to 
confiscate this property, civilians protested by insisting that they had paid for it and 
that the marines who stole it should be punished instead. Several higher-ranking 
American officers also perpetrated large-scale smuggling operations. Colonel Leslie 
Narum, the head U.S. quartermaster in Tianjin, colluded with men under his 
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command and Chinese businessmen to oversee a massive smuggling ring that 
brought pharmaceuticals, medicine, and automobiles from the United States and 
traded them for furs and Chinese antiquities.30 In Taipei, Lieutenant Colonel William 
Evans, the chief civil affairs officer for the U.S. Army in Taiwan, stole sixty kilograms 
worth of Japanese gold coins that were supposed to be given to the Nationalists and 
sold them in Shanghai.31 Narum was convicted, but Evans was acquitted despite the 
overwhelming evidence against him, which led to a minor diplomatic crisis between 
Washington and Chiang’s beleaguered government.  
 Once again, however, the most serious source of contention between 
American servicemen and the locals was sex. On Christmas Eve 1946, two marines 
allegedly raped a Peking University student named Shen Chong at a polo field in 
Beijing. Resentment against American servicemen had been building ever since the 
weeks following Japan’s surrender, as widespread misconduct and well-publicized 
crimes, such as the Zang Da Erzi murder, attracted attention around the country. 
Full-scale civil war between the Nationalists and Communists (CCP) had broken out 
earlier in 1946, and the alleged rape provided the CCP with an effective tool for 
attacking the U.S. military and branding the Nationalists as traitors who had allowed 
the American imperialists to run roughshod over Chinese sovereignty. By late 1946, 
the CCP had infiltrated student movements at universities across the country, and 
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on December 30, student protest groups in Beijing began a strike as other student 
groups established “Anti-American Brutality” associations across the country.  
 The CCP-led Anti-American Brutality movement became the largest 
nationwide protest demonstration in China since the 1919 May Fourth Movement. 
Protesters marched in more than twenty Chinese cities, including Kunming, 
Chengdu, and Chongqing, where the Jeep Girl Crisis had broken out more than a 
year-and-a-half ago. A U.S. courts martial convicted Corporal William Pierson and 
Private Warren Pritchard of rape in early 1947, but the newly formed U.S. 
Department of Defense overturned the verdict later that same year, sparking 
another round of nationwide protests. Scholars in China have recently argued that 
Shen Chong was an underground Communist agent, implying that her rape was a 
fabrication.32 Whether or not the rape occurred, however, is immaterial. By the end 
of December 1946, any Chinese who had spent time near the U.S. military anywhere 
in the country would have believed that Pierson and Pritchard were guilty. For 
years, they had lived with drunkenness, reckless driving, violent misconduct, and 
other abuses. Many people from all walks of life supported the protesters’ demand 
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that American troops “roll out” of China. The U.S. withdrawal of Americans troops 
from all cities in China except Qingdao, where they U.S. Navy trained Chinese sailors, 
was already underway, so while the protests might have hastened the withdrawal, 
they did not make a decisive difference.33 But the protesters’ message still resonated 
deeply with all the people who had lived near American servicemen and witnesses 
such conduct with their own eyes, or merely heard about it through rumors and 
newspaper articles.  
 The greatest irony of the U.S. military presence in China during World War II 
and the months after Japan’s surrender was that it helped the Communists win the 
Chinese Civil War and consolidate power during the early 1950s. Even by early 
1945, the American military presence had become a liability to the Nationalists, 
largely as a result of American servicemen’s misconduct. After Japan’s surrender, 
the Communists no longer felt compelled to hold back their criticism about the 
American military presence. Although U.S. financial and military support for the 
Nationalists was the core issue at stake for the CCP, they mobilized domestic 
opposition to the United States by drawing attention to GI behavior in China. After 
the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the CCP launched its Resist American and 
Aid Korea campaign. As Figure 6.2, an image from an educational pamphlet 
published in October 1950, demonstrates, American misconduct in China played a 
central role in this campaign as well. In this cartoon [See figure 6.2], two intoxicated 
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GIs plow over a Chinese pedestrian in speeding Jeep. An American military 
policeman beats up a Chinese civilian instead of arresting the men in the Jeep, as 
another GI assaults a Chinese woman in the background. Based on standard 
histories of U.S.-China relations, this image seems like overblown CCP propaganda. 
And yet, it is actually quite accurate—a portrayal of the American presence that 
resonated in postwar China. And because the Communists shut out alternative 
interpretations of the wartime alliance, this image remained orthodoxy in China 
until well into the 1980s.  
 
Figure 6.2: American Violence in China.34  
 
  Rethinking the history of American servicemen in China opens up a window 
onto how, during the Second World War, Americans carved out for themselves a 
new role in Asia. After Pearl Harbor, U.S. Army planners recognized that the 
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presumptions of racial superiority that undergirded American colonialism in the 
Philippines and the treaty port world in China had become liabilities in the war 
against Japan. The U.S. partnership with China thus became the country’s first 
nominally equal alliance with a non-Western nation. But the alliance that unfolded 
on the ground in China was a relationship of American domination and Chinese 
subordination. Exclusive jurisdiction and lackadaisical military policing fueled 
misconduct and aggravated longstanding resentment over unequal treatment. 
Economic dependence on the U.S. military fueled boomtown economies based on 
sex and alcohol and compelled the central government to adopt domestic policies 
that made life harder on locals. Distorted power relations also combined with 
racism to convince American military officers to see themselves as tutors of a 
Chinese military moving toward its inevitable Americanization. This pattern 
continued in China after Japan’s surrender and followed U.S. forces around Asia 
throughout the Cold War and beyond.  
 Traces of the American military presence in wartime China can be found in 
every Asian country that has hosted the U.S. military. Former R&R destinations like 
Pattaya, Thailand, and base areas, such as Angeles City in the Philippines, have 
become the epicenters of global sex tourism, while sex and alcohol based 
boomtowns still exist around U.S. bases even in wealthier places like Yokosuka and 
Seoul. Status of Forces Agreements provide the U.S. military with exclusive 
jurisdiction, and in instances where host country populations believe that the 
Americans are not enforcing the law, anti-Americanism simmers, particularly in 




response to sex crimes. In South Korea, the U.S. military retains ultimate authority 
over the country’s armed forces, and well-educated, English-speaking Korean 
Augmentation to the United States Army (KATUSA)—pulled from Korea’s leading 
universities—serve alongside less educated GIs, fueling class and racial tensions. Yet 
policymakers in these countries, with the exception of the Senate of the Philippines 
in 1991, have continued to believe that the security benefits deriving from the 
American military presence outweigh its negative effects, the same conclusion 
Chiang Kai-shek made during and after World War II. Barring unforeseen 
developments, President Barak Obama’s Pivot to Asia and calls in Vietnam and the 
Philippines for the return of American troops, ensures that Asians will be living with 
the U.S. military for a long time to come. 
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Jeep Girl Crisis: Sex in Wartime Sino-American Relations.” San Diego, CA. June 
2016 (Organized Panel) 
 Association for Asian Studies in Asia, Annual Conference: “Making Our Allied 
Friends at Home in China: The Chinese War Area Service Corps’ Hostel and 
Cross-Cultural Programs for American Servicemen, 1941–1945.” Kyoto, Japan. 
June 2016.  
 Graduate Student Political History Conference: “GIs and Chinese Women: the 
1945 Jeep Girl Crisis. Boston University, Boston, MA. March 2015.  
 Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Annual Meeting: “’Neither 
Haughty Nor Humble’: Chinese Interpreters and American Soldiers in Wartime 
China.” Lexington, KY. June 2015. (Organized Panel) 
 International Conference on the Anti-Japanese War and Modern International 
Relations: “Zhongguo yiyuan yu Meijun shibing: chubu tuiduan” 中国译员与美军
士兵：初步推断 [A Preliminary Study in Interaction between Chinese 
Interpreters and American Soldiers in Wartime China]. Chongqing University, 
Chongqing, China. November 2013. 
 International Workshop on China, World War II, and the Politics of Memory: 
“Chinese Interpreters and American Soldiers in Wartime China, 1942–1945.” 
The University of Hong Kong, China. April 2013.  
 New England Historical Association Annual Meeting: “The U.S. Marine Mission in 
North China.” Merrimack College, North Andover, MA. October 2012.  
 London School of Economics/George Washington University/University of 
California, Santa Barbara Graduate Student Conference on the Cold War: 
“Occupational Hazards: U.S. Marines in China and the End of the Special 
Relationship.” The London School of Economics, London, United Kingdom. April 
2012.  
 British Association of American Studies Annual Meeting: “Minstrelsy in 
Shanghai: The American Company, Shanghai Volunteer Corps and American 
Culture in Treaty Port China.” The University of Manchester, Manchester, United 
Kingdom. April 2012.  
 The Barnes Club Graduate Student Conference: “Creating the Bogeyman: The 
Impact of the Sino-Soviet Rift on Kennedy Administration Perceptions of 
Chinese Intentions in Vietnam.” Temple University, Philadelphia, PA. March 
2011.  
Invited Talks 
 Workshop on War Memory and the International Politics of War-Related 
Heritage in East Asia: Title TBA. Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan. December 
2016.  
 Massachusetts Historical Society: “China’s World War II Interpreter Program.” 
Boston, MA. November 2015.  




 Boston University Center for the Study of Asia: Discussant for Lyle Goldstein, 
“Meeting China Halfway.” Book Event, Boston. October 2015.  
 Boston University Center for the Study of Asia:  “American GIs and Chinese 
Women: the 1945 Chongqing Jeep Girl Crisis.” Lunch Seminar Talk, Boston, MA. 
February 2015.  
 The Chinese Expeditionary Army Memorial Dedication Ceremony: 
““Xianghuzunzhong: zhanshi Yunnan ZhongMei guanxi de jishi” 相互尊重：云南
中美关系的基石 [Mutual Respect: The  Cornerstone of Cooperative U.S.-Chinese 
Relations in Wartime Yunnan]. Longling, Yunnan, China. September 2013.  
TEACHING EXPERIENCE 
Boston University 
 As Instructor 
 HI 332: History of International Relations, 1900–1945. Summer 2013. 
 HI 334: History of International Relations Since 1945. Summer 2012.  
 As Teaching Fellow and Seminar Leader 
 HI 190: Community and Conflict in Boston’s Past. Fall 2012.  
 HI 301: A History of Women in the United States. Fall 2011.  
 HI 334: History of International Relations Since 1945. Spring 2011. 
 HI 332: History of International Relations, 1900–1945. Fall 2010.  
Phillips Exeter Academy, Exeter, New Hampshire 
 As Instructor 
 English Writing for Non-Native Speakers. Summer 2012.  
Kaplan Education Pre-Master’s Degree Bridge Program, Chengdu, China 
 As Instructor 
 Research Methods and Thesis Writing. 2007-2009. 
 Principles of Management. 2007-2009. 
 International Business. 2007-2009.  
The University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, China 
 As Instructor 
 Written and Oral English. 2004–2007.  
RESEARCH EXPERIENCE 
United States 
 National Archives, Hoover Institution, U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center, U.S. 
Army Heritage and Education Center, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, 
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Harvard University, Library of Congress. 
China 
 National Library-Beijing, Second Historical Archives-Nanjing, Beijing 
Municipal Archives, Tianjin Municipal Archives, Shanghai Municipal Archives, 
Chongqing Municipal Archives, Yunnan Provincial Archives, Sichuan 
University Archives. 





 Academia Historica Archives, Party History Archives, Academia Sinica 
Institute for Modern History.  
Myanmar 
 Myanmar National Archives-Yangon.  
Singapore 
 Singapore National Archives. 
United Kingdom 
 Churchill College Archives, The National Archives.  
 
BOOK REVIEWS  
 “Review of Lyle Goldstein, Meeting China Halfway: How to Defuse the Emerging 
US-China Rivalry,” H-DIPLO, H-Net Reviews, September 2015.  
 “Review of Ch’i Hsi-sheng 齐锡生, Jianbanuzhang de mengyou: Taipingyang 
zhanzheng qijian ZhongMei junshi hezuo guanxi, 1941–1945” 剑拔弩张的盟友：
太平洋战争期间中美军事合作关系 (1941–1945) [Allies at Daggers Drawn: U.S.-
China Military Cooperation in the Pacific War, 1941-1945], The Journal of 
American-East Asian Relations 22 (2015): 76–78.  
 “Review of Norton Wheeler, The Role of American NGOs in China’s 
Modernization: Invited Influence,” H-DIPLO, H-Net Reviews, July 2015.  
 “Review of John Paton Davies, Jr., China Hand: An Autobiography,” Frontiers of 
History in China, 10:4 (December 2012): 647-650. 
 “Review of Michael Hunt and Steven Levine, Arc of Empire: America’s Wars in 
Asia from the Philippines to Vietnam,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 
25:4 (December 2012): 690-692. 
 “Review of Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in 
Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations,” H-DIPLO, H-Net Reviews, December 
2012.  
 “Review of Robert J. Lieber, Power and Willpower in the American Future: Why 
the United States Is Not Destined to Decline,” H-DIPLO, H-Net Reviews, October 
2012. 
 “Review of Zhihua Shen and Danhui Li, After Leaning to One Side: China and its 
Allies in the Cold War,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 25:3 
(September 2012): 476-478. 
 “Review of Guoqi Xu, Chinese and Americans: A Shared History,” forthcoming in 
Frontiers of History in China. 
PROFESSIONAL AND PRE-DOCTORAL ACTIVITIES 
Professional Service 
 Proofreader, Frontiers of History in China, 2010–2014. 
 Manuscript Reviewer, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 2012–2013.  




Research Assistantships  
 Research Assistant for Brooke Blower, 2015.  
Pre-Doctoral Service 
 Organizer and Director, Graduate Student Workshop on Preparing Manuscripts 
for Submission to Academic Journals, 2012–2013.  
 Co-President, History Department Graduate Student Organization, 2010–2012. 
 Co-Chair, History Department Professional Development Committee, 2011–
2012. 
 Organizer, American Political History Conference, 2011.  
 Department Representative, Graduate Student Organization, 2010.  
PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS 
 Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations 
 American Historical Association 
 Society for Military History 
 Association for Asian Studies 
LANGUAGES 
 Mandarin Chinese, Full Professional Proficiency. 
 Spanish, Reading.  
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